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Abstract 
The Yale Center for Faith and Culture has held seven Consultations on God and Human Flourishing, 
2007 to 2013, where it was affirmed that human relation to God is reason enough for human 
flourishing. The seven consultations indicate a growing conversation on God and human flourishing in 
theology. With this is mind the three female theologians are considered and argued to be important as 
participants in a conversation on God and human flourishing. The three female theologians are Serene 
Jones, a feminist theologian, Ellen Charry a systematic-pastoral theologian, and Jennifer Herdt, a 
virtue ethicist.   
Serene Jones is presented in the thesis as the first voice to engage theologically with the notions of 
happiness and human flourishing from a feminist critical position. Serene Jones argues, by means of 
feminist theory, that gendered constructions of women’s nature are present in readings of doctrine and 
Scripture. The way in which happiness and human flourishing is understood to characterise the lives 
of women is consequently challenged and critiqued. Due to the oppressive logic inherent in gender 
insensitive readings of doctrine and Scripture, Serene Jones opts for a re-reading where the agency of 
women is affirmed. The doctrines of justification and sanctification are re-formulated by Serene Jones 
as justifying and sanctifying grace. Grace is described by Serene Jones as an envelope that enfolds the 
substance of women, presenting women with a redemptive narrative that they are able to identify with. 
Serene Jones’ contribution lies in her affirmation of the graced agency of women.  
Ellen Charry, a female theologian who is concerned with the salutary effect of knowledge on an 
individual represents the second voice. Ellen Charry understands the dichotomy between goodness 
and pleasure established by modernity to be false. In the notion of asherism Ellen Charry seeks to 
bridge the gap by asserting that obedience to God’s commandments evokes both goodness and 
pleasure. Pleasure is described as the enjoyment of God and creation. Ellen Charry goes further by 
affirming that God enjoys creation when creation flourishes. A mutual enjoyment between God and 
creation takes place which brings about a happy disposition. Happiness accordingly is a way of life 
established through a particular knowledge of God attained when one obeys God’s norm for living. In 
addition, happiness is not just marked by an excellent life but also by the enjoyment of both God and 
creation. Ellen Charry contributes to the conversation by affirming that happiness is established when 
humans and God flourish.  
Jennifer Herdt, a virtue ethicist, starts with the secularisation of moral thought present since the 
sixteenth century. The secularisation of moral thought caused morality to be separated from its 
religious moorings. A shift in emphasis occurred, moving from the person doing the action to the 
action itself. With this shift in emphasis the possibility of virtue to bring humans into relation with 
God through grace was negated. The result was a recapitulated Augustinian anxiety of acquired virtue. 
Jennifer Herdt seeks to negate the Augustinian anxiety by returning the emphasis to the agent of the 
action. Jennifer Herdt delineates an account of mimetic performance, where she argues that by 
imitating a divine exemplar through virtue, grace progressively brings one into relation with God. 
Virtue is a means by which an individual partakes in and is formed by a liturgy. As virtue is practiced 
the agent participates in God, an act denoting happiness. Jennifer Herdt’s account of human happiness 
takes into consideration how virtue assimilates an agent to Christ.  
From the three female perspectives, happiness and human flourishing is understood to pertain to one’s 
relation to God, a perspective which resonates with the God and Human Flourishing Consultations. In 
light of the female theological contributions, the suggestion that each female theological voice may be 
important for a diverse conversation on God and human flourishing as well as future initiatives for 
God and Human Flourishing is warranted.   
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Opsomming 
Die “Yale Center for Faith and Culture” het sewe konsultasies gehad, 2007 tot 2013, oor “God and 
Human Flourishing” waar daar beklemtoon is dat die menslike verhouding tot God genoegsame rede 
is vir menslike florering. Die sewe konsultasies weerspieël ŉ toenemende gesprek oor God en 
menslike florering in teologie. Dié toenemende gesprek het daartoe gelei dat drie vroulike stemme 
geidentifiseer word en geargumenteer word dat hulle belangrike deelnemers in ŉ gesprek rondom God 
en menlike florering is. Die drie vroulike stemme is Serene Jones, ŉ feministiese teoloog, Ellen 
Charry, ŉ sistematies-pastorale teoloog, en Jennifer Herdt, ŉ deugde etikus.  
Serene Jones word in die tesis eerste aangebied om teologies, vanuit ŉ feministies kritiese oogpunt, in 
gesprek te tree met die konsepte van geluk en menslike florering. Serene Jones argumenteer, deur 
middel van feministiese teorie, dat geslagskonstruksies van vrouens se natuur teenwoordig is in die 
lees van die Bybel en leerstellings. Die konsepte van geluk en florering, wat beskrywende woorde is, 
moet daarom ook krities gelees word en by tye uitgedaag word. Weens die geslags onsensitiewe lees 
van die Bybel en leerstellinge, onderneem Serene Jones om die leerstellings van regverdiging en 
heiligmaking te heroorweeg, met die klem op vrouens se agentskap. Die leerstelllings van 
regverdiging en heiligmaking word heroorweeg en benoem as geregverdigde en geheiligde genade. 
Genade word deur Serene Jones beskryf as ŉ koevert wat die wese van vrouens omvou. Vrouens word 
hiermee van ŉ verlossingsnarratief voorsien waarmee hulle kan identifiseer. Serene Jones se bydrae lê 
dus in haar prioriteit teenoor vrouens se genadigde agentskap.   
Ellen Charry, ŉ vroue teoloog wat besorg is oor die pastorale effek van kennis, verteenwoordig die 
tweede stem. Ellen Charry is krities oor die tweedeling van goedheid en genot wat deur die 
modernisme ingestel is en beskou dit as vals. Deur die konsep van asherisme probeer Ellen Charry die 
tweedeling oorbrug deur te argumenteer dat gehoorsaamheid aan God se gebooie beide goedheid en 
genot meebring. Sy beskryf genot as die wedersydse plesier wat mense beleef wanneer hulle God 
geniet deur gehoorsaam te wees aan God. Ellen Charry gaan verder deur te verduidelik dat God ook 
die mensdom geniet wanneer die mensdom floreer en God daardeur floreer. Die wedersydse florering 
van beide skepping en God bring ŉ gelukkige disposisie mee. Geluk word vervolgens beskryf as ŉ 
manier van leef, gebaseer op die uitlewing van die kennis wat deur God se gebooie geopenbaar word. 
Ellen Charry dra by tot die gesprek van geluk en florering deur die wedersydse genot wat mens en 
God beleef as kardinaal te beskou vir die verstaan van geluk.  
Jennifer Herdt, ŉ deugde etikus en die derde vroulike stem, begin met die verwêreldliking van 
moraliteit wat sedert die sestiende eeu teenwoordig is. Die verwêreldliking van morele nadenke het 
moraliteit en godsdiens van mekaar geskei. Die skeiding van moraliteit en godsdiens het tot gevolg 
gehad dat die klem verskuif is van die agent na handeling self. Met dié verskuiwing is die rol van 
genade om die agent geleidelik in gemeenskap met God te bring ondermyn. Die resultaat was die 
herhaling van die Augustiniese angs oor verkrygde deugde. Jennifer Herdt probeer die Augustiniese 
angs vermy deur die klem weer op die agent te laat val. Die konsep van nabootsende uitvoerings word 
deur Jennifer Herdt gebruik om te beskryf hoe die individu wat deugde beoefen, deur die nabootsing 
van Christus, toenemend in verhouding met God gebring word deur middel van genade. Deugde is ŉ 
wyse waarop ŉ persoon deelneem aan en gevorm word deur ŉ bepaalde liturgie. Wanneer die persoon 
deugde beoefen, word daar deelgeneem aan God deur Christus, ŉ daad wat geluk vergestalt. Jennifer 
Herdt se weergawe van menslike geluk neem in ag hoe ŉ persoon geassimileer word tot God deur 
deugde te beoefen.  
Deur die drie vroulike stemme se bydrae word daar verstaan dat geluk en die florering van mense 
verband hou met hulle verhouding tot God, ŉ perspektief wat resoneer met die “God and Human 
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Flourishing Consultations.” In die lig van die onderskeie vroulik teologiese bydrae, is die voorstel dat 
elke stem belangrik is vir ŉ gediversifiseerde gesprek oor God en menslike florering so wel as 
toekomstige initiatiewe waar daar besin word oor God en menslike florering geregverdig. 
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Chapter 1 
On God and human flourishing 
1.1 Introduction 
The question of happiness and human flourishing is one asked in various academic disciplines, 
yielding a diversity of perspectives. Some disciplines articulate their understanding in view of the 
health sciences and others in terms of the social sciences. A third category of voices, namely, 
theological reflection, has been added to the diversity of perspectives. In each instance a different 
rendition of happiness and human flourishing is brought to the fore.  
An example of the growing conversation within theology is The God and Human Flourishing 
Consultations held from 2007 to present by the Yale Centre for Faith and Culture. Its contributions 
span from themes such as “Good Power- Divine and Human” (2007), “God’s Power and Human 
Flourishing” (2008), “The Same God?” (2009), “Desire and Human Flourishing” (2010), “Happiness 
and Human Flourishing” (2011), “Joy and Human Flourishing” (2012) to “Respect and Human 
Flourishing” (2013).  
The thesis is situated within the growing theological conversation on God and Human Flourishing. As 
three female voices engage with the notion of happiness and human flourishing a diversity of 
perspectives come to the fore. The thesis consequently makes a contribution to the growing 
conversation by indicating what three female theologians could possibly say about happiness and 
human flourishing when presented with the question “in which way do Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and 
Jennifer Herdt contribute to theology’s engagement with happiness and human flourishing?” The three 
female voices form part of lively conversation while engaging distinctively from their own theological 
thought processes.  
The concept “human flourishing”, understood theologically, seeks to uphold and appreciate gender, 
health and theology respectively while bearing in mind their dynamic relation to another. As such 
Serene Jones, a feminist theologian warns the reader of the myriad ways in which gendered 
constructions can negate the flourishing of women. Ellen Charry, a pastoral-systematic theologian, 
underscores the importance of a life lived excellently and Jennifer Herdt, a virtue ethicist, understands 
the Christian narrative to provide a liturgy wherein individuals may flourish. In all three instances 
theology is the centre around which happiness and human flourishing may be formulated. In light of 
the Gender, Health and Theology pilot programme at the University of Stellenbosch, this intersection 
proves to be fruitful for the conversation.  
One might be tempted to think that a theological reflection minds itself only with the apparently 
theological. This, however, is not the case. A theological reflection on happiness and human 
flourishing is one marked by collaboration; where theory and theology are complementary to another. 
Here, an individual is understood in relation to self, society, ecology and God. Happiness and human 
flourishing, from a theological perspective, accordingly asks how one’s relating to others and self 
either affirms happiness and flourishing or negates it. In addition, it is asked “how is this relation 
constitutive of happiness and human flourishing?” 
The question of happiness and human flourishing is one asked by a variety of disciplines. In each case, 
the account reflects the presiding presuppositions within the discipline. Theological reflection presents 
a rendition of happiness that is dynamic and ever changing. Three female theologians who are 
believed to contribute to the question of happiness and human flourishing will be considered. In no 
way should their contributions be understood as contradicting the other, instead, complementarity is 
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key. It is to be expected that a difference in opinions might exist. This however serves to enrich 
instead of subvert.  
1.2 The three female voices 
Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt are three female theologians who have in some way 
joined the theological conversation on human flourishing. Serene Jones is a Yale graduate and former 
professor at Yale (1991-2008), Ellen Charry, a Luce post-doctoral fellow at Yale Divinity School 
(1989-1991) and Jennifer Herdt, Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School since 2010.  
The first female theologian is Serene Jones, who is President and Johnston Family Professor for 
religion and democracy at Union Theological Seminary. Prior to accepting a lecturing position at 
Union Theological Seminary Serene Jones studied and taught at Yale Divinity School, where she 
acquired her PhD in 1999. She taught at Yale Divinity School for 17 years (Waddle, 2010). Jones 
notes that her relationship to Yale Divinity School extends beyond teaching to the formative years 
when her father was pursuing his B.D and PhD at Yale Divinity School. She states that, “after twenty-
six years, Yale has seeped into my bones” (Babakian, 2010).  
Serene Jones describes her teaching style as follows (Waddle, 2010):  
What I spend most of my time doing is trying to engage and expand [students’] imaginations and hence 
their deepest desires. I teach and write to their imaginative universes - to the landscape of images, 
expectations, and possibilities that form the dramatic mental worlds in which their thoughts unfold. 
Jones was involved in a few “exciting collaborative endeavours” at Yale Divinity School (Waddle, 
2010). Waddle further indicates that Jones worked “interdisciplinary with the Faculty of Law and Arts 
and Sciences. She was particularly involved in The Department of Religious Studies, The Department 
of African American Studies, and The Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies program” (Waddle, 
2010). Jones describes the Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies program as “a community marked 
by academic earnestness and lively intellectual commitment” (Waddle, 2010).   
Serene Jones understands her theological contribution as culminating from the lived experiences of 
her church community, students and Tuesday-night group (Jones, 2000: ii). In total, Serene Jones has 
published 37 articles and three books, including: Trauma and Grace: Theology in a Ruptured World 
(2009), Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of Grace (2000) and Calvin and the 
Rhetoric of Piety (1995). She also co-edited, Feminist and Womanist Essays in Reformed Dogmatics 
(Pauw & Jones, 2006), Constructive Theology: A Contemporary Engagement with Classical Themes 
(Jones & Lakeland, 2005), Liberating Eschatology: Essays in Honour of Letty Russell (1999) and 
Setting the Table: Women Theological Conversation (Nakashima, Camp & Jones, 1995) (Waddle, 
2010).  
She also serves as full time minister at the Disciples of Christ Church and the United Church of Christ 
(Jones, 2000:10), which testifies to her commitment to be an “imparter of faith” instead of only a 
“scholar of faith” (Babakian, 2010). Intellectual rigor without spiritual rigor leads to a situation where 
“students, as a result, do not always have mentors who can guide them on a journey that is both 
spiritual and intellectual,” argues Jones (Babakian, 2010).  
On the 1st of July 2008, Serene Jones began her career as the President of Union Theological Seminary 
in New York, where she was the first female president in 172 years. Jones motivates her acceptance of 
the position at Union Theological Seminary by stating that, “what you see happening globally 
parallels what was happening 500 years ago when this little guy named John Calvin got run out of 
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Paris” (Babakian, 2010). Genine Babakian observes the parallel Jones makes to the context of Calvin 
(Babakian, 2010):  
She points to many forces that are challenging people and communities of faith: The battle scars of 
violence, the often-divisive influence of religion and the economic problems that pushed many to the 
brink of poverty and increased the suffering of those already living on the edge.  
Serene Jones’ orientation toward happiness and flourishing is captured in an interview done by Bill 
Moyer in the television show “The Journal”, which hints at an uncommodified rendition of happiness. 
Jones is recorded telling Bill Moyer (Babakian, 2010): 
Today’s crisis is a crisis of values, we can never underestimate the crisis of desire. Turbo-capitalism takes 
over your desire, turning you into a creature who wants commodities. But in churches another kind of 
desire should be being crafted. That’s where you can get in their bones and really begin to force the 
question: What makes you happy?  
She also assigns a similar role to graduate students entering communities of faith whose orientation 
needs “to be less about moral obligation and more about delight” (Babakian, 2010). 
The second female theologian that will be discussed is Ellen Charry, a Margaret W. Harmon Professor 
of Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, where she teaches an array of classes from an 
introduction to Systematic Theology to Judaism, Christianity and interreligious dialogue. Her interest 
in theology developed from her first position as a social worker. In an interview with Ellen Charry for 
Christianity Today, it is conveyed: “She was a social worker in New York and Philadelphia who 
became dissatisfied with the purely practical nature of her work. Searching for a way to ‘put my feet 
and my head together,’ Charry found her way to Temple University’s Department of Religion” 
(Stafford, 1999: 47).  
Ellen Charry is described as “a pert woman whose words seem to come out of her mouth entangled 
with her whole life. You can’t listen to Charry for long without noticing that she is very smart, but not 
showoff smart. She seems to care about everything and everybody—especially about how God helps 
people” (Stafford, 1999: 47). A similar line of thinking runs through Ellen Charry’s book By the 
renewing of your minds: The pastoral function of Christian doctrine (1997a), where she sought to 
deconstruct the way one thinks about God in order to bring forth a reading of Scripture that transforms 
the mind.  
Ellen Charry reminds the reader: “I am interested in the flourishing of people because I am a mother!” 
(Stafford, 1999: 47) The Stafford describes Charry’s motivation as (Stafford, 1999: 47):  
the experience of motherhood gave her an insight into the character of God: that he wants us to flourish. 
Therefore theology, which teaches us to know God, must nourish human lives. That is a notion wildly at 
variance with the world-view of theologians in the last few hundred years. Theology is more usually about 
getting things right, establishing a system of truth, and protecting against error. Charry is concerned with 
those matters, too, but she believes the point of the exercise is to help people. And so it was, she contends, 
for Christian theologians through most of history. 
In 2010, Ellen Charry contributed to the conversation on happiness when she wrote the book God and 
the art of happiness (2010). At the Interfaith Summit on Happiness, Ellen Charry states: “it is true that 
we have had a glut of books on happiness but we have not had happiness from theologians and 
particularly not from Christian theologians” (Reflections on the Interfaith Summit on Happiness, 
2010). Charry motivates her reason for writing on happiness further (Reflections on the Interfaith 
Summit on Happiness, 2010):  
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I thought about happiness and why I wanted to write about happiness from a distinctively Christian 
perspective but even more so from an Augustinian perspective. The reason I concluded was that 
Christians are skittish to talk about happiness because some Christians perceive happiness and goodness 
to be in tension with one another. If Christians have a choice between being happy and being good they 
want to be good and they are willing to forego happiness in order to be good and obedient.    
She continues to describe her rationale in the following manner (Reflections on the Interfaith Summit 
on Happiness, 2010): 
I wanted to move through the dualism (between goodness and piety) and find ‘a both-and’ in the middle. 
To do so I went, in all honesty, to the Bible. The word ashrey came up which depicts a biblical 
understanding of what it means to be happy. I think it is both appropriate for the Jewish and Christian 
tradition. What I concluded is that the Jewish and Christian traditions are very interested in having people 
obedient to God, that is to say, the way of life God puts forth for us in Scripture and the tradition’s 
elaboration of Scripture which is meant to offer a way of life. A good way of life. A way of life that is 
both for the well-being of the community and that in enabling the creation to flourish God is pleased with 
us for being obedient to enabling creation to flourish. When we enable the creation to flourish, we 
flourish. When we flourish in that way, we are happy. We and God enjoy one another, enjoying creation.  
Ellen Charry’s consideration of happiness through flourishing is premised on the creation account in 
Genesis 1, where God creates in order that creation may flourish (Reflections on the Interfaith Summit 
on Happiness, 2010).  
The literature that has developed from Ellen Charry’s concern for the flourishing of creation is in 
total: six books, thirty-one essays, thirty-two articles, excluding her contributions as editor of 
Theology Today from 1997-2004, and her contributions to academic and ecclesial services. Charry is 
currently involved in a theological commentary on Psalms 1-50 (Brazos Theological Commentary on 
the Bible, 2013). 
The third female theologian to be discussed is Jennifer Herdt, who is the Gilbert A. Stark Professor of 
Christian Ethics, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at Yale Divinity School. Courses taught by 
Herdt include Political Theology, Virtue and Hypocrisy and Imago Dei and Human Dignity. Prior to 
teaching at Yale Divinity School, Herdt taught at the University of Notre Dame for ten years.  
The Yale Divinity School profile on Jennifer Herdt describes her interests as including early-modern 
and modern moral thought, classical and contemporary virtue ethics, and contemporary Protestant 
social ethics and political theology (Waddle, 2011). Herdt has been the “recipient of Carey Senior 
Fellowship at the Erasmus Institute (2004–2005), a postdoctoral fellowship from the Centre for 
Philosophy of Religion (1998–99), a Mellon Graduate Prize Fellowship from the University Centre 
for Human Values at Princeton University (1992), and a Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities (1989)” 
(Waddle, 2011).  
In an interview done with Ray Waddle, Jennifer Herdt describes how her reflection on social 
structures and social moral order started from as early as childhood (Waddle, 2011). Waddle recalls 
(2011): 
 
At age 5, she and her family moved from the American Midwest to the Philippines and saw poverty on a 
global scale. Her father, an agricultural economist, took a position there to work with an international 
team of researchers to create new, productive strains of rice to improve harvests and ease the crisis of 
world hunger.  
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Waddle quotes Jennifer Herdt (Waddle, 2011): 
 
I saw so much abject poverty all around me there. It gave me a strong feeling of gratitude for all that we 
had – also a strong sense of the contingency of my condition: I just happened to be born into a family that 
was not poor. This really impressed on me a sense of social responsibility. But I learned other things too. 
Even among the very poor we saw resilience, a capacity to be joyful despite their conditions. I certainly 
felt like it was a gift they had given me: they could teach me something about joy.  
 
The sense of social responsibility continued in Jennifer Herdt’s studies with an understanding that 
“people secretly are eager to contribute to society’s improvement in ways that transcend self-
orientated materialism” (Waddle, 2011). This notion of the “common good” is under threat, argues 
Herdt, with the increase of individualism and materialism. “This ‘thinning’ tendency might be 
inevitable under pluralism: people fall back on subjective desires and values because notions of public 
virtue sound too ambitious or intolerant. Strident individualism intensifies the trend, insisting that 
society’s task is to maximise individual autonomy and preferences, not contemplate the common 
good” (Waddle, 2011).  
 
Despite the increase of individualism and materialism, Jennifer Herdt holds fast to a communal 
understanding of the common good. She argues that “we must grapple together. Strict individualism is 
a utopian fantasy. Life has an irreducible social dimension. A commitment to the common good 
involves organising social structures so that they “foster the flourishing of everyone” (Waddle, 2011). 
The belief in the inevitably social dimension of human flourishing motivates Herdt to assert that: 
“Human beings are capable of finding their happiness in contributing to the common good. I think 
people are dying to hear that” (Waddle, 2011).  
 
As a member of the Episcopalian denomination, Jennifer Herdt places the responsibility on the church 
to provide an example of the common good through the performance of its sacraments and liturgy. 
Grace plays a central role in this process, Herdt indicates in her book Putting on Virtue (2012b: 119): 
 
Grace is active in our acting, in the beauty of virtue displayed that engages and transforms our affections, 
allowing us to play a part that becomes our own as we play it. While imitation is an act, there is also a 
chastening of human agency implied in the cascade. We must be inspired by our exemplars: we cannot 
simply decide to love them, to find them beautiful.  
 
A variety in the depictions of the common good, seen in cultural appropriations of happiness and 
flourishing does not threaten Jennifer Herdt’s concern for the common good. Instead, Herdt affirms: 
“People will differ over definitions of the common good, but it’s much better that people bring out 
their robust views for healthy debate and attempt to find common ground than it is to retreat into 
individual preferences and public silence” (Waddle, 2011). It is this very grappling with various 
conceptions of the common good that is seen in Herdt’s articles and books, including Putting on 
virtue: The legacy of the splendid vices (2010) and Religion and faction in Hume’s moral philosophy 
(1997).   
 
Serene Jones, a President and Johnston Family Professor for religion and democracy at Union 
Theological Seminary, points toward an uncommodified rendition of happiness which takes into 
consideration human agency. Ellen Charry, a Margaret W. Harmon Professor of Theology at 
Princeton Theological Seminary, indicates that Christians are skittish to talk about happiness because 
“some Christians perceive happiness and goodness to be in tension with one another” (Reflections on 
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the Interfaith Summit on Happiness, 2010). Jennifer Herdt, who is the Gilbert A. Stark Professor of 
Christian Ethics, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at Yale Divinity School, asserts that humans are 
able to find their happiness by contributing to the common good. The three female theologians with 
their priority toward human happiness and flourishing contribute to the growing conversation on God 
and human flourishing.  
1.3 Motivation for female voices 
Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt represent three female theologians who may be added 
to the conversation on human flourishing and happiness presented in the God and Human Flourishing 
Consultations. Their addition is worthy to be considered for two reasons. The first is their position as 
female theologians. Secondly, each female voice either taught or studied at Yale Divinity School. 
Serene Jones lived, studied and taught at Yale Divinity for a cumulative 26 years. Ellen Charry is a 
Luce Post-Doctoral fellow (1989-1991) at Yale Divinity School and Jennifer Herdt is currently a 
Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School.  
In light of the diversity of perspectives on human flourishing, one may infer the nature of each female 
voice’s distinctive contribution. Serene Jones, President of Union Theological Seminary in New York, 
brings to the conversation the awareness that talk of happiness and human flourishing necessarily 
concerns the way women’s nature have been constructed through theological misappropriations of 
doctrine and Scripture. She engages with feminist theory to reinterpret the Reformed tradition and 
describes the collaboration of theology and feminist theory as “companionable wisdoms” (Jones, 
2000: ix), where four central moments define the collaboration: (a) “the communal content of 
struggle” where community is of “paramount importance”; a (b) “pragmatic utilitarian”1 orientation; 
(c) a critical disposition towards “the myriad ways gender relations of power inform our most 
fundamental patterns of thought and practice; and finally, (d) whether theory or theology “contributes 
to the betterment of women’s lives” (Jones, 2001c:297).  
Read in light of the conversation on happiness, Serene Jones cautions against any rendition of 
happiness that does not take into consideration how women’s lives have been constructed by 
oppression and gendered patterns of thought (Jones, 2000:3). Oppression, for Jones, is the very 
antithesis of human flourishing and defies the will of God that all creation should flourish (Jones, 
2000:109). As a feminist theologian, who wants to work from the Reformed tradition, she re-narrates 
the doctrine of justification and sanctification to affirm the agency of women (Jones, 2009:160). As a 
theologian, Serene Jones has a priority toward grace as catalyst of the agency of women (Jones, 
2002:64) and as a feminist she affirms the emancipation of women.  
Ellen Charry, Margaret W. Harmon Professor of Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, brings 
a priority for a salutary reading of Scripture to the conversation. It is Charry’s belief that knowledge of 
God shapes the becoming of an individual (2004b:26), which informs her understanding of happiness. 
Charry’s study of Augustine, who she terms the “father of Christian Psychology”, motivated her to 
come to this conclusion (2006b:575). Charry explains (2001a:126): 
I have argued that Christian psychology and secular psychology part company over the relevance of God. 
Christian psychology claims that we are made in the divine image but fallen from that basic identity, that 
on our own we are lost and confused. Our true identity is reclaimed for us by God in Christ so that we 
may return to our proper self. This is the healing of the soul. Secular psychology grounds the self in itself. 
                                                     
1“…in that we recognize the role that a normative vision of ‘the-way-things-should-be’ plays in motivating these 
communities to struggle for social change” (Jones, 2001c:297).  
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The self is autonomous; it does not need God either to understand itself or to chart a path to true happiness 
and emotional and behavioural stability.  
Ellen Charry also provides a corrective to secular psychology (2001a:129): 
Augustine’s view is that desire is easily deformed. He saw that we are caught between our worst self, 
which brings false happiness, and our best self, which brings true happiness yet lies dormant under our 
futile attempts to follow our own lights. The struggle for goodness and happiness is a spiritual one that 
will finally be resolved not through any short-term pleasure but only in a life pleasing to God, to whom 
we are indissolubly tethered and whose grace alone makes life possible. 
Ellen Charry’s contribution to the conversation on happiness lies in her belief that God wills creation 
to flourish (2011a:34) and beyond that, that the flourishing of creation is enjoyable to God 
(Reflections on the interfaith Summit on Happiness, 2010). Premised on the doctrine of creation in 
Genesis 1.27, she asserts that God has created human kind to live in a particular way, one that is 
ashrey (Reflections on the interfaith Summit on Happiness, 2010). When individuals come to the 
knowledge that God wills their happiness and has set out a norm by which they are to live, happiness 
follows (Reflections on the interfaith Summit on Happiness, 2010).  
As a theologian who is concerned with the salutary effect of knowledge of God on humans, Ellen 
Charry challenges any conception of happiness that is abstract and premised solely on an 
eschatological conception of happiness.  
Jennifer Herdt, Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School, contributes to the theological 
conversation on happiness by means of virtue ethics. Herdt takes issue with the divide that occurred 
between morality and its religious moorings present since the sixteenth century, a divide which 
rendered theology superfluous to conceptions of the common good. In her approach, Jennifer Herdt 
does not make happiness the priority of her study, but instead treats it as a natural extension of human 
participation in God and the greater good. She regards virtue as the forum wherein grace actively 
draws the agent toward its origin, namely God. Herdt establishes that (2012b:55, 60): 
virtue is not the way I demonstrate to God that I am worthy of the reward of eternal life: rather, virtue 
proves to be nothing but the perfection of the love of God. And it is when my love to God is perfected that 
I can experience the union with God, which is fruition, the love of enjoyment. Virtue proves after all to be 
not just instrumental but partially constitutive of my happiness, of my final end … My final end is not just 
external: even though I cannot in this life fully realize that loving union with God, my loving, virtuous 
activity is even now an expression of the love of God. Finally, it is through the Christian’s responsiveness 
to grace that mimesis may take place, permeating every act done by Christians. 
Happiness, as intricately connected to morality and its religious moorings, has ethical implications for 
the agent of virtue. As a virtue ethicist, Jennifer Herdt warns that happiness cannot be understood 
apart from morality. She affirms (Herdt, 2012b: 57): 
Happiness is found not in achieving independence but in embracing our ultimate dependency … while our 
final good is not fully up to us, it is something that requires our active participation: it is not something 
that we simply passively undergo. If virtue is the perfection of my love for God, the end of enjoyment of 
God cannot be fully characterized apart from my virtuous activity, my loving response to God. We find 
happiness in the perfected activity of receiving and returning God’s gifts.  
Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt contribute to the conversation on happiness from a 
feminist, pastoral and virtue ethics perspective, which is arguably not taken into consideration by the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 
 
God and Human Flourishing Consultation. This thesis aims to understand in which ways each 
respective voice could contribute to the conversation on happiness. 
Serene Jones as a feminist and theologian begins the conversation in Chapter 2, where feminist theory 
with its critical disposition toward constructed essentials cautions the use of the word “happiness.” In 
light of the God and Human Flourishing Consultations, Chapter 2 investigates how a feminist 
theologian reads and interprets the notion of happiness. Ellen Charry as a female theologian, who is 
not a feminist, moves beyond the moment of critique to understand happiness as a way of life. Chapter 
3 consequently seeks to understand how knowledge of God enables a particular understanding of 
happiness. Chapter 4 shows how knowledge of God and human agency form part of virtuous acting 
where Jennifer Herdt delineates how virtue as mimetic performance constitutes happiness. The final 
chapter, Chapter 5, asks whether a particular theological understanding of happiness is distinguishable. 
The order of voices in this thesis, namely, Serene Jones first, Ellen Charry second and Jennifer Herdt 
third, serve to move the reader from one conversation to the next. Serene Jones is first in the 
conversation on happiness because she cautions against reigning gendered patterns of thought and how 
these patterns influence interpretation and meaning. It is accomplished by Jones’ use of feminist 
theory, which deconstructs the notion of happiness and affirms the agency and freedom of women. In 
accordance with a feminist theological reading of happiness, she transitions from the moment of 
critique to a vision of happiness premised on the doctrine of justification and sanctification. Feminist 
theology enables the reader to engage critically with the God and Human Flourishing Consultations, 
before moving on to an understanding of happiness premised on knowledge of God and virtue. In 
addition, Serene Jones equips the reader with the necessary awareness to engage with Ellen Charry and 
Jennifer Herdt respectively.  
Ellen Charry, the second voice in the theological conversation, describes happiness as a way of life 
premised on the affirmation of human freedom and agency. Happiness as a way of life is understood to 
be the process whereby knowledge of God evokes enjoyment through conformation to God’s 
commandments. Charry moves beyond Serene Jones’ conception of happiness in two ways. In the first 
instance, she understands human agency and freedom to be the precondition for asherism. Secondly, 
Charry moves beyond the notion of happiness as a state of being marked by the absence of oppression, 
to happiness as a way of life.  
Jennifer Herdt arguably marks a culmination in female voices in her understanding of happiness. 
Herdt, similar to Ellen Charry and Serene Jones, affirms the agency and freedom of human beings 
through the notion of virtue. In addition, she understands knowledge of God to be a liturgy that 
individuals partake in when they act virtuously. Stated differently, when a Christian acts virtuously 
premised on knowledge of God, the agency of that individual is affirmed. Jennifer Herdt consequently 
furthers the contribution of both Serene Jones and Ellen Charry respectively in her understanding that 
virtue, whether secular or Christian, is a means by which through grace we are brought into relation 
with God. Happiness becomes more than a way of life or the absence of life negating circumstances to 
a way of relating to the world and God by means of virtue. 
The three female theologians have different emphases when talking about happiness and human 
flourishing that leads to a diversity of perspectives. Serene Jones emphasises the agency of women, 
Ellen Charry, the shaping potential of knowledge of God on happiness and Jennifer Herdt, how virtue 
is a means to participate in God and contribute to the common good. In light of the diversity of 
perspectives some research considerations are to be made.  
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1.4 Research considerations 
This thesis is situated within the context of the Gender, Health and Theology pilot program launched 
in 2013 by the Church of Sweden in partnership with Stellenbosch University, the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, Makumira University College and the Ethiopian Graduate School of Theology. The 
initiative was launched as a forum for study on themes pertaining to the millennium development 
goals, namely, the child mortality rate and the improvement of maternal health. With the millennium 
development goals in mind, the question of happiness and human flourishing was one to be 
considered. Three distinctive voices were chosen who, in their unique way, could contribute to the 
theological conversation on happiness. Furthermore, in consideration of the Pilot Program where an 
emphasis was placed on gender, health and theology respectively, three female voices were chosen to 
contribute to the continuing conversation on happiness. The research question asked is: “In which 
ways do Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt contribute to theology’s engagement with the 
themes of happiness and well-being?”  
In any conversation, the diversity of conversation partners has the potential of either 
miscommunicating what needs to be said or negating a constructive conversation altogether. A similar 
challenge is presented to this study. There is a possibility that each voice’s contribution to happiness is 
irreconcilable with the others. The possible irreconcilability need not be a problem; instead, a hostess 
is required who allows each voice its respective opinion and point of departure. The role that I am to 
assume in this thesis may perhaps be likened to the metaphor of a hostess. A hostess is one who shows 
hospitality to the other, who invites and welcomes. A similar role is assumed when inviting Serene 
Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt to the table. My role in the research is to allow each voice to 
speak in its own right while contributing to the greater conversation. In the unlikely instance where the 
voices may perhaps be irreconcilable, one may recall the dynamic of a conversation, namely, sending 
a message, receiving the message and acknowledging its content.  
The role of the hostess is not to decide what is right or wrong, but rather to enable the three different, 
sometimes contrasting, sometimes agreeing voices to speak to the topic of human flourishing. Each 
theological contribution employs a different method when arguing for happiness and human 
flourishing. In each instance the notion of happiness and human flourishing is developed in distinctive 
ways: Serene Jones, by means of feminist theology, Ellen Charry, in her pastoral-systematic approach 
and Jennifer Herdt, by means of virtue ethics. The term conversation and the exact role of a hostess 
therein might need some clarification. For this clarification one may turn to the matter of 
methodology.  
1.5 Methodology 
The research question, “In which ways do Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt contribute to 
theology’s engagement with the themes of happiness and well-being?” is approached from a 
systematic theological perspective. A systematic theological approach is represented by two moments, 
a literature study and therein the discovery of overarching or recurring themes which allow for the 
discovery of a leitmotif. By looking at the recurring themes present in each voice as well as the whole, 
a leitmotif in its singularity and plurality of perspectives comes to the fore. The leitmotif not only 
indicates the recurring themes but also suggests a possible conceptual framework. Premised on the 
conceptual framework at work in each respective voice a rendition of happiness and human 
flourishing may be retrieved.  
In order to stay true to a literature study, I embark on the theological investigation by means of a close 
reading. A close reading suggests a mode of reading where attention is paid to logic, presuppositions, 
the agenda of the authors as well as their theological reservations. It characterises a careful and 
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consistent interpretation of the theological texts as a means by which the respective voices may be 
understood. The style of writing further seeks to stay true to a close reading by conveying the thoughts 
and processes of each voice. Throughout the investigation it will be an aim to respect each voice 
according to their style of writing, allowing each voice to set out their argument coherently. In light of 
this aim, it will be attempted to stay as close to the original text as possible. The thesis is proliferated 
with quotations as I have sought to interpret each voice with integrity. The use of quotations in the 
thesis is therefore deliberate and intended to guide the reader through the thought processes of each 
voice. It might be asked why I have not paraphrased some lengthy quotations? In such instances the 
particular quotation conveyed both meaning as well as providing the reader with a sense of the 
author’s theological “presence”.  
After reading the three theological voices they may be juxtaposed. Juxtaposition takes the form of 
converging and diverging conversations. An opportunity is presented where rhetoric, style and theory 
may be contrasted or emphasised premised on the focus of each author. In this way a rich, textured 
account of happiness and human flourishing may be established. When interpreting the voices no 
account is deemed more adequate or relevant. For Serene Jones appropriately notes that human 
flourishing is always in a state of flux as it is dependent on the particular givenness of a context 
(2000:75). The question to the nature of happiness and human flourishing is one that permeates the 
study. In the end, the reader is presented with three renditions to the question. The focus then, is not to 
consider which theological account is more appropriate than the other, but rather to understand how 
each voice has intended to answer the question. The question of happiness and human flourishing is 
one that extends beyond the thesis to ask the reader and future theologians what its nature might be in 
their particular context.  
What arises from the question asked to both author and implied audience is a growing conversation. In 
consideration of the dynamic interplay between the three female theological voices a conversation as 
possible forum for interaction seems viable. In a conversation the three female theological voices may 
be represented in their own right while relating to the other in a distinctive manner. When the three 
voices converse, new themes and appropriations are erected as diverging and converging perspectives 
enliven the textured account. It might also be the case that there are stark contrasts and possible 
contradictions within the varying accounts. If this be the case it would only serve to show how 
reflection on theological themes is context dependent and deeply embodied in the lives of the authors.  
A conversation may also be attributed with negative characteristics such as power play and 
interpretive bias. For this reason I present each author with the same question, “in which ways does A, 
B or C contribute to theology’s engagement with happiness and human flourishing?” This does not 
exclude the possible presence of the issues mentioned above but does begin by limiting the extent to 
which incoherent interpretation may take place. With regards to the issue of power play or preference, 
the ordering of the three female voices in no way suggests a hierarchy or primacy but is rather a 
method of helping the reader navigate through the theological investigation.  
Feminist theology, Systematic-Pastoral theology and Moral theology are three lenses from which an 
account of happiness and human flourishing is read. Serene Jones is placed first in the conversation of 
three because she unpacks and develops the notion of human happiness extensively. Ellen Charry and 
Jennifer Herdt are ordered to continue the conversation by emphasising the transformative power of 
knowledge of God and the value of a Christian liturgy as forum for contributing to the common good. 
The conversation is a growing and continuing one and can therefore on no account be given 
preference. Instead, through every moment of reflection the meaning and extent of happiness and 
human flourishing is developed anew.  
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Finally, interpretive bias is perhaps the most difficult issue to avoid. An awareness of interpretive bias 
therefore encourages me to restrict my voice when interpreting the author’s. I have excluded my 
opinion from the theological rendition for two reasons; the first being the dynamic and complex nature 
of the question which has as its result an ever-changing answer and the second being its dependence 
on context. A rendition that is constantly in flux and context dependent deprives me of the ability to 
make judgements. Interpretive bias is in this way circumvented due to the nature of the question itself.  
The methodology for this thesis is a systematic theological literature study which has two moments, 
the establishment of a leitmotif present in each theological contribution wherein a conceptual 
framework is discovered. I have used the notion of a conversation to indicate a possible means by 
which the voices could be read in the presence of the other. In the theological investigation the 
research question will guide the reader through the dynamic and complex theological rendition. The 
interpretive task is left to the three voices who, when juxtaposed with the other, emphasise the 
nuances and differences. The conversation on happiness and human flourishing is indeed one that 
theology has begun to engage with extensively.   
1.6 Conclusion 
The aim of the first chapter has been to identify the conversation with its respective conversation 
partners. The conversation exists within a greater context of conversations on happiness and 
flourishing presented (amongst others) in the 2007 to 2013 Consultations of God and Human 
Flourishing at the Yale Center for Faith and Culture. It has been indicated that each respective voice 
has a unique relation to Yale Divinity School and seeks to understand how theology may engage with 
the notion of happiness.  
Serene Jones as a feminist theologian introduces the need to account for women’s voices in her critical 
disposition toward the construction of women’s natures. Ellen Charry challenges the reader to 
critically consider the false dichotomy between piety and pleasure in the consideration of happiness. 
Jennifer Herdt reminds the reader that happiness has to do not only with one’s relation to God, but 
also, with the agent contributing to the greater community through virtue.  
The format of the thesis will be similar to a conversation, where each voice is heard respectively. Each 
voice will engage with the other to present a conversation on happiness where a diversity of 
perspectives is taken into consideration. A conversation which indicates both the nuances and 
differences of conceptions of happiness while remaining true to the agenda of each female theologian. 
This contribution to happiness and human flourishing serves to enrich growing conversations on God 
and human flourishing.  
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Chapter 2 
Graced? Serene Jones on human flourishing 
 
In our minds, to be feminists means that, emboldened by our faith in God, we are actively seeking 
to build a world where all people, women and men alike, flourish, where God’s creation is 
nurtured, and where God’s will for justice, beauty, and mercy prevails. We ask what things 
presently (and in the past) hinder the flourishing of women: in this context, we are committed to 
looking at the causes of women’s oppression (Jones, 2004a:260). 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Serene Jones is a feminist theologian who makes a contribution to theology’s engagement with 
flourishing and happiness through her remapping of Christian theology with feminist theory. The 
former conceptualises the latter, whilst the latter contextualises the former (Jones, 2000:56). Jones 
insists in her book Feminist theory and Christian theology that (2000:2): 
Students of theology have much to learn from feminist theory … It deepens our understanding of human 
identity and community and opens up new avenues for understanding the Christian theological tradition 
and its view of divine grace.  
Jones’ theology is nuanced skilfully in the way she approaches both text and context (2006: 24):  
as a feminist with a pragmatic interest in social change, I found the aesthetic avenue of approach helpful 
because it required taking seriously the concrete practice, cultural patterns, and communal actions- and 
not just the reasoned ideas- that make us who we are.  
An apt example of this is found in Serene Jones’ contribution to the book Feminist and Womanist 
essays in Reformed Dogmatics (Pauw & Jones, 2006), where she employs the strategy of remapping 
the experiences of women in light of biblical texts. Jones uses the metaphor of a map (2000:10) to 
denote how feminist theory is superimposed onto Christian theology.  
As a theologian, Serene Jones has a priority toward Scripture and doctrine and as a feminist she 
critiques traditions of doctrine and Scripture that harbour an oppressive logic for women. Oppression 
is deconstructed by Jones as anything that threatens the agency and freedom of a woman (Jones, 
2000:74). Moreover, “feminist theory tries to hold its analysis of women’s oppression in tension with 
an appreciation for both the flourishing of women and the complex ‘givenness’ of their multiple 
circumstances” (Jones, 2000:6). 
Serene Jones develops her theory of flourishing established by the feminist vision of ‘women’s 
wholeness’ (2006:75) premised on Iris Young’s2 theory of oppression (Young, 1990), a position 
described as an ‘eschatological moment’ (Jones, 2006:75). Jones affirms (2006:75):  
this vision functions as a yardstick against which the pains of the present are measured and critiqued. In 
theories of oppression, this measurement serve as a “regulative ideal,” allowing one to assess the present 
against standards of justice, wholeness, and in the case of my definition, “flourishing.”  
Serene Jones presents to the conversation on happiness a position that simultaneously critiques and 
affirms. The Reformed tradition is utilised by Jones to construct a theological account of human 
                                                     
2 Serene Jones draws on the work of Iris Young whom she references as follows: “see Iris Marion Young, 
Justice and Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), 125ff.” (2000:183).  
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flourishing, which takes into consideration the “myriad ways gender relations of power inform our 
most fundamental patterns of thought and practice” (2001c:297). 
In the remapping of Christian theology, Serene Jones employs feminist theory to critically engage 
with doctrine and Scripture, a method that takes into consideration both text and context. With a 
sensitivity toward the oppression of women, Serene Jones argues for a reading of doctrine and 
Scripture that affirms the agency of women. In her use of Christian theology and feminist theory, 
Serene Jones illustrates that theory and theology are what she terms, “companionable wisdoms” 
(Jones, 2000:34).  
2.2 Companionable wisdoms 
The act of superimposing feminist theory onto Christian theology is underscored in the subtitle to 
Serene Jones’ book Feminist theory and Christian theology: Cartographies of grace (2000). Jones 
often likens her methodology to a map where a theological landscape resides; upon this landscape 
feminist theory is laid in order to mark out new routes for understanding (2000: ix) doctrine3 (Jones, 
2000:1):  
We read Scripture and reflect on what it means for us- exhausted women living in the new millennium- to 
believe in a triune God whose grace embraces us and opens us up to abundant life4 
To “read” and “reflect” takes on a life of its own, as Serene Jones journeys through feminist theory 
and Christian theology. Jones remarks that, “Irigaray’s5 “alternative” is a position that tries to take 
seriously the gifts of critique and normativity” (2001a:54) at the level of method, content and cultural 
aesthetic (Jones, 2001a:54). Theory and theology are two companions in the work of Jones (Jones, 
2001a:51):  
I argue that it is a relationship marked by two moments: embracing the gifts of critique and radical 
openness and, second, celebrating the gifts of normative structure and emancipatory vision. 
The interplay of normative frameworks and its critique extends to Jones’ reading of the Bible and 
doctrine, where words such as “boundedness” and “openness”, “freedom” and “form”, serve to 
characterise an alternative reading (Jones, 2000:2). Each alternative reading is strategically qualified 
for the implied readers. Serene Jones’ focus falls on a multitude of audiences with whom she engages 
regularly. The diversity in audiences forms the bedrock for her readings: “These women remind me 
again and again that high theory and local wisdom make wonderful companions” (Jones, 2000:2). 
Feminist theory equips Serene Jones with a critical disposition toward the construction of the 
identities of women. The result is the awareness of unquestioned readings of Scripture and doctrine, 
                                                     
3Serene Jones utilises the metaphor of a map to describe how feminist theory and Christian theology may be 
companionable wisdoms: “Similarly, I am certain that in charting the central concepts that mark the worlds of 
feminist theory and Christian theology, I have left huge blank spaces in places where there is much more traffic 
than I had realized. When you find these places, fill them in and be bold enough to redraw the entire map if need 
be. Do so realizing, however, that maps are never simply open windows to the real: they are just as often 
blueprints for the ‘real’ that is being formed, the emergent terrain. In other words, maps create just as they are 
created” (Jones, 2000: ix). 
4 Serene Jones uses the notion of “flourishing” interchangeably with concepts that denote well-being and 
happiness. Within her writing such notions are finely nuanced with theology, theory and cultural norms, which 
are always interacting with one another as she uses the terms within certain contexts.  
5 Serene Jones provides three resources of Irigaray when speaking of her methodology, Jones writes, “See L. 
Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. G. Gill (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985);  
idem, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. C. Burke and G. Gill (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1993); idem, Sexes and Genealogies, trans. G. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)” (2001a: 53).  
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which has had an oppressive logic. The readings are accordingly deconstructed and reformulated to 
establish an emancipatory reading of women’s nature. It is Jones’ conviction that feminist theology 
has an important contribution to make to the world of feminist studies.  
In her article “Companionable Wisdoms: What insights might feminist theorists gather from feminist 
Theologians”, Serene Jones describes the relevance of feminist theology for feminist engagement 
(2001). The unique contribution of feminist theology begins with the “common story” it shares with 
feminist theory, where “four central moments” exist (Jones, 2001c:297). These are (a) “the communal 
content of struggle” where community is of “paramount importance”; a (b) “pragmatic utilitarian”6 
orientation; (c) a critical disposition towards “the myriad ways gender relations of power inform our 
most fundamental patterns of thought and practice”; and finally, (d) whether theory or theology 
“contributes to the betterment of women’s lives” (Jones, 2001c:297).  
Since the postmodern “disenchantment with the Enlightenment”, feminist theorists, deconstructivists, 
as well as communitarians, have found themselves bound to normative frameworks without pragmatic 
outcomes (Jones, 2001c:298). The result is twofold; theorists “find themselves uncertain about how 
they should proceed when crafting constructive proposals” and “over the past twenty years … it has 
increasingly distanced itself from the communities that initially inspired its eschatological yearnings7“ 
(Jones, 2001c:298). The relationship between the “academy” and the “emancipatory communities of 
struggle” has thus been separated (Jones, 2001c:298).  
Feminist theology on the other hand, “has not lost touch with the communities and the normative 
traditions that inspire its eschatological yearnings” (Jones, 2001c:298) and facilitates them to “manage 
the messiness of normative claims in the context of its pragmatic eschatology and its correlative 
understanding of grace” (Jones, 2001c:299). Feminist theorists have critiqued theology however, for 
its “unchecked gendered patterns” (Jones, 2001c:299) and for “constructing essentials8” of women’s 
nature (Jones, 2001c:299). Instead of seeing feminist theory and feminist theology as contradictory 
(Jones, 2001c:301), Serene Jones suggests that they are instead companionable wisdoms (2000:34).  
 
Serene Jones argues for the potential of doctrine to have “two very different imagistic economies 
standing together as markers of a single self” (2001c:301). The example she uses is the doctrine of 
justification and sanctification with its corollary “potential to critically undo whilst organically 
constructing identity through grace” (Jones, 2000:55) illustrates a concern for the agency of women 
(Jones, 2008a:330):  
Therefore much of the work that captivates me lies in the realm of grace and the particular experiences of 
persons whose agency and hope have been fractured by violence – another version of the wretched of the 
earth, I suppose. 
In the particular context of sin, later read as “grace-denied” (Jones, 2000:117), Serene Jones affirms, 
“implicated in a sin from which we cannot fully disentangle ourselves we stand here, simul iustus et 
peccator, persons who are unceasingly marked by sin and yet are freed from it through the counter-
discourse of grace” (2001c:301). She describes the self, community and oppression in light of sin, 
which is the origin of the brokenness of humanity (Jones, 2000:55). Jones writes (2001c:301): 
                                                     
6“…in that we recognize the role that a normative vision of “the-way-things-should-be” plays in motivating 
these communities to struggle for social change” (Jones, 2001c:297).  
7 Serene Jones calls this the “originary normative moment” (2001c:298).  
8 “Essentials” refer here to those “characteristics” that are believed to be innate in women’s nature and immune 
to change throughout history (Jones, 2000:42).  
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With respect to gender and the oppression of women, we are thus doubly marked as persons (both men 
and women) who are deeply implicated in its oppressive logic- as both perpetrators and victims- yet also 
called to live in a grace that affirms the ultimate flourishing of women. We thus stand here, affirming our 
agency as both a willing tool of sin and as resister of sin. 
Normative theological constructs provide the opportunity where re-interpretations may be made 
without harbouring “implicit exclusion or subjugation” (Jones, 2001c:302). Instead, apparent 
theological binaries work “paradoxically (as opposed to parasitically), providing a methodological 
advantage to theological engagement” (Jones, 2001c:303). Jones argues (2001c:302): 
So, for example, one does not choose whether to live in sin or under grace: one lives in the tension of 
having been simultaneously overcome by both. Further, one’s starting point for talking about this 
paradoxical condition depends on one’s rhetorical context and purpose. Thus, each pair, as pair, has a 
strategically malleable nature that benefits from the implicit and positive inclusion of both terms. 
In her article “Bounded Openness: Postmodernism, Feminism and the Church Today”, Serene Jones 
presents in a similar fashion the unique contribution of theology’s engagement with feminist theory 
and postmodernism. She states: “Postmodern sensibilities need to be combined with a bold 
willingness to stake claims, to make normative judgments, to build structure-both conceptual and 
material- that enable human beings to flourish and live as God intended” (Jones, 2001b:50). The 
“strange relationship” that exists between feminist theology and feminist theory or postmodernism, 
highlights the value of “Christian theology’s unwavering commitment to normative reflection” (Jones, 
2001b:52).  
Feminist theory shares a “common goal, namely, the liberation of women … (it) represents a form of 
oppositional political action, albeit one with unique tools” (Jones, 2000:3). The initial focus was on 
forms of oppression “that structured women’s lives” and an imagining of “an alternative future 
without oppression” (Jones, 2000:3). Serene Jones adds: “What soon became apparent, however, was 
that oppression is not always easy to name” (2000:3). Feminist theory consequently provides Jones 
with the necessary tools for detecting instances of oppression. She writes (Jones, 2000:4): 
In this book, I look at what feminist theorists have discovered about the rules of their various academic 
disciplines … an important point about the scope of feminist theory’s project: this theory reaches into not 
only the academy but also the most personal dimensions of everyday living. 
Characteristic of a feminist “commitment to participating in the struggle against the oppression of 
women and for their liberation” (Jones, 2000:5) is the awareness toward cultural aesthetics, normative 
criteria and what Jones calls a pragmatic eschatological orientation (2000:10). The characteristics of 
feminist theory provide a platform by which doctrine, institutions and practice may be analysed.   
Firstly, cultural aesthetics concerns how women’s natures are constructed by social institutions and 
the implication it has for gender constructs. There are two approaches to the debate; the essentialist: 
“Defined most broadly, essentialism/universalism, refers to any view of women’s nature that makes 
universal claims about women based on characteristics considered to be an inherent part of being 
female” (Jones, 2000:26). These essential properties were thought to be immune from historical force 
(Jones, 2000:24) giving women an unchanging core (Jones, 2000: 27). Such debates are often seen 
within “the sex-gender scheme” (Jones, 2000:27). 
Constructivism, on the other hand, has “a profound appreciation for the constitutive role of nurture or 
socialisation in the construction of ‘women’” (Jones, 2000:32). It consequently focuses “on the social, 
cultural, and linguistic sources of our views of women and women’s nature” (Jones, 2000:32), which 
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serves not as “ideas”, “but the very institutional materiality within which (we) live” (Jones, 2000:34). 
In this way, the nature of a woman can be seen as multi-layered as a result of the various sources that 
shape her being.  
Critique has been levelled at both essentialism and constructivism by feminists with a third proponent 
coming to the fore. Strategic essentialism, an alternative, represents an “in-between position” that 
“applauds constructivist critique of gender but feels nervous about giving up universals (or essences) 
altogether” (Jones, 2000:44). Unlike essentialism, strategic essentialism “stays open to critique and 
hence continually revises its “universals” (Jones, 2000:46). 
 
Jones states this differently in her article “Sin, creativity, and the Christian Life” (2004a:260):                                      
All this is to say that, in our experience, many of what Christians have named as natural features of our 
gendered differences (as men and women) simply are not natural: rather, they are stories we have dreamed 
up- often in our churches- and called them natural … In this regard, gender is itself an artefact of the 
human process of creative production. Our gender myths are tales crafted by our cultural minds and 
passed down through the generations by the habits of our cultural bodies. As feminist theologians, we are 
actively engaged in an on-going process of re-crafting these “stories” about gender …  
In an article on womanist visions and the future of theology, Serene Jones utilises the aesthetics of 
culture as paradigm for womanist readings described as “the aesthetics of racialized constructions” as 
“the terms by which it [race] is shaped in the world of our imagination” (2004:191) is significant. As 
will be seen later, Jones understands the imagination as the place where happiness and flourishing 
reside, for it is here that doctrine and practices either promote flourishing or negate it. If, then, the 
imagination is filled with norms which are not suitable, flourishing is negated. Jones elaborates on this 
notion by referring to doctrine as evoking particular “habits of thought” (2002:56). These habits of 
thought translate into forms of “knowing”, which leads to “experiencing the joy of life abundant in 
God” (Jones, 2002:56).  
Secondly, as strategic essentialism seeks to show, “feminist theory tries to hold its analysis of 
women’s oppression in tension with an appreciation for both the flourishing of women and the 
complex “givenness” of their multiple circumstances” (Jones, 2000:6). Oppression cannot be 
analysed, however, if it is not given normative criteria9 (Jones, 2000:7). It consequently provides a 
framework by which the negation of flourishing may be named. For Jones, feminist theory cannot be 
utilised apart from theological norms. John Calvin serves as apt example: “Correlatively, his deep 
belief in and facility for articulating a normative theological vision enabled him to engage in battles of 
cultural contestation that far surpassed those imagined…” (2001a:161). The model of doctrine that 
held together cultural critique and normative theological intervention was that of justification and 
sanctification (Jones, 2001a:162).  
Cultural aesthetics and normative criteria go hand in hand, as the former contextualises the latter and 
the latter conceptualises the former (Jones, 2001a:163). 
Thirdly, when speaking of the final component, “a predilection for the future” (Jones, 2000:8), Jones 
starts to integrate theology and theory: “Feminism has always been sustained by the belief that things 
can get better. This hope is reflected in the theory that comes out of the movement” (2000:9). The 
images of the future depicted need clarification yet are open enough to invite further interpretation 
                                                     
9 Normative criteria like cultural aesthetics and a pragmatic eschatological orientation, is a key moment in the 
analysis of the doctrine of justification and sanctification within Jones’ work (2001b:51). It is this normative 
reflection on Scripture that produces new means of appropriation of the text.  
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(Jones, 2000:10): “In this sense, the future that feminist theorists imagine is one that has already left 
its mark… It is a future that is both “already” and “not yet” present in history … I refer to this 
predilection for the future as feminist theory’s pragmatic eschatological orientation10 (Jones, 2000:10). 
A special place is thus given “to women’s wisdom and the faithful visions of the future embedded 
therein” (Jones, 2004a:260).  
As Jones moves back and forth between feminist theory and Christian theology, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to distinguish the already-not yet identity apart from Christian theology. Every 
moment of re-imagining is centred in grace. The act of flourishing is the driving force behind Serene 
Jones’ particular remapping of Christian theology into feminist theology. While she never explicitly 
states what the exact “meaning” of flourishing11 may be, Jones uses words such as “the abundant life” 
and “fullness” interchangeably. This understanding of the abundant life is “informed by doctrines of 
the Reformation tradition” (Jones, 2000:11). Flourishing is often described by its opposites, such as 
oppression for example. Serene Jones asserts (Jones, 2004a:260): 
In this regard, we both have a distinctly theological (and Reformed) understanding of the task and nature 
of feminism. In our minds, to be feminists means that, emboldened by our faith in God, we are actively 
seeking to build a world where all people, women and men alike, flourish, where God’s creation is 
nurtured, and where God’s will for justice, beauty, and mercy prevails. We ask what things presently (and 
in the past) hinder the flourishing of women: in this context, we are committed to looking at the causes of 
women’s oppression.  
 
Serene Jones locates reflection on flourishing in the Trinity and its relation to humanity “at the heart 
of my theological reflections also lie the affirmations that in Jesus Christ, God reconciled the world to 
Godself and redeemed humanity from sin and that this triune God calls us to abundant life in 
community and promises to dwell with us here and now and in the world to come” (Jones, 2000:11). 
The triune God, Jones suggests, is a normative framework “through which to make judgments about 
the character of human flourishing” (2008a:329).  
A normative framework provides the forum wherein particular habits of thought are established and 
re-evaluated. Reformed “habit of thought” prove to be “deeply engaged, self-involving, and a form of 
trusting knowledge- the knowledge of faith” (Jones, 2000:56) and must therefore be revisited at every 
instance of re-imagining. “As such, it is a story that not only reaches back through time but also 
stretches forward into the present and through it to a future for which we wait with hopeful 
expectation” (Jones, 2000:56). The “Word event” becomes a moment where humans “might know the 
depth of God’s love for them and, in knowing, experience the joy of life abundant in God” (Jones, 
2000:56). The life abundant grows forth from knowing through doctrine.  
Serene Jones described doctrine as embodied and embodying. “The plays of mind and imagination 
that comprise the landscape of doctrinal meanings are the same plays of mind and imagination that 
construct and engage everyday life in all its complex fullness” (Jones, 2008b:202). This means that 
life and doctrine are inseparable (Jones, 2008b:202). In the first instance, doctrine functions from the 
lived realities of its readers and in the second, Scripture exerts formative pressure on the experiences 
                                                     
10 This eschatological orientation is emancipatory by nature (2001b:51). 
11 Grace Jantzen makes the case for flourishing as it is gender inclusive and favours the human condition 
(Jantzen, G. in Brummer & Sarot, 2006:11). Here, flourishing does not substitute talk of salvation but 
supplements it. Moreover, it does not describe the human condition as calamitous and in need of an external 
saviour who operates outside of the lived realities of humans. Instead, God is seen as intricately involved in the 
world and exists as source of life and meaningful existence (Jantzen in Brummer & Sarot, 2006:11).  
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of the individual and communal (Jones, 2007:74). Jones likens doctrine to the map of truth that 
anchors all her other stories (2007:75). Out of these stories, God comes to the readers and assures 
them of God’s steadfastness (Jones, 2007:76). “Its authority is embedded in the “stuff” that my mind 
and body use to make sense of this all-pervading, ever-alive, graced assurance” (Jones, 2007:76).  
The authority of doctrine is not only anchored in God’s active presence, but also in its transformative 
power. As a fluid construct, doctrine presents the particular imaginings with a new reality (Jones, 
2007:75), one free of oppression and negative social institutions. Jones calls this the rules of doctrine 
(2008b:199):  
When I open this world of doctrine to students, I try to show them what that imaginative world consists of 
by teaching them habituated thought-patterns that Christians have devised over the centuries to structure 
the deep faith plays of mind that comprise the terms of their engagement with the world.  
Doctrines however, have not always favoured the female disposition in its lack of mediation of gender 
relations that structure the lives of women (Jones, 2000:17). For this very reason feminist theology 
“asks whether the church practices what it confesses and it requires that doctrinal dramas be tested in 
the concrete lives of women” (Jones, 2000:18). Feminist theory associates the negation of 
flourishing12 with oppression. Jones expands the theme of oppression by discussing the doctrine of sin.  
Oppression “refers to dynamic forces, both personal and social, that diminish or deny the flourishing 
of women” (Jones, 2000:71). There are multiple forms and these forms are ever changing. Iris Young 
calls these various oppressions “the five faces of oppression” (Young in Jones, 2000:80). They are as 
follows: 
Oppression as exploitation, “this form of oppression describes a specific dynamic related to the 
distribution of labour and money” (Jones, 2000:80), additionally according to material feminists, it 
occurs in a sphere not normally considered, the home (Jones, 2000:81). The home is traditionally seen 
as the place where women are to work. Often the public and private spheres are categorised according 
to “traditional” familial roles. The result is the double exploitation of women, who work in both 
spheres, but are only given acknowledgement in the public sphere. Jones argues (2008:81): 
We also find in the “non-wage-earning sphere” the labour of slaves, children, and indentured servants, 
who worked both inside and outside the domestic sphere. Because the domestic sphere was associated 
with “women’s work” and could be under- or uncompensated, capitalism profited from this labour, which 
was necessary to keep the economic machinery humming, but did not have to remunerate the labourers.  
The gender training implicit in this duality is apparent; women are taught through social structures to 
want remuneration in the form of security, status and financial stability (Jones, 2000:83). “Again, the 
gender training women and men receive from their earliest years prepares them for such an exchange 
…” (Jones, 2000:83).  
Oppression as marginalisation; “in Marxist theory, marginal persons constitute the permanent 
underclass of the unemployed, those who in advanced capitalist societies depend on state subsidies to 
survive” (Jones, 2000:84). Implicit in this understanding is the notion that dependence and 
                                                     
12 Noteworthy is the fluid nature of “flourishing”; “Articulating this vision is challenging because it is always in 
a state of flux. Women’s flourishing means something different to my Tuesday-night group than it meant to the 
first women’s group that gathered in the church in 1772” (Jones, 2000:75).  
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productivity as “a basic human condition” is unsatisfactory (Jones, 2000:85). Feminist theorists 
understand productivity and dependence to be inevitable. Serene Jones confirms that (2000: 85):  
For persons to survive and flourish, social interactions and interdependency are inevitable: the modern 
myth of the self-sufficient individual is illusory in that it implies that one can exist in social isolation and 
carry out one’s life plans without help from anyone. Concretely, this form of oppression is then seen in 
unemployment based on race, class or gender. 
Oppression as powerlessness pertains essentially to “how decisions are made” and “power is 
distributed”13 (Jones, 2000:86), evoking a sense of being infantilised, patronised, invisible and 
disrespected (Jones 2000:86). Within the corporate arena, organisations follow a gendered logic, 
whereby those being managed (whether male or female) are “imagined as feminine (passive, obedient, 
less rational, and dependent)” (Jones, 2000:86) and are subordinate to people who are deemed more 
“qualified” often imagined as “masculine (assertive, rational, and independent)” (Jones, 2000:86). In 
this logic, the former is found “performing in ways that the more powerful find acceptable” (Jones, 
2000:86). “The(se) unspoken assumptions” consequently “prevent” women “from moving up in 
organisations where masculine leadership qualities are valued” (Jones, 2000:87).  
Cultural Imperialism is best illustrated in the account told by Jones of one of the woman in her 
Tuesday-night gathering (2000:87): 
At Christmas, our Tuesday-night gatherings are often more tension filled than they are joyful. This is 
especially true for the woman in our group from Jamaica … Last year, this experience of being out of 
place was exacerbated by her failed attempts to find a new job with the temporary agency where she 
works - a failure related to her being a middle-aged, large-sized, African Caribbean woman with her 
strong Jamaican accent and a quiet demeanour. Nothing about her values, her appearance, her voice, or 
her sense of humour fit the unstated cultural standards of the employers she met. 
Consequently, cultural imperialism “has to do with the way groups develop and apply cultural 
standards for defining, interpreting, and regulating beliefs, actions, and attitudes” as “universals” upon 
others (Jones, 2000:87,88). Character traits of an individual that challenge these norms are then seen 
as “deviant”, “aggressive” and “unruly” (Jones, 2000:88). “This universal imposition of a distinctly 
masculine-socialized model devalues and silences cultural difference, the difference of women as 
relationally orientated decision makers” (Jones, 2000:89).  
Oppression as violence is any act of “harassment, intimidation, or ridicule simply for the purpose of 
degrading, humiliating, or stigmatizing group members” (Young in Jones, 2000:89). Violence has 
become a social practice where women experience “specifically gendered forms of violence as a 
systemic and structural component of women’s oppression and not merely the product of the 
pathologically maladjusted behaviour of small numbers of individual men” (Jones, 2000:89).  
Violence as social practice implies that a “social climate”14 is created where “violence is not only 
imaginable but tolerated or accepted as “natural”” (Rose in Jones, 2000:90). Identity is consequently 
                                                     
13 Here, Jones remarks on the work of Kathy Ferguson “(she) has mapped this dynamic of powerlessness in 
decision-making processes by looking at how the culture uses terms like “professional” and “nonprofessional” to 
describe the work people do” (2000:86). Jones instructs, “See Kathy, E. Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against 
Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1984), 84. See especially “Femininity as Subordination,” 92-
98: and “The Manager as Subordinate,” 99-110.”” (2000:190).  
14Rose is cited by Serene Jones as, “Jacqueline Rose, “Introduction II,” in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan 
and the École Freudienne (New York: Norton, 1982), 27-57.” (2000:191).  
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won through the negation of another’s (Jones, 2000:90). Furthermore, violence becomes a tool 
whereby everything that embodies a culture’s fears is “sacrificed”15 (Girard in Jones, 2000:91). By 
opening up the scope of that which constitutes violence, all physical and emotional harms may be 
called out for what they are.  
Serene Jones engages with Iris Young’s theory of oppression to illustrate how the agency of women is 
negated when they are assigned gendered roles. A position of critique toward an oppressive logic is 
the first step Jones takes to set forth a theological account of women’s nature. In her affirmation of the 
Reformed tradition, Jones turns to the doctrine of justification and sanctification to re-establish an 
account of women’s agency.  
By introducing feminist theory and Christian theology as companionable wisdoms, Jones shows how 
feminist theory contributes to theology by critiquing unchecked gendered constructions. In return, 
Serene Jones argues that theology contributes to feminist theory by providing a normative vision 
established in the redemptive narrative. The doctrine of justification and sanctification are 
reformulated by Serene Jones in terms of feminist theology where the agency of women are 
understood as “graced agency.” 
2.3 Rediscovering the agency of women 
The choice is made by Serene Jones to move beyond the moment of critique of feminist theory to the 
reading of doctrine and Scripture with the emphasis on grace. In her opinion, grace is the forum where 
women’s agency find expression. The doctrines of justification and sanctification are consequently 
critiqued and re-interpreted in light of Jones’ priority toward grace (2000:55): 
I have chosen the landscape of these two doctrines as the terrain to be remapped by the feminist 
discussion of women’s nature because these doctrines also discuss human nature, albeit from the distinct 
perspective of our ‘graced (redeemed) nature’ in Christ. Feminist theology offers a re-appropriation of 
these doctrines in order to understand what it means to be a woman of faith … in a world where many 
different constructs compete to define her …  
Two questions are presented to a woman of faith reading the doctrine of redemption, both pertaining 
to the “shaping” potential of justification and sanctification on their “identity” (Jones, 2000:55). 
Serene Jones explains that (2000:55):  
In the language of doctrine, this means asking, how might the doctrine of justification and sanctification 
craft the faith character of the woman who inhabits it? In the parlance of theory, this means exploring how 
a strategic essentialist like Iragaray might describe the principal contours of the feminist subject.  
For Serene Jones, it is the “conversational play” between theory and theology that allows for a 
remapping (2000:55). Of importance for this study is the manner in which Jones uses this 
conversational play to engage theologically with the notion of flourishing as happiness and 
flourishing, a depiction of lived grace (2000:55).  
The process of God “coming alive to persons as the creator and redeemer of their lives” “is grounded 
in God’s merciful re-establishing of the divine human relationship destroyed by human sin” (Jones, 
2000:56). This process of transformation is understood in terms of justification and sanctification. 
Justification is described by Luther as a dual process where human are simul iustus et peccator, an 
                                                     
15 Here Jones makes use of the work by René Girard a cultural anthropologist. “See René Girard’s discussion of 
imitation, “The Victimage Mechanism as the Basis of Religion,” chap 1. in Things Hidden since the Foundation 
of the World (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987).” (Jones, 2000:202).  
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identity marked by both judgment and love (Jones, 2000:57). Hereafter, the Holy Spirit empowers 
believers to be in service to their neighbour and faithful obedience to God (Jones, 2000:57). An 
“internal transformational” process “initiated fully by God” (Jones, 2000:57). “Standing in the space 
of sanctification, the one whose identity has been “undone” and “forgiven” is now given normative 
contours, disciplines, laws, and ethical directives within which to become a concretely new person in 
Christ” (Jones, 2000:58).  
The traditional juridical setting and sanctified believer metaphors proposed in the previous paragraphs 
are problematic for feminist theorists however (Jones, 2000:59). When referring back to the discussion 
on women’s nature, strategic essentialism asks, “How “women” are defined in the play of these two 
dramatic dynamics?” (Jones, 2000:59). Strategic essentialism subverts “the sex-gendered subject by 
dissolving its seemingly natural moorings and exposing the dangerous politics hidden in it” (Jones, 
2000:59). Universals created from these normative frameworks are problematised as the nature of 
women are a “site where multiple axes intersect” (Jones, 2000:59), causing any standardisation of 
women’s nature to be unfruitful (Jones, 2000:59). At the same time, strategic essentialists “also talk 
about the value of asserting an emancipatory vision of a just and caring society” (Jones, 2000:60). The 
nature of a woman is described by Jones (2000:61):  
She is the woman whose identity feels the pull of two dramatic forces: she is continuously undone and 
remade, disarticulated and redeployed: she is radically relational yet centred and directed. 
Serene Jones asks accordingly, “How might the story of Christian conversion to new life in God look 
through the eyes of feminist theory?” (2000:61). Luther’s juridical setting serves as one of Jones’ 
examples. In this setting, “the pretensions of self-definition and pride are broken, and the arrogant 
defendant is positioned before God as deservedly “fragmented” and “lost” (Jones, 2000:62).  
A problem is encountered, “feminist theory asks: What happens to the woman who enters this tale 
having spent her life … in the space of fragmentation and dissolution?” (Jones, 2000:62). Jones 
indicates the misplaced nature of Luther’s appropriation of grace. “Women have a radically different 
‘illness’” (Jones, 2000:6) than men, she describes (Jones, 2000, 62): 
Her sin is not one of overly rigid self-containment: her brokenness lies in her lack of containment, in her 
cultural definition in relation to others. Instead of an overabundance of self, the source of her alienation 
from God is her lack of self-definition: she is too liquid, she lacks skin to hold her together, to embrace 
and envelop her.  
At risk of not being able to relate to the saving power of God, “she is therefore without a story to 
initiate her into grace” (Jones, 2000:63) with the result that the God she meets is a recapitulated power 
relation unravelling her substance (Jones, 2000:63).  
Serene Jones indicates how such a reading is counterintuitive. She suggests the moment of 
“conversion” be narrated in “reverse” (Jones, 2000:63), “starting with sanctification and its rhetoric of 
building up instead of with justification and its initial language of undoing” (Jones, 2000:63). The 
reversal creates the opportunity for the “construction of the self” before “turning to the moment of 
dismantling and forgiveness” (Jones, 2000:63). In the construction of self a woman’s nature becomes 
agentic and embodied, “she is, in short, given an envelope of grace to contain her” (Jones, 2000:64). 
Jones describes a woman clothed in grace as having “a skin of her own” with “God’s best desires” for 
her flourishing. Here, a second feature comes to the fore; flourishing is an existential position wherein 
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grace captures the emancipatory vision of woman. Grace then, embodies flourishing, through its 
containment of God’s love for women. “Graced” becomes her new identity (Jones, 2000:64).  
Serene Jones asks “how might she live in such a gracious space? Her nature is now defined according 
to the grace-given virtues of the Christian life: faith, hope, and love” (2000:65). The power of this 
formulation lies in the shift from talk of “women’s nature” to her “becoming”16 (Jones, 2000:65). “In 
the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, we meet this gracious love face to face, as it were” 
(Jones, 2002:57). “In him, the entire history of God with us happens” (Jones, 2002:57).  
Strategic essentialists require in addition to “the positive space,” that women “are called to self-
critique and (a) collective revisioning” (Jones, 2000:65). The doctrine of justification functions as apt 
rhetorical tool to “expose the role that sin plays in humanity’s attempts to define and control the world 
by measures of our own making” (Jones, 2000:66)17. Freedom is evoked when woman may “perform” 
(Jones, 2000:67) “an identity that is not ours by right but is a gift” (2000:67). Serene Jones explains 
(2000:60): 
When one is sanctified, one performs and is performed by the script of divine love that comes to us in 
Jesus Christ, a script mediated to us ecclesially … This script … is not just something that Christians learn 
to enact. Rather, as the very context within which we become who we are, it is the script of our most 
fundamental selves. As such, when we perform and are performed by grace, our lives take on the form 
that we are.  
Conversion becomes an act of forgiveness by God through “the imputation of an alien righteousness, a 
performative conversion in which we receive a new role…” (Jones, 2000:67). Women who were 
uncontained selves are now “relational and fluid” (Jones, 2000:67). A woman is “opened by God to 
relation in God and thereby opened by God to the world of her relations” (Jones, 2000:67). To the 
possible critique of constructivists “de-centred, fluid subject”, Jones answers that women are partially 
de-centred(Jones, 2000:67), “for in the space opened by conversion, relation is not the product of a 
culture that relentlessly constructs but is the gift of the God whose grace opens all to interactive co-
existence” (Jones, 2000:67). Justification and sanctification thus form “a space within which women’s 
agentic identity is reconfirmed and created, ever anew” (Jones, 2000:67).  
“The twofold character of grace” (Jones, 2002:57), justification and sanctification, provide woman 
with freedom and form. Within the community of faith, this takes on the form of excellence and 
freedom (Jones, 2002:69). Jones describes the “interrelated nature of justification and sanctification” 
(2002:69). Justification is seen as the “ground out of which sanctification grows.” “When one 
recognises the power of God’s justifying love, one cannot help but celebrate that reality by forming 
one’s life in the image of the One who has so freely loved”. “When one “puts on Christ” (when one is 
sanctified), one is adorned in freedom that Christ gives us (the reality of justification)” (Jones, 
2002:69-70).  
                                                     
16Serene Jones describes in this regard: “As I shall later illustrate, this containment is communal in character: its 
shaping force lies in the space of Calvin’s mother church or, better from a feminist perspective, in the 
community of faith adorned in freedom” (2000:65).   
17“Recall constructivism’s two principal contributions to a theory of ‘woman’. Its critical function- that of 
exposing the illusions of falsely inscribed gender ‘truths’ that have patterned women’s lives for centuries … Its 
alternative view of personhood- persons as relational and fluid subjects- is captured by the doctrine’s notion of 
imputed righteousness: the new identity one puts on in Christ. To rethink this dimension of the doctrine of 
justification from a feminist perspective, remember the constructivist notion that ‘gender’ … is best described as 
a ‘performance’ (Jones, 2000:66). 
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Serene Jones takes feminist theory and feminist theology to be conversation partners. Where feminist 
theory provides a “critical lens”, feminist theology provides a platform where “conceptual tangles” 
(2001c:298) may be worked out through doctrine. This is only possible when the apparent binaries, 
such as justification and sanctification, are seen to function paradoxically and not parasitically (Jones, 
2001c:303). Doctrine consequently has “two simultaneous images: one of dismantling critique and 
freeing judgment, the other of organic wholeness and envelopment” (Jones, 2001c:299). Furthermore, 
the tension between “exaggerated notions of responsibility and rather despairing notions of 
entrapment” (Jones, 2001c:301) seen in the themes of women’s nature, oppression and identity, are set 
within the “imaginistic economies standing together as markers of a single self” (Jones, 2001c:301).  
Serene Jones continues from the imaginistic economies to what she calls an “eschatological 
(normative) vision” (2001a:162). It is to this “eschatological (normative) vision” that she turns in her 
appropriation of the doctrine of grace for example. She does this by using biblical narratives, the 
metaphors of dramas or scripts (Jones, 2000:20) and the imagination (Jones, 2009:20). Jones indicates 
(2000:20):  
As I discussed earlier, doctrines can be understood as sets of performative directives that define the 
possibilities and boundaries of appropriate Christian identity and behaviour. Christians and Christian 
communities can be said to ‘perform’ these scripts when, in faith, they try to follow their rules and 
directives. Doing so involves some individual and collective improvisation. To enact a dramatic role, one 
has to make the script one’s own while recognizing that one does not own it-the script has its own logic 
from which the actor improvises. In this process of improvisation, feminist theory suggests to us new 
performative possibilities. As it remaps traditional doctrinal terrain, it allows Christians to find new ways 
to live (enact) their knowledge of the reality of God’s grace. 
To stay true to Serene Jones’ method of making feminist theory and Christian theology two sides of 
the same coin, she turns to the source of our brokenness, sin. She investigates the relation that 
oppression has to sin by moving beyond oppression as social phenomenon to the role of sin in 
“despoiling” humanity (Jones, 2000:106) later named, “grace-denied” (Jones, 2000:123). Serene Jones 
explains (2000:93): 
Perhaps the most significant constant is our belief…that the brokenness we experience is not right, that 
there must be another way for us to live, a way that enables the flourishing of women and of all people … 
When we move feminist theory into this new world of theology, our understanding of injustice deepens 
and our basic assumptions about women and the character of our brokenness are challenged.  
For women, the doctrine of sin has been highly ambivalent as the character of their brokenness was 
traditionally seen inherent in their sexuality (Jones, 2000: 94). In this way, the concept of sin became 
oppressive in and of itself (Jones, 2000:94). Jones consequently introduces the doctrine of original sin 
with much caution and allows, in the case of her Tuesday night group, the experience of each woman 
to “map” their reading of sin: “It was thus important that our Lenten study honour the particular 
stories of our members … This meant allowing our experiences of oppression to guide us as we turned 
to the study of … original sin” (Jones, 2000:94). 
It is noteworthy that Serene Jones employs a similar methodology to that of Calvin in his Institutes 
when considering Christian doctrine (1995:201). 
 
However, as Calvin begins the task of constructing Christian doctrines, these earlier sentiments undergo a 
subtle transformation. He continues to make judgments about the meaning of doctrine based on its social 
function and use, and he continues to respect the complexity of the ways by which doctrines must be 
accommodated to the capacities and contexts of their audiences. 
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Jones’ approach to sin in light of the doctrine of justification and sanctification is a “traditional 
Reformed rendition”, albeit with a different point of departure (2000:95). Whereas feminist theory 
traditionally situates original sin with creation and the imago dei, Serene Jones suggests that (2000:95-
96), 
 
Approaching sin from the perspective of justification and sanctification means seeing sin from the 
eschatological perspective of the woman who knows herself as sanctified and justified in faith, both now 
and in the promise of things to come.  
She turns to Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian religion where Calvin makes the knowledge of sin a 
function of Christian faith (Jones, 2000:98). It “depends on a prior doctrine of grace” where 
knowledge of sin lies in knowledge of humanity apart from sin, a knowledge that is given in faith 
alone” (Jones, 2000:98). Jones accordingly makes four comments, (a) “Sin is identified as theological 
concept” where its meaning only truly functions if understood as the negation of “God’s positive 
purposes for humanity” (Jones, 2000:98). (b) “Sin is a distinctly dogmatic concept” … ”we can see 
the wretchedness of our situation only if God reveals it to us by opening our eyes in faith” (Jones, 
2000:98). (c) “As a grace-dependent concept, sin can never be understood apart from simultaneous 
affirmation of the promised grace that contradicts it” (Jones, 2000:98). Finally (d), “sin-talk is a tool 
of faith’s pedagogy (Jones, 2000:99) and must thus not be used “to constrain the conditions of their 
(women’s) flourishing” (Jones, 2004a:263).  
Calvin uses the image of bereavement to depict the “wretchedness” of humanity as unfaithfulness 
(Jones, 2000:107). Unfaithfulness is a position “bereft of the benefits of faith: it is to be without both 
the sanctifying structure of God’s love and the ever renewing forgiveness of justification” (Jones, 
2000:107). Serene Jones refers to two metaphors used by John Calvin; despoilment and a juridical 
setting. The former refers to “a loss of skin or, to use the language of sanctification, the loss of the 
enveloping grace that holds us together and gives our lives direction and purpose” (Jones, 2000:107), 
while the latter speaks of human agency which is “tempered” by “our servitude to the sin that binds 
us” and the responsibility to be taken for sin in light of God’s righteousness (Jones, 2000:107).  
To stay true to the feminist theological agenda, Serene Jones continues to do what Valerie Saiving 
Goldstein18 argues for, “that Christians need to expand their imaginative categories for naming sin to 
include the experiences of women” (Goldstein in Jones, 2004a:262). The question becomes “What 
does sin look like when the sinner in question is socialised to be subservient rather than 
dominating?”19 (Jones, 2004a:262). Asked differently, how does this doctrine “shape their becoming” 
(Jones, 2000:108). Jones investigates what content within the doctrine of sin warrants a reading of 
oppression as sin: “The short answer is that the two (feminist theory and feminist theology)20 are 
viewing the world through different “lived imaginative constructs- different interpretive lenses” 
(2000:108).  
Inherent in the lens of feminist theologians is that “God wills the flourishing of all people” (Jones, 
2000:108). It is an eschatological moment breaking into the present, “women’s oppression is no 
                                                     
18 Serene Jones references Valerie Saiving Goldstein’s contribution as “Valerie Saiving Goldstein, “The Human 
Situation: A Feminine View,” Journal of Religion 40 (April 1960)” 100-112.” (2004a:262).  
19 This statement is made in light of the classical Augustinian conception of sin as “excessive self-centredness 
and robust pride” (Jones, 2004a: 262).  
20 Jones refers here to the two different ways that feminist theorists and feminist theologians look at violence as 
either oppression or sin (2000:109). 
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longer simply a social phenomenon (as feminist theorists see it) but that which defies the will of God” 
(Jones, 2000:109). A world without oppression is constantly threatened by daily realities with the 
result that “the theological vision of flourishing easily slips away” (Jones, 2000:109). Using the 
example made earlier of the Caribbean woman, Jones proffers: “The Caribbean woman’s imaginative 
power cannot stretch to see her without muscles tensed each day to repel racism. She can name her 
oppression, but to call it “sin” and tie it to a vision of God’s redemption is a different matter” 
(2000:109).  
As a result of the fact that sin blinds women to the true nature of their oppression, grace comes from 
outside their normative framework and provides “a vision that has the power to transform our 
knowledge of harms and injustices into knowledge of sin” (Jones, 2000:109). Redemption becomes an 
alternative reality, where the effects wrought by sin “does not linger long: in faith, she affirms the 
reality of redemption, the future of women’s flourishing” (Jones, 2000:110). In effect, hope serves as 
foundation for the eschatological orientation towards flourishing.  
The unique contribution of feminist theology exists in the reading of sin from an economy of grace 
(Jones, 2000:124). “This perspective permits feminist theologians to have a broader understanding of 
oppression than do feminist theorists. It allows them to be both less and more optimistic about the 
brokenness of our world, particularly with respect to women” (Jones, 2000:124). “Feminist 
conceptions of sin also provide hope for women’s liberation against what often seem daunting odds. 
In faith, grace accompanies us in the struggle, and we know that the victory has already been won and 
is assured in the future” (Jones, 2000:124). Grace consequently, “continues to define God’s undaunted 
love for humanity …” (Jones, 2000:125).  
Serene Jones illustrates a discomfort with the sin-grace model employed in the doctrine of 
sanctification and justification in her reading of sin. She further problematises the sin-grace dichotomy 
in light of oppression and violence toward women by suggesting that it breeds “an almost instinctual 
optimism about change that is hard to sustain” (Jones, 2009: 155).   
Serene Jones has indicated how doctrine and Scripture shape the identity of women through their 
identification with the redemptive narrative. Due to the shaping potential, gender insensitive readings 
need to be critically engaged with. Jones does this by establishing grace, instead of sin, as forum 
where women’s agency finds their expression. The result is a reading of the doctrine of justification 
and sanctification where the emphasis is placed on grace which gives to women a new role in the 
redemptive narrative. Grace may consequently be understood to affirm the agency of women which 
enables their happiness and flourishing.  
2.4 Grace enabled flourishing 
In the last chapter of Trauma and Grace, Serene Jones shows a discomfort with “the fundamental 
dramatic structure of the sin-grace model” which remains unquestioned (2009:155). Jones holds that 
“whether it was liberation theology, feminist theology, or substitutionary atonement theology (all of 
which rely on a version of the basic story line), the story bred an almost instinctual optimism about 
change that is hard to sustain” (Jones, 2009:155). “At the crudest level, it trains one to assume that if 
one works hard enough at healing, one will obtain what one asks for” (Jones, 2009:155). The “harsh 
fact” is “that the vast majority of trauma survivors reach the end of their lives still caught in its 
terrifying grip” (Jones, 2009:155). Serene Jones questions “how do we come to grips with the fact that 
a mind disordered and diseased by violence might well be one in which the very “imagining” 
mechanism necessary for redemption has been broken … beyond repair” (2009:155).  
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Serene Jones engages in a search for a “trauma-wizened version of the sin-grace story” (2009:157). 
The moment of simultaneous embrace, where the crucifixion narrative enables an individual to behold 
Christ while also being beheld, is significant for the process of discovering a new way of 
understanding grace. “What matters is the physical sensation of simultaneously loosing yourself (to 
pain, to fear, or to just the strangeness of the motion) and being safely held while it happens. 
According to trauma theory, this off-kilter embrace enacts the therapeutic insight: by testifying and 
bearing witness, you intuitively learn to bear up under the weight of the trauma you are speaking” 
(Jones, 2009:160). “Theologically, this strange embrace physically performs the promise that through 
grace, we are found, forgiven, and fortified by God” (Jones, 2009:160). 
The “strange embrace” becomes the premise of a “trauma-wizened” grace argues Jones (Jones, 2009: 
160):  
Unlike the vanquishing of sin in the old story of sin-grace, this double motion of loss and support 
physically enacts the reality of being a sinner and a saint, not in succession but both at the same time. 
Fully, we are undone and yet also held together in the strong grip of divine compassion. 
An unexpected moment comes in the process of being “thrown open” when ones is “viscerally 
extended toward your surroundings” (Jones, 2009:160). “Theologically cast, the moment enacts the 
embodied grace feeling of accepting your life as a gift and a promise, and living in the expansive 
sense of time and space that this gift provides” (Jones, 2009:161).  
Grace evokes “two habits of spirit” (Jones, 2009:161), which Jones calls “mourning and wonder” 
(2009:161). Serene Jones admits (2009:161, 165): 
Neither one answers the question that trauma poses to grace. They are, instead, states of mind that, if 
nurtured, open us to the experience of God’s coming into torn flesh, and to love’s arrival amid violent 
ruptures… At the edge of every thought, there resides the promise of both ever-deepening loss and 
insistently imposed newness … there is a space that both carries traumatic loss and yet remains open and 
new. This is a profoundly presentist vision of life, landing us hard in the here and now: to be saved is not 
to be taken elsewhere” neither is it “driven toward evolving resolution. It is to be awakened- to mourn and 
to wonder. And to stand courageously on the promise that grace is sturdy enough to hold it all. 
Jones follows a similar logic when approaching the church as graced community. She starts her 
chapter on community by looking at the various critiques feminist theory has levelled at the church as 
social institution, after which she offers a new perspective.  
In a discussion held with Serene Jones’ Tuesday-night group on the distinctiveness of the church as 
community, eight features came to the fore. (1) The church as community where “Scripture is 
recounted and listened to”, (2) within Scripture “the theme of community is sounded repeatedly,” (3) 
“the story (of Scripture) is recounted in many different ways,” (4) “people have a rather peculiar 
relationship to this story.” (5) “Church as the community that imitates and performs21 us,” (6) “people 
describe themselves as “called22” into this community by God,” (7) church as community takes 
precedence over other communities, but “the church never constructs our world in isolation from our 
other communal commitments: it normatively shapes us in the midst of them” (Jones, 2000:156-158).  
                                                     
21“The image of performance clarifies the way the church inhabits Scripture. It captures even better than 
imitation the theatrical dimensions of the church’s life in the narrative” (Jones, 2000:157). 
22 In the act of being called, “divine initiative” is displayed. “The church thus experiences its existence as a gift” 
(Jones, 2000:158).  
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The final characteristic of the church has to do with the often “unquestioned authority” it has been 
given in the past, “We knew from history that the church’s view of itself as chosen had justified 
horrendous acts of injustice against women and many other as well” (Jones, 2000:158). The final 
characteristic was thus the churches “identity as a sinful community” (Jones, 2000:159). The church 
consequently becomes a place where “those who have faith” (Jones, 2000:159) come together. Jones 
emphasises the “fallenness” (2000:159) of the church in “creating the golden calf” and “oppressing 
the poor” (Jones, 2000:159). For such instances, the “language of performance” is used by Jones; “the 
church simultaneously performs the roles of the righteous and the unrighteous - of both saints and 
sinners” (2000:159). The church is therefore “engaged in a continual process of internal critique-a 
process of continued reformation-lest its faith pronouncements and practices become destructive idols 
of its own creation” (Jones, 2000:159).  
The reason for seeing the church as graced community is motivated by Serene Jones in the statement: 
“While I am aware of the church’s ongoing sinfulness, I experience it as a place where I can respond 
to the Christian and feminist call to live in and struggle with communities of diversity seeking justice” 
(2000:161). She continues to describe the church as one place where one can “live in intentional and 
diverse communities” (Jones, 2000:161).  
The notion of simul iustus et peccator is applied to the church where “a collective people” “is 
similarly undone by divine judgment and remade by divine grace” (Jones, 2000:162). According to its 
status as simultaneously justified and sinner, the church as community is placed in the “defendant” 
seat (Jones, 2000:162). Jones continues (2000: 163): 
Standing under the judgment of the law, this church is not only condemned because of its false 
institutional pride and its arrogant functionalist pretensions: it is so levelled by the law that it can finally 
claim no special standing, in its own rite, before God. 
As such, the church “is fully implicated in the sins of the world” (Jones, 2000:163) it too stands 
“undone” before God (Jones, 2000:163) with no means of justifying itself from within itself. The 
church is only deemed “forgiven” when God pronounces the church “justified” through the 
reconciliation brought in Jesus Christ (Jones, 2000:163). “As such, it is a community whose identity 
comes to it from beyond itself. It receives the name “forgiven”” (Jones, 2000:163) and a “space is 
created where God’s will for human flourishing might be embodied, in this space, people might know 
God and be formed by God’s love” (Jones, 2000:170-171).  
As result of the “alien righteousness” (Jones, 2000:56) being given to the church, it responds in 
thankfulness by proclaiming “God’s reconciling the world to Godself in Jesus Christ” an act which is 
in itself a “performance” (Jones, 2000:163). A performance which recognises its “full implication in 
the sin the cross reveals” (Jones, 2000:163). With Luther’s emphasis of the justified community of 
believers, Serene Jones turns to Calvin’s doctrine of the church.  
Calvin displays a different approach to the “institutional aspects of ecclesial life” than Luther, where 
Luther, “realizes that the earthly church inevitably takes institutional form, his basic disposition 
toward authority and institutions is largely negative” (Jones, 2000:165). “Calvin, in contrast, dwells on 
the institutional features of ecclesial existence: he delights in them, struggles with them, and in his 
own life tried to shape them” (Jones, 2000:165). Serene Jones attributes Calvin’s “positive references 
to the church” (2000:165) in his vocation as teacher of ministry students (Jones, 2000:165). These 
ministry students were headed for “parishes in France”, where they were “actively persecuted” and 
was intent on “fostering forms of community resilient enough to resist outside forces seeking to 
destroy them” (Jones, 2000:165). Accordingly, Jones believes the doctrine of sanctification to be “one 
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of the responses to the hardships faced by the community” (2000:165). “Calvin’s doctrine of the 
church therefore focuses more on the processes by which a faith community is formed and maintained 
than on the monetary juridical decision central to Luther’s account of community” (Jones, 2000:165).  
The particular characteristic of grace as “envelope” (Jones, 2002c:60) has the similar function in a 
communal reading, “the church as a communal context in which people are pulled together and given 
defining practices and institutional form by a sanctifying grace” (Jones, 2000:165). This 
understanding of sanctification extends to two metaphors; the church as “God’s accommodation” and 
the church as “Mother” (Jones, 2000:166). The church as God’s accommodation is for Serene Jones 
“The external means or aims by which God invites us into the society of Christ and holds us therein” 
(2000:166), “the central drama of the sanctified life in its corporate dimensions” (Jones, 2000:166). 
Here, “God’s grace welcomes us into it and then contains and embraces us once we arrive” (Jones, 
2000:166).  
The church as mother underscores the “forming power of Christian community” (Jones, 2000:167): 
“Just as a child is knit together in her mother’s womb, the people of faith are conceived and brought to 
life in the corporate body of the church” (Jones, 2000:167). Two implicit images are noteworthy for 
Serene Jones, “the material and embodied ways in which the church forms us” (2000:167). “In the 
womb of the Christian community, we are pulled together and refashioned in a manner that 
contradicts the chaos of sin and gives us new patterns of living in Christ’s life” (Jones, 2000:167).  
The two “moments” (Jones, 2002:55) provide the graced community with “the convictional ground 
for understanding the importance of “the excellence of practices.” Justification complements “this 
understanding of forming grace by stressing “the freedom of practices” (Jones, 2002:55). Serene Jones 
has illustrated in the doctrine of justification and sanctification how grace deconstructs the brokenness 
of humanity while creating a forum wherein the brokenness may be healed. The community of faith 
undergoes a similar process, termed “bounded openness” (Jones, 2000: 170). Serene Jones 
underscores the notion of “bounded openness” in her feminist ecclesiology. A feminist ecclesiology 
serves to continue the affirmation of agency in both the individual and the community of believers.   
2.5 The graced agency of the church 
In seeking to establish a feminist ecclesiology, Serene Jones focuses on the “eschatological vision that 
undergirds and drives it” (2000:170). The image of “bounded openness”23 describes the process where 
“the church adopts certain rules and normative claims, while remaining open to God, others, and the 
world” (Jones, 2001b:49). This image “draws together” the two perspectives of Luther and Calvin, 
while remaining aware of “the tension between normative agendas” and a feminist suspicion of “false 
universals” (Jones, 2000:170). The image of bounded openness “sums up the debate” between 
liberalist and communitarian theories of community24 (Jones, 2000:170):  
                                                     
23 Here, Serene Jones alludes to a third path between liberal and communitarian theories, “a path that values the 
liberative potential of both normative rigor and historical openness.” The notion of bounded openness is not 
without its tension: “Liberal social contract theory gives us boundedness in the form of its universal principles 
and its robust understanding of rights … As feminists point out, however, liberalism’s universals are gender 
biased and its procedures may not facilitate the openness they seek.” “Communitarianism gives us boundedness 
in its insistence on the thick cultural and institutional particularities of communal life ... As feminists argue, 
however, communities” boundedness can become an uncritical celebration of patriarchal values, and without a 
gender analysis, their openness may be more confining than liberating” (Jones, 2000:152).  
24Liberalism: “The model of political community with which most people in North America are familiar,… 
Liberalism thus gives primacy to a theory of the self in its definition of ideal community … As one can see, 
liberal theory is driven by the desire to create a rationally ordered social environment in which persons with 
differing interests and aspirations can peacefully coexist (Jones, 2000:135-137).  
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Ecclesial boundedness embraces both the boundedness of liberalism’s universal principles and the 
boundedness of communitarianism’s thick community formation. Ecclesial openness, affirms both the 
respect for difference crucial to liberalism and the irreducible particularity of tradition important to 
communitarianism.  
In order to account for the unique contribution that an “eschatological ecclesiology” makes to feminist 
theology, Serene Jones finds the correlation of the church to community insufficient. “The language of 
“church” and “community” (in the liberal/communitarian debate) are so different one cannot simply 
correlate them. Instead, one must tell the ecclesial story in a new way, uncovering dramatic forces 
similar to those in the story of political community” (Jones, 2000:170).  
The analogy of divine forgiveness and undoing comes to the fore again when seeking “to understand 
the church as gift of God” (Jones, 2000:170). Jones indicates that: “In each story, the economy of 
grace in the God-church relation is different, both, however, are necessary to apprehend the singular 
yet complex reality of ecclesial community” (2000:171). The “two economies of relation” are that of 
touch, where the “church is created by a grace that embraces and contains it” (Jones, 2000:171) and 
speech through the reading of Scripture. “God’s word brings the church into existence as people hear 
the gospel news and believe” (Jones, 2000:171).  
In one moment, states Serene Jones (2000:171):  
This word breaks in upon the church as a judgment that profoundly undoes it. Grace disarticulates the sins 
of the community, and God’s judgment ruptures its boundaries, exposing the arrogance of its false 
adornments and undoing its many pretensions.  
In the next moment, she (Jones, 2000:173) suggests: 
this graced word also redeploys the church as a constantly forgiven community of sinners: it permits the 
church to forever start again, knowing that God’s love embraces it regardless of its feeble mistakes and 
gross misdeeds. 
The two images of adornment and forgiveness allow Jones to relate to liberal/communitarian theories 
by looking at “the emancipatory practices associated with each” (2000:173). As “adorning church”, 
the church focuses on “enclosure and formation” over and above “devolution and critique” (Jones, 
2000:173). “In all these ways25, this church gives great attention to the formation and nurture of 
faithful subjects who know themselves created and redeemed by God” (Jones, 2000:173). Forgiveness 
as openness goes beyond the formation of its own to seeking “practices that honour the bodies of all 
people.” 
The church becomes “an advocate for those in the broader culture as well as in its own midst” (Jones, 
2000:173). “Recognizing the grace that envelops and defines the integrity of all creation, this church 
contests institutions and practices that fracture and diminish” and “it has a positive vision of the kind 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Communitarianism: “Communitarianism” refers to a wide range of perspectives in contemporary political theory 
… What these perspectives have in common-what makes them communitarian- is their rejection of liberalism’s 
isolated individualism in favour of a more community-centred understanding of human life ... Rather than 
ground their reflections on ideal community in a rational account of the abstract, isolated, self-interested ‘man of 
reason’ and his actions in the public realm of politics, communitarians thus look to our neighbourhoods, our 
churches, our ethnic traditions, and our extended family networks to find a whole clutch of values and views of 
self that form our view of communality and our sense of a good society” (Jones, 2000:144-145).  
25 Serene Jones refers here to the various graced practices (2002) the church engages with to ensure its 
boundedness. “Many different practices fall under this rubric: practices of birthing, nurturing, comforting, and 
protecting” (Jones, 2000:173).  
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of space human beings need to flourish” (Jones, 2000:173). In the process of envisioning a space 
where human beings can flourish, practices are created “in which the freedom of the church allows it 
to reach beyond itself to serve the needs of others. These practices of outpouring mimic the gifted 
nature of God’s forgiving grace” (Jones, 2000:173). 
The sanctified and justified church work together in bounded openness: “The sanctified church is 
skilled in the crafts of creating community: it binds people together by establishing and enforcing 
shared rules and a common sense of identity. The justified church is forever transgressing those 
boundaries in order to greet what is different from it.” They thus “require” one another (Jones, 
2000:174).  
The church described by Serene Jones is seen by her as a “preliminary aesthetic of community.” “It 
provides two images of a single community that, when laid upon each other, create a portrait of 
communal life in which a substantive, walled structure opens itself both to the grace that posits it and 
the people it is called to serve” (Jones, 2000:175). The church “in traditional terms of theological 
ecclesiology,” “is both a “sacramental embodiment” of grace and a “witness” to grace” (Jones, 
2000:175).  
The church as graced community has “the most basic claim undergirding the vision- the claim that 
ecclesial community is a gift from God” (Jones, 2000:176). This claim calls for “its materiality” to be 
“treasured” and “the freedom it affords celebrated” (Jones, 2000:176). The eschatological vision of the 
church as graced community resonates with feminist theory’s “hopes of envisioning community as it 
should be” (Jones, 2000:176).  
In the aforementioned paragraphs, Serene Jones brings liberal/communitarian theory into conversation 
with feminist theology. A process described by her as theory being “pulled into (or unwillingly 
dragged into) the strange universe of faith and unfolded from inside this perspective” (2001b:55). 
Theory simultaneously effects the workings of the boundedness of the church as it, “in turn, push(es) 
against the contours of this strange universe, shifting its infrastructure and pressing its boarders” 
(Jones, 2001b:55).  
The dynamic interplay of conversation partners leads Serene Jones to reflect in her article “Bounded 
Openness”26 (2001b) on Luce Irigaray’s methodology. Irigaray’s methodology is one where a self-
critical posture might lead towards giving “up on the task of making normative, bold, and often 
unambiguous truth claims about the content of the Christian confession.” Jones (like Irigaray) prefers 
that a “deconstructive moment” be “accompanied by the constructive (cataphatic) moment of 
normative assertion” (Irigaray in Jones, 2001b:56). She sees this as “a call for theology to rightly 
ground its normative assertions in the soil of its confessed story- the story of God with us in Jesus 
Christ- and its compelling beauty” (Jones, 2001b:57). Serene Jones describes this narrative as 
(2001b:58): 
                                                     
26 In “Bounded Openness”, Serene Jones engages with the theme of the church, postmodernism and feminism. 
She looks at each respective perspective with specific focus on the “deconstructive posture” of postmodernism. 
“This deconstructive posture forces us to be especially self-conscious about the grounds we use to justify a given 
theological position, particularly if those grounds are of an uncritical Enlightenment variety. As we engage in 
doctrinal reflection, the postmodernist asks us to remember that what often passes for universal, rational truth 
may well be more a product of culture than of a mythic “unencumbered reason” (Jones, 2001b:55-56). She goes 
on to argue: “However, I part ways with such positions when the desire to embrace this negative moment leads 
one finally to give up on the task of making normative, bold, and often unambiguous truth claims about the 
content of the Christian confession” (Jones, 2001b:56).  
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The church is not a community of sinners … It is a community marked by a grace that constantly opens it 
outward in two directions. On the one hand, the church is called to look beyond itself to the God who calls 
it into being and to offer praise for the grace that holds it…On the other hand, the church knows that it has 
been called into being by God not simply for its own sake but for the purpose of serving the world…In 
both these ways, then, the church is a community of radical openness: openness to God, openness to the 
world. 
The narrative of grace creates a conceptual arena wherein the “bounded openness” (Jones, 2001b:57) 
of the church may be practiced. The community of faith is given a normative framework for living as 
“graced individuals” whereby they are characterised by both adornment and freedom. Similar to the 
grace enabled flourishing of women, the church is enabled to flourish communally through grace that 
“embraces and contains it” (Jones, 2000:17). The church accordingly creates practices that attests to 
their grace enabled flourishing which are a healing performances.   
2.6 Grace as an arena for healing performances 
Serene Jones makes the transition from theory to practice in her description of doctrine as “lived 
imaginative landscapes” and “dramas”. Doctrine extends beyond “propositional statements affirmed 
as true in faith, more broadly, these doctrines function as conceptual arenas within which Christian 
identity is shaped and the contours of Christian life are formed” (Jones, 2002:74).  
“As lived imaginative landscapes, doctrines serve as conceptual territory within which Christians 
stand to get their conceptual bearings on the world and the reality of God therein” (Jones, 2002:74). 
“The term ‘imaginative’ functions to describe the role doctrines play in structuring the conceptual 
terrain of our thought and action” so that doctrines “demarcate the interpretive field through which we 
view the world and ourselves and are not merely ‘truth claims’ whose objective factuality demands 
our assent” (Jones, 2002:74). Doctrines as “dramatic scripts” which “Christians perform and are 
performed by” alludes to “the person-shaping character of doctrine” (Jones, 2002:75). In both of the 
above mentioned cases doctrine necessarily implicate practice (Jones, 2002:75), “Practices are not just 
things we do in light of doctrine: practices are what we become as we are set in motion in the space of 
doctrine” (Jones, 2002:75). Imaginative landscape and drama co-exist, affirming “the relationship that 
exists between the imaginative intention of the person or community engaging in a practice and the 
visible grammar of the practice itself” (Jones, 2002:75).  
In her book, Trauma and Grace (2009), Serene Jones continues from doctrines as imaginative 
landscape and dramatic script to that which undoes this “conceptual terrain” (2009:13), trauma and 
violence. She broadly defines trauma as any act of violence (or oppression) “where one experiences 
the threat of annihilation” (Jones, 2009:13). This threat of annihilation has the potential of 
“disordering the imagination” (Jones, 2002: 119), the very platform from which doctrine functions 
(Jones, 2009:20). “A traumatic event reconfigures the imagination, affecting our ability to tell stories 
about ourselves and our world that are life giving and lead to our flourishing” (Jones, 2009:20).  
Jones sees a “traumatized mind as a challenge of healing imagination” (2009:20). In the articles 
published from her book Trauma and Grace27(2009), she “attempts to think through the implications” 
of traumatic “experiences” “for the healing work of theology and faith communities today” (Jones, 
2009:21). “The Christian faith provides a manner of imagining that inspires a way of life shaped 
deeply by biblical stories, rituals, and traditions, and it has its own ways of ordering the imagination” 
                                                     
27“Emmaus Witnessing: Trauma and the Disordering of the Theological Imagination” (Jones, 2001d), “Sin, 
Creativity, and the Christian Life” (Jones & Rigby, 2004a) and “Hope Deferred: Theological Reflection on 
Reproductive Loss (Infertility, miscarriage, stillbirth)” (Jones, 2001e). 
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(Jones, 2009:21). In this way, Serene Jones tries to “explore how an imagination shaped by grace 
might meet and heal an imaginative world disordered by violence” (2009:21).  
Jones describes the imaginative landscape shaped by a Christian identity (2009:21): 
A Christianly formed imagination thus tells stories about people who are agents in their own lives, with 
God-given grace to act, moving through concrete embodied history in time, coherently connected to their 
own pasts and the stories of others who came before them, related intimately to other people and to the 
good creation that sustains them, and looking forward in hope to a flourishing future. 
In the article “Inhabiting Scripture, Dreaming Bible” (2007) Serene Jones describes Scripture as the 
means through which God continuously comes to us (2007:76). She describes how “Scripture and its 
many stories captivate our imaginations and brings us to new knowledge of God and ourselves” 
(Jones, 2000:167). Jones remembers that (2007:76): 
As I look back over it all28, it strikes me that at each step along the way, the stories pulled me into their 
realm of imagination in radically different ways. What has remained constant, however, is this dynamic of 
the stories pulling me in, sometimes kicking and screaming, at other times without a struggle, and at still 
other times without my knowing it has happened.  
Serene Jones calls this process of “Scriptural pull” the “inhabitation” of her imagination by Scripture 
(2007:78). From this “inhabited” space, she describes Scripture as nurturing in her “a profound and 
abiding feeling that existence is not only contingent on God’s will but is unfolding in space that exists 
only and forever in God” (Jones, 2007:78). From the imaginative landscape of Scripture, Jones locates 
the “reordering of imagination” (2002:119) through the reframing of traumatic stories “in the context 
of the story of our faith”29 (Jones, 2002:120). She continues to describe the various social institutions 
that will compete to reorder the collective imaginations of America, such as movies30 and comedies. 
In effect, when the traumatic event is rehearsed over and over in the collective memory, these 
comedies or movies provide a different ending to the anticipated traumatic31 event (Jones, 2002: 124). 
In the context of collective disordering of the imagination, Serene Jones believes “the tale of the 
disciples meeting Jesus on the road to Emmaus” (Luke 24:13-43) with its “images” and “narrative” to 
“work better than the logic of systematics,” “when trying to re-order the disordered thoughts of a 
people in crisis” (2002:125). She believes the disciples to be trauma survivors, evidenced “in their 
speech and their bodies the reality of the horror that unfolded before them and forever pulled their lies 
into its drama” (Jones, 2002:126). Three “moments” occur in the process of orientation, where Jesus 
“comes to them:” firstly, “Jesus walks up and joins them,” symbolising the “coming of God into a 
                                                     
28 Here, Serene Jones refers to experiences that had formed her from the age of thirteen, such as baptism, the 
birth of her daughter and when she had cancer. At each moment different scriptural stories came alive “in ways 
hitherto unimaginable” (2007:76).  
29 Jones locates the process of reframing in the church as a community of faith because the event of 9/11 caused 
collective trauma to occur (2007:119). As such, it is necessary that the church engage collectively in a re-
imaginative process.   
30 Serene Jones refers here to the presence of “vengeful patriotism, exclusionary compassion and escapist 
comedies” (2002:124).  
31 Jones describes trauma as causing a “memory breach” in an individual who experiences trauma, as the 
imagination calls to remembrance the events continuously without the experiences associated with the trauma 
ceasing. Thus, every time the imagination remembers the traumatic event, the body responds as though it is 
experiencing the trauma anew. “To suffer from a traumatic stress disorder is to live in a mental world where the 
usual landmarks of meaning have fallen down and the most familiar path to reordering this disordered world is 
to repeat the event” (Jones, 2007:119).   
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place of disordered violence,” secondly, “Jesus breaks the pattern of their storytelling,32“ finally, 
“through a bodily gesture that is deeply embracing,” “an event of life-giving communion,” “the 
repetitive cycle is broken, and their imaginations are reframed around a shared table” (Jones, 
2002:126-127). 
Instead of returning to a “state of previous innocence”, the disciples wrestle with the traumatic event 
whilst witnessing of Christ (Jones, 2002:127), the disciples “want to believe in a world where Jesus 
lives, where hope stands strong, but they cannot seem to get there. They say all the right words, but 
the truth remains elusive…Belief and horror stand together” (Jones, 2002:127). It is this disposition 
that marks the church that has collective disordered imaginations. “According to Lawrence Langer33, 
after trauma, we never return to a state of previous innocence. The survivor does not travel a road 
from the normal to the bizarre back to the normal again … but from the normal to the bizarre back to a 
normalcy so permeated by the bizarre encounter with atrocity that it can never be purified again. The 
two worlds haunt each other” (Langer in Jones, 2002:127).  
The process of the reimagining and reordering of the imagination occurs in a new reality exemplified 
in the wounds of Christ34, “the way forward will be into the heart of the wounds, by being receptive to 
grace that continually vanishes and returns” (Jones, 2009:41). Finally, “His words ‘Peace be with 
you,’ gives us a vision of what we are called to create among ourselves now and in the days to come” 
(Jones, 2009:42).  
In a more pastorally orientated context, Serene Jones reads the doctrine of grace through the lens of 
violence. She does so by turning to “Calvin’s most famous biblical commentary, a reading of 
Psalms”35 (2009:43) where “we meet a theologian who is not afraid to jump into the messiness of 
everyday life and explain how this poetry might help one negotiate difficult issues and challenges” 
(2009:45). Calvin’s commentary on the Psalms parallels Jones’ reading of Scripture as imaginative 
landscape; Calvin “called the Bible “a lens we put on” and through which we look at the world,” “he 
also used theatrical images to describe our relation to Scripture” (2009:46). In fact, Scripture is a 
“script of our existence” (Jones, 2009:46). Another parallel lies in Calvin’s view of violence36 (as 
extending beyond the physical to the emotional): “He is similarly aware that their suffering is ongoing 
(not just a past event), that it is collective (not just individual and personal), and that it involves their 
social isolation and marginalization” (Jones, 2009:49).  
In the final instance, similar to Luke 24:13-43, Calvin “using his theological and rhetorical genius, 
interpreted the Psalms in a manner that invited his suffering readers into plays of mind and vistas of 
                                                     
32“Remarkably, he begins to reconstruct their account of his death and continued life, and he does so by first 
interpreting for them the tale of “Moses and the prophets.” He reorders the disciples’ imagination by piling it 
into the history of God’s relation with Israel” (Jones, 2002:126).  
33 Serene Jones references the work of Lawrence Langer as “Lawrence Langer, Versions of Survival: The 
Holocaust and the Human Spirit (Albany: State University of New York Press), 1982, 88 in Emmaus 
Witnessing” (2002:127). 
34 Serene Jones writes in her article “Glorious Creation, Beautiful Law” regarding Calvin’s understanding of the 
relation of Christ to the law: “Christ fully enacts it (the Law) by becoming, in our midst, both a complete and 
full sacrifice and a perfect model of regenerate existence. In this existence Christ performs in the purest and 
clearest form possible the double grace that inspires and constitutes the law” (2006:37).  
35“Calvin called the book an “anatomy of all parts of the soul,” thereby meaning it was a map of a human soul, 
divided, torn, haunted, rageful, terrorized, and yet amazingly made ever hopeful through the enduring presence 
of grace awakened in prayer” (Jones, 2009:43). 
36 Here, Jones offers a brief autobiographical section on the life of Calvin and his history of coming from a 
context of persecution. In her opinion, Calvin likens himself to David, in that David was persecuted and had a 
pastoral heart towards “the folks of old to whom the Psalms were written, they embodied the anatomy of a 
tortured soul” (Jones, 2009:48).  
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faithful imagination that he believed would offer them hope and healing” (Jones, 2009:49). By 
inviting readers into the plays of mind present in the Psalms, Calvin (Jones, 2009:52): 
enters into the depths of their traumatic anguish: instead of explaining why they are suffering. He lays 
before them collective patterns of thinking, acting, and feeling that he believes has the power to soothe 
their mental distress even as they continue to experience the ravaging force of traumatic events.  
Prayer is described as a “healing performance” where “we testify” and “God witnesses” (Jones, 
2009:52). “Calvin’s commentary is devoted to showing his readers how this transformation of 
imagination happens when we lift up our groaning to the Divine” (Jones, 2009:53). In prayer an arena 
is created that (a) establishes safety (Herman37 in Jones, 2009:52), (b) remembers and mourns 
(Herman in Jones, 2009:52) and (c) reconnects an individual with the ordinary life (Herman in Jones, 
2009:52). Serene Jones explains (2002:53, 54):  
There needs to be an ongoing, dynamic conversation taking place between a testifier and a witness. In 
testifying the survivor gives voice to previously unspoken agony, and in witnessing, the receiver of the 
testimony is able to confirm that the survivor’s voice is heard and that the plight no longer needs to be 
hidden in a dark corner of the soul, but can be pulled into the light of day and affirmed as a reality worthy 
of sustained lamentation and possible redress.  
Two of Serene Jones’ articles, “Sin, Creativity, and the Christian Life” (2004a) and “Hope Deferred: 
Theological Reflections on Reproductive Loss” (2001e) examine “the working of grace in the lives of 
individuals who have suffered from trauma” and seeks to find patterns of thought whereby “trauma 
survivors can allow grace to speak to them” and “their own lived experiences” (Jones, 2009:100). In 
the instance where grace has enabled new patterns of thought, creativity, beauty and imagination mark 
the agency of women.  
2.7 The graced agency in human flourishing 
Female creativity, imagination and beauty extend beyond the affirmation of human agency to a means 
of participation in “God’s good creation” (Jones, 2004a: 265). When women enact the creativity of 
God, God’s glory is embodied (Jones, 2004a: 265). Serene Jones delineates creativity as follows 
(2004a: 265): 
Our understanding of creativity goes something like this: As creature made by the Creator God, we are 
called to participate actively in God’s good creation. The challenge of the Christian life, in this context, is 
to determine how this creativity might best be enacted. Faithful Creativity is then when Christians seek to 
mimic God’s own creative intentions for the world. The embodiment of this creativity entails the 
embodiment of God’s glory. At the heart of these descriptions is the claim that glory is something that we 
apprehend not just intellectually but through the full range of our senses: it is imaged and embodied. This 
implies that glory has to do with form, shape, and substance.  
Jones also warns the reader of unfaithful account of human creativity (2004a:266): 
Just as creativity may be construed as faithful, depicting the goodness and glory of God made manifest on 
earth, creativity can also be employed unfaithfully, “when we exercise creativity without imagining God’s 
creative intentions, we risk constructing a “hyperreality” that has no relationship to God’s desire for the 
restoration of the world. Creativity divorced from imagining what God desires produces fantasy worlds 
that serve as escapes from reality.  
                                                     
37 Serene Jones references the contribution of Judith Herman as, “Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The 
Aftermath of Violence- from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 52.” 
(2009:170).  
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Two female voices in the New Testament are introduced to depict how female agency is related to sin 
and creativity. These voices are analysed with the purpose of, “(1) explor[ing] the ways in which 
experiences of traumatic violence in our lives can disable our capacity to create in manner that 
enhance our lives and the lives of others” (Jones, 2004a:268) and to (2) “suggest how understanding 
ourselves as ‘sinners’ can, in some instances, enable us more faithfully to create with joy and beauty, 
particularly in contexts where lived experience of harm seems to have stunted our abilities to craft our 
world in meaningful ways” (Jones, 2004a:268).  
The two women are Mary, the mother of Jesus, who is depicted as the “quintessential model of 
creativity” that is called to “bear Divinity” and a woman in the book of Matthew, whom Serene Jones 
names “Rachel” (2004a:269). “She is a woman who has been undone by traumatic violence: her spirit 
fractured by that mythic event the Christian tradition has named “the Slaughter of the Innocents” 
(Jones, 2004a:270).  
Rachel’s story is described as “Trauma and Creativity,” where Trauma is the result of “social sin38“ 
effecting “feelings of powerlessness, memory loss, a loss of personal voice, experiencing an 
unforgiving habit of thought and with all trust in the world violated39“ (Jones, 2004a:274). A depiction 
of “how sin undoes us as creative beings who embody the glory of God” (Jones, 2004a:274). Mary 
“demonstrates that recognizing our identity as sinners can, in fact, simultaneously precipitate our 
acting in creative and transformative ways”(Jones, 2004a:278. “This process is initiated by Mary 
coming to terms with the identity which God has given her, ‘Many generations will call me blessed,’ 
she insists, recognizing the role she is playing, in the present moment, as a creative agent” (Jones, 
2004a:278). “Because she owns up to who she is, she is able not only to imagine a different future, but 
to envision her place in it” (2004a:278).  
Serene Jones creates a scenario where these two women meet to illustrate the way creativity might be 
sparked in this meeting. “Maybe standing there, Rachel is able to catch a glimpse of grace, a fleeting 
hint of redemption, a sense of the hope that long ago faded…What kind of grace is capable of meeting 
her loss?” (2004a:281). The crucified Christ communicates this grace, “Prevenient - and enhancing 
grace” that “bears the double mark of being at once a new freely bestowed, externally composed gift 
and a deeply familiar, intimately known presence- a grace both foreign and indigenous to us” (Jones, 
2004a: 281-282). The glory of Christ lies in a particular form of love, expresses Jones: “It has no 
corollary…It simply is the truth of that moment, in all its inexhaustible particularity” (2004a:283).  
Jones explains (Jones, 2009: 124): 
The good news it reveals to her … is that even if she never knows or acts as the creative, glorifying 
woman she was created to be, her glory shines nonetheless. It shines in the inexhaustible and brilliant 
particularity of her existence, in all its horrifying, lost details.  
Jones affirms, “She is loved: she is glorified and glorifies” (Jones, 2004a:283). Serene Jones describes 
how grace affirms the agency of women and as a result, their creativity, beauty and imagination.  
Grace not only enables an individual to participate in God’s creative activity, but also provides the 
forum wherein an individual becomes the embodiment of God’s glory. The embodiment of God’s 
glory is the epitome of a flourishing and happy disposition. Serene Jones indicates how God’s relating 
                                                     
38“The reality of larger structures of oppression that diminish the flourishing of humanity” (Jones, 2004a:270).  
39 All of the aspects mentioned previously express the negation of agency, time, voice, permission and call, “five 
theological features of “the self” that “are crucial to the creativity of women” (Jones, 2004a:267).  
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with humans through doctrine and Scripture forms a healing performance where individuals and the 
community of faith are given a new role to play in the redemptive narrative. The performance of a 
script marked by grace is one characterised by both freedom and form as well as adornment and 
forgiveness.  
2.8 Conclusion 
Feminist theory and Christian theology are indeed companionable wisdom in Serene Jones’ 
delineation of flourishing. Feminist theory in its critical disposition toward the construction of 
identities helps Jones to question readings of doctrine and Scripture that are life negating. Feminist 
theory moves from a critical disposition toward an emancipatory vision of human existence, a vision 
evident in Jones’ re-reading of the doctrine of justification and sanctification.  
Doctrine and Scripture captures the imagination of its audience (Jones, 2009:13), evoking habits of 
thought that are transformative in nature (Jones, 2002:56). The habits of thought are perpetuated 
through imitation of Christ, which assigns to an individual an identity other than their own. In light of 
a disordered imagination, the antithesis of flourishing, performance of an alien righteousness reorders 
the imagination through grace. Serene Jones’ therapeutic soteriology undergirds her belief that grace 
enables the freedom and agency of a woman (2004a: 265). A flourishing disposition is consequently 
one where the imagination continuously reimagines itself in relation to Christ’s redemptive narrative. 
In addition, a flourishing disposition marks the absence of oppression (Jones, 2004a:260). Through the 
lens of feminist theory, Jones indicates how gendered readings of doctrine and Scripture have 
reinforced an oppressive logic in society (also called structural oppression (2000:89)).   
Happiness may be understood to be intertwined in Serene Jones’ logic of the imagination. In the case 
where an imagination is disordered, women are unable to construct their identities premised on their 
relation to God and the community. The inability to imagine oneself in relation to God and others with 
the negation of freedom and agency (which is also called oppression) is a disposition of unhappiness. 
A state devoid of flourishing is unhappy, as the disordered imagination cannot relate to itself as agent 
participating in salvation. The logic may be turned on its head; if a woman’s imagination is re-ordered 
through the performance of the redemptive narrative, agency and freedom is assigned to her by means 
of grace (Jones, 2000:64). She is an individual who is in a constant position of flourishing.  
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Chapter 3 
Happy? Ellen Charry on human flourishing 
 
“Happiness … is a state of the soul that can be cultivated through a certain way of knowing. It 
depends upon knowing, because knowing shapes the soul …” (Charry, 2004b:26). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Ellen Charry has a unique approach to happiness captured in the phrase “Christian doctrine of 
happiness” (2010:x). The articulation “doctrine of happiness” with the definitive category “Christian” 
hints at three components that underlie her construction and “reclamation” of happiness for theology; 
its church-historical approach, happiness as a state of being and its dependence on knowledge of God 
(Charry, 1998b:379). Theology is described by Charry as not being “a theoretical enterprise - a set of 
ideas that ought to fit together like pieces of a puzzle. Theology is about knowing and growing in the 
love of God and our neighbour so that we flourish in the destiny that God has in mind for us” 
(2002:22).  
The word “doctrine” with its ability to “shape a way of life that forms people for living their lives 
excellently” (Charry, 2010:ix) undergirds Ellen Charry’s excursus of happiness. Doctrine serves for 
Charry as theoretical framework through which happiness and flourishing is addressed. The act of 
flourishing is constituted by the mutual enjoyment between God and humanity, which has as its result 
happiness. Happiness understood as a continuous flourishing disposition is not conditional but a state 
of being that defines the individual. Charry argues (2011a:240): 
The argument is simple. God created for his40 own enjoyment. God enjoys himself when creation 
flourishes. Therefore, God intends that we flourish. To tend to our own flourishing and that of the rest of 
creation...  
She continues to state (Charry, 2011a:240): 
The starting point of the inquiry is that God created for his own pleasure and enjoyment. God’s hope for 
creation is that it flourish that he may rejoice in the beauty and strength of his creative genius. Turning the 
Christian discussion of happiness toward God’s happiness draws us toward a delightful life that furthers 
God’s enjoyment of creation by means of our flourishing and that of the rest of the material world.  
Doctrine is the arena where academic theology, the Augustinian focus on beauty, truth and 
goodness41, soteriology and the search after knowing God come together to unravel the human striving 
after happiness. It is here that the distinctively Christian nature of doctrine comes to the fore as Ellen 
Charry engages with the New Testament, Old Testament and the patristic tradition to uncover a 
“temporal teaching of happiness” (2011a:23). Happiness, as temporal entity has enjoyed less attention 
than an eschatological understanding of happiness. Charry draws the reader’s attention to this reality 
in her book, God and the art of happiness (2010: ix): 
                                                     
40Ellen Charry remarks in a footnote regarding her use of pronouns: “In writing this work I have struggled with 
the question of gender with regard to pronouns for God. Since this work focuses solely on figures who wrote in 
the pre-modern period, when there was no question regarding the use of masculine pronoun, I have decided to 
respect their thought world because to do otherwise would be artificial and jarring. This should not be 
interpreted as excluding other possibilities for current theology but simply as respecting those from whom I seek 
to learn ...” (1997a:30).  
41 Charry understands the themes of beauty, truth and goodness to be evident of a therapeutic dimension within 
Augustine’s reflections (2000c:453). 
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My attention turned to happiness when my beloved husband and companion of forty years died an 
untimely and pointless death. The gap between eschatological happiness and temporal happiness needs to 
be addressed because people experience hardship and grief that sets them off balance, and they wonder 
whether they can ever be happy again in this life, or whether life amount to no more than a vale of tears 
simply to be slogged through somehow in hopes of a heavenly reward.  
Charry introduces the notion of asherism to express how earthly happiness may be pursued 
(2003a:39):  
Jesus boldly begins his formal teaching with a set of traits and circumstances that redescribe radical 
holiness, although he calls it happiness or blessedness. Makarios in the LXX translates “ašrê”, the first 
word of the Psalter…The NRSV translates the first word in the Psalter “happy,” while in Matthew it 
renders makarios “blessed.” The assumption is that happiness and blessedness rest on the same 
circumstances and conditions. 
Asherism denotes a particular understanding of God, where goodness, beauty and wisdom are 
mutually reinforcing (Charry, 2002a:176). Knowledge of God evokes a response in the knower termed 
“sapience” where knowledge is internalised and transformation takes place. The word “sapience” 
consequently describes the process through which knowledge becomes wisdom by the act of 
connecting the knower to the known (God) (Charry, 2006a:167). Moreover, Ellen Charry shows that 
(2006a:167): 
the participation of knower and known in each other is the blessing of being known, knowing, and 
learning. God is blessed by our knowing him, we are blessed by knowing him…If knowing well, 
sometimes gently and sometimes harshly, (trans)forms us through –and even at times into- itself, it is 
indeed true that knowledge cannot be directed other than toward wisdom or toward folly.  
Charry continues in her article “Walking in the truth: on knowing God” (2006a:167):  
strong knowing is a dynamic and interactive process in which both the known and the knower are 
constantly shaping each other. Good knowledge is directed toward wisdom and bad knowledge goes 
toward folly. Knowing is a spiritual craft or art by means of which the soul grows by God’s grace…Good 
knowing is sapiential: it is only possible by divine grace.  
The process of coming to know God presents itself in sacraments, liturgy and obedience to God’s 
commandments, reverberating Ellen Charry’s choice for “asherism.” Asherism denotes a position 
marked by knowledge of God that enables the enjoyment of God through obedience to God’s 
commandments. Happiness describes the moment where knowledge of God, obedience to God’s 
commandments and enjoyment of God marks the life of an individual.  
It is accordingly important for Ellen Charry to emphasise the salutary role of knowledge of God 
because it shapes the way a life is lived excellently. Living a life excellently is predicated on the 
notion of asherism where obedience to God’s commandments communicates a particular knowledge 
of God. When it is understood that God wills the flourishing of creation through God’s 
commandments, life is enjoyed and lived excellently. Knowledge and God were divorced however 
which endangers the salutarity of Knowledge of God. For this reason Ellen Charry seeks to reclaim 
knowledge and God from “secular captivity” (2010:xii).   
3.2 Knowledge of God  
Knowledge and happiness are two concepts Ellen Charry seeks to reclaim from “secular captivity” 
(2010:xii). She traces the separation of knowledge and God through the history of the twelfth and 
thirteenth century, the separation of knowledge and goodness in the seventeenth century and the 
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separation of rational truth and wisdom in the twentieth century (Charry, 2006a:145-147). Each 
respective crisis dislodged knowledge of God, goodness and truth from another leaving in its wake an 
impoverished understanding of happiness. Charry systematically treats each perspective individually 
indicating its relation to the other and its relevance to a theological understanding of happiness. 
In addition to dislodging a theological understanding of happiness from God, goodness and truth, the 
epistemological crises evoked a response from the church which divided it. Ellen Charry consequently 
takes issue with the ‘academizing’ (2006a:145) of theology as knowledge of God underlies happiness 
and human flourishing. In the act of making theology an objective science, happiness recedes to the 
margins where secular notions have constructed it as a fleeting disposition. Charry’s argument for the 
reclamation of happiness begins with Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas as antitheses of the present 
day dichotomy between knowledge of God and happiness.  
Knowledge of God and happiness are themes Ellen Charry discusses separately by deconstructing 
each notion in terms of its reception history, the implication of past dichotomies and its relevance for 
the other. Once she has engaged with each respective perspective, she draws knowledge of God and 
happiness into conversation with another. Charry’s priority toward the flourishing of humanity leads 
her to engage with the asherist commandments in the New and Old Testament. Asherist commands 
enable a way of life characterised by “sustained flourishing as result of living wisely and being 
carefully guided by reverence for God” (Charry, 2011c:347), a life Ellen Charry describes as happy 
(2011c:347).  
Ellen Charry draws a thematic inclusio in her literature on happiness. In By the renewing of your 
minds (1997a), she begins to show how knowing God is salvific by nature. In light of the division 
evoked by modernity between sapience and science, Charry proposes that this division is artificial and 
counter intuitive. Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas serve as examples where such a divide was not 
acknowledged. Charry continues thereafter to implicate a new form of knowing, which evokes 
happiness through participation, obedience and exemplification of Jesus Christ (2010:157), namely 
asherism. Asherism is a practical “living out” the understanding of God, which implicates individual 
and community. As human beings live in accordance to God’s will, creation flourishes and when 
creation flourishes God enjoys Godself (Charry, 2011a:240).  
God and the art of happiness (2010) illustrates how sapience and scientia as a unified form of 
knowing becomes realising eschatology (asherism) (Charry, 2010:110). The happiness wrought by 
Christ is realised on earth when in the act of participating and obeying God, we consciously enact out 
knowledge of becoming one with God. This beatific vision42 transforms our character in order that we 
may live a virtuous life. “A Christian vision of the good life: Happy Pursuits” (2007) illustrates how 
Charry makes this point; “feeling good is the result of doing good in ordinary and common choices of 
daily life. We become happy not by pursuing fleeting moments of pleasure, but by being the self that 
                                                     
42 Ellen Charry indicates the process through which the beatific vision provides Christians with a theological 
identity in her article, “Virtual Salvation” (2004a). She argues: “Our theological self-concept is as one who 
participates in the goodness, light, and beauty of God. It is at the intersection of God’s being and his being 
creator that our true identity lies. Our self-concept is from God’s being, not from the identity that the culture of 
wealth would impose upon us. Divine beauty is its own lure to our self-identification with the truly good, truly 
beautiful order of things” (Charry, 2004a:338,345,346). Charry likens this theological identity to virtual 
salvation, a salvific reality constituted by an entity which exists as centre of a Christian identity: “Although there 
is a real sense in which we are what we do, our virtual theological identity offers us a way to do what we are. It 
is an identity that we do not create and that we cannot destroy, even if we abandon it. Because these theological 
identities are where we have our most noble being, the can gather up and knit together the fragments of our 
tattered, socially constructed selves into a stronger, better fabric” (2004a:338,345,346). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 
 
God created us to be” (2007:31). It is later added that the choices involved in daily life has a moral 
dimension.  
The inclusio culminates when Ellen Charry indicates how a sapiential knowledge of God, a 
characteristic form of knowing that underlies asherism, is strengthened when one realises this 
knowledge through various acts. A re-articulation of salutary happiness occurs by partaking in 
liturgical, as well as societal acts that re-emphasise our soteriological disposition. Charry describes 
this process as “knowledge which is toward wisdom” (2006a:167).  
Ellen Charry suggests (2006a:167): 
I am suggesting here that good knowing is to be taught by what one seeks to know. This is a moral and 
communal art that requires well-developed instincts and tendencies. When done well, it shapes the souls 
for a wise, good, and productive life. Good knowing is sapiential: it is only possible by divine grace43. 
Therefore, a fuller way of talking about knowing will be to speak of it so that the skills and strengths of 
the soul are recognized. Learning happens in the soul. 
Sapiential knowing accordingly underscores a reciprocal knowing between the one known and the one 
being known. Charry states that (2006a:167): 
Locating knowing in the soul enables us not only to reconnect the knower with the known but also to see 
the connection between truth and goodness. Knowledge here is not information that one either has or 
lacks but has better or worse access to, depending on divine grace empowered by one’s training and 
setting. Knowledge is stronger and better – that is, truer – to the degree that one’s soul, and that of others, 
is enhanced or damaged by it. 
In two articles, “The Trinity and the Christian Life” (1997b) and “Academic Theology in Pastoral 
Perspective” (1993b), Ellen Charry understands Augustine to be motivated toward the right kind of 
knowing. She argues that (Charry, 2002c:114): 
Saint Augustine was plagued by the problem of knowing and not knowing throughout his life. He wanted 
to love God completely, but he was puzzled by how he could love what he did not know. Augustine 
wanted to know God, not in order to gain the power over others that knowledge brings, but in order to 
gain power over himself. Augustine exhibits the proper function of knowledge. 
Wisdom and knowledge are differentiated in Augustinian thought; “Augustine devoted wisdom and 
rational judgments to knowledge … one important task of knowledge” Charry indicates (1993b:92): 
[is] to make moral judgments in accordance with the cardinal virtues, since knowledge is capable of 
rational normative judgment. Wisdom (which he calls the intellectual feature of the mind), by contrast, 
will be constituted by love and worship of God that makes us truly happy and blessed and finally able to 
share in God. Wisdom does not judge of, but delights in, God because it knows of God’s gracious deed 
                                                     
43 Ellen Charry recognises two moments in the grace of God; the first is how grace and the law are not in 
opposition to one another but a fulfilment of the promise of Christ’s reign: “It is a mistake to oppose law and 
grace, for God’s grace makes way for a radically transformed social and moral order. The law of Christ enables 
a new way of life that is obedient to God” (Charry, 2003a:34). Secondly, grace centres our practices in Christ, 
“both Pauline and Matthean interpretations of faith in Jesus Christ elucidate a new and demanding vision of 
religious practice that applies divine grace given through Christ,” (Charry, 2003a:34) moreover, “Cross and 
resurrection, not the Decalogue, are front and centre for Paul. They reformulate godliness and regulate the 
practice of a pure life. They are the grace of God for the reconciliation and true empowerment of Jews and 
Gentiles as one people…Purity lies in the spiritual strength to live as Christ died: testifying to the power and 
strength of letting go that others may live. Christ embodied the wisdom of God that now belongs to those who 
belong to Christ. One should not worry about how one makes one’s way into the body of Christ …” (Charry, 
2003a:38).  
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from Scripture. So, judgments regulate our conduct and guide our thinking, while contemplation brings 
happiness through a relationship with God. 
A further contribution lies in the way Augustine links knowledge and wisdom to sapience, so that 
knowledge is constituted by the material things of creation which teach us about God (Charry, 
2002c:114). Ellen Charry continues with Augustine’s train of thought: “Augustine understood that 
wisdom is spiritually superior to correct information, for it uplifts the knower, bringing one into 
intimate contact with the known” (2002c:114-115). Sapience is constituted in Charry’s opinion by 
knowledge that is attained from creation, as well as liturgical ceremonies. It is a knowledge of God 
“that elicits love”, which forms a particular identity and purpose in Christians. Ellen Charry affirms 
(1998b:379):  
[sapience provides] a godly standard of goodness and a vision of coherent living that that can serve as a 
comprehensive guide to an intelligent and stable, that is to say, happy life. The belief is that knowing and 
loving God the Holy Trinity is genuinely salutary for people because we really need God and God is 
really food for us. 
In light of Ellen Charry’s concern that knowledge of God should shape the character of humans, she 
seeks to indicate how moral and spiritual formation takes place as natural result of knowing God. 
Charry denotes the process whereby character is transformed through knowledge of God as the 
“pastoral function” of Christian doctrine (1997a:5).  
Ellen Charry illustrates by means of Augustine how the academising of theology as response to the 
separation of knowledge and God, is a problematic one. Augustine is an example, for Ellen Charry, 
who communicates the right form of knowing, namely, one that connects the knower to the known. 
The inability of academic theology, according to Ellen Charry, to connect the knower with the known, 
leads her to ask whether there is currently a divided theological task.  
3.3 A divided theological task? 
Ellen Charry’s emphasis on the pastoral function of Christian doctrine is motivated by her concern 
that theology has lost its ability to shape the character of its audiences. This is due in part, to modern 
culture44, along with theology’s lack of priority toward the facilitation of an audience to come to know 
God45. “… a central theological task is to assist people to come to God. This in itself is a contested 
idea for modern theology, which has moved away from primary Christian beliefs and focused on 
theological method instead” (Charry, 1997a:5).  
Charry describes the divide by referring to David Dawson46 in a discussion of literary theory and 
theology (Dawson in Charry, 1997a:31):  
                                                     
44Ellen Charry, in her article “Virtual Salvation”, describes modern culture, in particular American culture, to be 
manipulative and governed by consumerism. “Consumerism is successful in part because it has developed 
techniques to insure our dependence on it. First, of course, it is obvious that we cannot survive apart from it. 
There is no opting out. It is the air we breathe. Still, its power to construct our identities is more than 
straightforward: it is also manipulative … we will briefly consider five manipulative strategies that keep the 
system going: calculated dissatisfaction, the illusion of personal power, the invention of self-perpetuating need, 
impulse buying, and the craving for success. These strategies appeal to and then exacerbate greed and vanity to 
enhance the sense of self-importance” (Charry, 2004a:336).  
45 In her book, By the renewing of your minds (1997a), Charry affirms; “thus the primary task of theology is to 
facilitate its audience to come to know God. This task has waned, however, with the Enlightenment” (1997a:5). 
46 Ellen Charry’s engagement with Dawson is referenced as follows by Charry, “Dawson, David (1995). Literary 
Theory: Guides to Theological Inquiry. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.” (1997a:249).  
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Academic theology turned into theological method at about the same time practical literary criticism 
turned into literary theory, and perhaps for much the same reason- as an apologetic or protectionist 
strategy by humanists who found themselves increasingly marginalized by the rising prestige of science 
and technology. 
The modern disparage between method and Christian belief became increasing evident for Ellen 
Charry in her study of classical texts (2003b:2):  
Although I started this project as an exercise in historical theology, a constructive thesis emerged: when 
Christian doctrines assert the truth about God, the world and ourselves, it is a truth that seeks to influence 
us. As I worked through the texts, the divisions of the modern theological curriculum began making less 
and less sense to me. I could no longer distinguish apologetics from catechesis, or spirituality from ethics 
or pastoral theology47. And I no longer understood systematic or dogmatic theology apart from all of these 
… 
Ellen Charry’s theological agenda is distinct from modern theological agendas: “I realized that I was 
uncovering a norm of theological integrity that had become unintelligible to the modern discipline” 
(1997a:viii-ix). The reading of classical texts is “an invitation to consider how theology intends to 
shape readers for the good life” (Charry, 1997a:viii-ix).  
The context wherein Christian theology began life was “in a time of epistemic security, when God was 
believed to be real and some knowledge of him and wisdom through him to be possible. Under these 
conditions, the goal of reflection on God and the things of God was to understand them for the sake of 
a good life as well as eternal life” (Charry, 2006a:144). When coupled with its Hellenistic 
environment, Charry (2006a:145) states: 
knowledge is true if it leads us into goodness, making us happy and good. The idea that knowing good 
things make us good implies continuity between the knower and what she knows. It is not simply to be 
cognizant of the truth but to be assimilated into it.  
Ellen Charry describes two forms of knowledge that shape the Christian identity; the first is practical 
and the second is concerned with the content of the Christian character. She describes each 
respectively (Charry, 1997a:5-6): 
In short, primary doctrines are the practically orientated content of the faith. They enable a religious 
community to propose a pattern of life to its members and nurture them in it as best it can. Second-order 
reflection should support the primary doctrines of a community and so is indirectly of practical import.  
Christians should seek the knowledge of God, Charry argues, so that one can “come to dwell in the 
truth: for the truth will make us happy and good, and in that way, free” (2006a:145). The vision of 
truth was undermined, however, by three epistemological crises (Charry, 2006a:145). Ellen Charry 
describes the first crisis as one where the task of theology shifted from being salutary to academic 
(Charry, 2006a: 145). Ellen Charry explains, “Knowledge of God became possible on purely 
intellectual grounds, regardless of the piety of the theologian” (Charry, 2006a: 145). The crisis came 
with the “West’s recovery of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries” (Charry, 2006a: 145) 
                                                     
47 Ellen Charry reminds her readers of medieval Christian women theologians who abstained from this division: 
“To put it more precisely, the women interpreted the doctrinal heritage through, not apart from, the spiritual life. 
They viewed the tasks of theology through their own yearning for God that they believed others shared. The 
exegesis of doctrine served to bring them and their readers into the divine presence, or perhaps to remind their 
readers that they already dwell in the divine presence. They sought to teach their disciples the skills needed to 
maximize their life in God” (Charry, 2003b:3).  
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where theology “was pressed in ever more theoretical and less practical directions” (Charry, 2006a: 
145). Ellen Charry draws the implication of this crisis for theology (Charry, 2006a: 145):  
This distancing made normal theology impossible. Gradually, knowing something to be true took on 
overtones of acknowledgment and assent to what one judges to be the case rather than being an 
investment in understanding for the sake of becoming happy, wise, and good.  
The second crisis occurred during the seventeenth century, when (Charry, 2006a:146): 
experimental science and empiricism transformed truth again- and therewith theology. In order to 
maintain-or perhaps regain- intellectual credibility, theology adopted the modern positivist and rationalist 
understandings of knowledge. These understandings separated knowledge from goodness (and therefore 
wisdom), and sapience remained at bay.  
The third and final crisis was “the modern critical philosophical understandings of truth, knowledge, 
and goodness” (Charry, 2006a:146), which predicts the “final turn of theology” (Charry, 2006a:146-
147). Ellen Charry understands the final crisis to be an opportune moment to reclaim sapiential 
theology. She describes (Charry, 2006a:146-147): 
Modern epistemology is also under investigation from a postcritical perspective that is not nihilistic: this 
perspective is reconnecting the knower to the knowledge and truth with goodness, so that knowledge of 
God may again be epistemologically possible. The recognition that knowing is a shared moral activity 
that requires excellences of soul can lend itself to retrieving truth that moves toward goodness-not in a 
sentimental way but in a way that truly recognizes our modern experience.  
The increasing divide between rational truth and sapience is illustrated by Charry’s use of the phrase 
“academic theology.” The rise of academic theology runs parallel to what she calls “the spiritual crisis 
of modernity” (Charry, 1997b:368), where “theological disciplines are more oriented to the academy 
than the church” (Charry, 2000a:73). Academic theology is impoverished in its lack of priority toward 
“the cure of souls.” Charry describes in her article, “To what end knowledge? The academic captivity 
of the church” (2000a:74):  
Classical theology, following Paul, developed in response to specific problems that arose in the church. In 
the ancient church, theology defined and defended the church’s teachings in order to help people know, 
love, and enjoy God, that they might live a noble, righteous, and godly life by dwelling in God on earth 
and beyond. Knowing God was essential to being transformed by and partaking of God’s sapience, 
goodness, and beauty. In short, the cure of souls was central to the theological task.  
There is a close connection for Ellen Charry to the divide between sapience and academic theology, 
namely the spiritual crisis of late modernity. In her discussion on the spiritual formation by the 
doctrine of the trinity, she describes that “under the influence of modern notions of truth, theology 
became more interested in the coherence of Christian doctrines than in the ability of those doctrines to 
sponsor a godly life” (Charry, 1997b:168). Charry argues (1997b:178): 
In accommodating modern sensibilities, theology neglected spiritual nurture: helping Christian teachings 
help people know, love, and enjoy God. Classical theology was an exercise in Christian paideia- an 
intellectual and spiritual undertaking-helping people both to understand and be formed by loving the God 
they confess. This neglect has contributed to the spiritual crisis of the day.  
In addition, academic theology (Charry, 1996:114-115):  
has turned from encouraging personal reform through attachment to God toward articulating the logic of 
Christian doctrines, unearthing the history of Christian texts and politics, and analysing ethical reasoning. 
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It posits an autonomous self, formed in advance of engagement with God, whose reason and knowledge 
manipulate the ideas of the tradition ... The academic model cultivates and employs the intellectual virtues 
for the correction and interpretation of the tradition ...  
Ellen Charry seeks to counter the modern tendency by reclaiming knowledge of God that is formative 
of Christian character. In light of a discussion on the spiritual crisis of modernity and its conception of 
the autonomous self, she argues (Charry, 1997b:369, 371): 
Thinking of theological doctrines, especially the doctrine of the Trinity, as an instrument of spiritual 
formation in this regard will probably strike some readers as odd…One reason for this…is that doctrine is 
no longer viewed as a means of spiritual nurture…In short, Christian theology can offer a path to an 
alternative source of formation for late-modern life, a source to which a secular sensibility has no access: 
God. Christians have a distinctive contribution to make in the area of spiritual nurture.  
The case is made for the renewal of salutary readings, as knowledge of God enables humans to 
flourish by exercising particular habits of mind (also understood as sapience). Athanasius, Augustine 
and Aquinas are three voices who echo, for Ellen Charry, the priority toward right forms of knowing 
(2010:ix).  
  
3.4 Towards a sapiential reading of happiness 
To engage with doctrine as a purely intellectual endeavour apart from a practical agenda is 
methodologically unsatisfactory for Ellen Charry. Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas are three 
proponents who displayed both intellectual rigor and pastoral concern. Charry notes in this regard 
(1992:33): 
While texts were analysed intellectually … a careful examination of many dogmatic treatises reveals 
concern for the moral effects of doctrine alongside coherence and intelligibility … The practical side of 
doctrinal exegesis, asks after the divine rationale: Why did God do such and such, or do it in that way?  
Ellen Charry continues to describe how texts influence the reader through its rationale (1992:33):  
The practical voice of dogmatic exegesis … assumes that, while the theological minds that carved out the 
tradition did seek to resolve logical problems that seemed to beset Christian claims, at least some of them 
some of the time also kept the big picture in view. That is, they viewed dogmatic explication of the faith 
as an instrument of individual and societal formation and transformation, as an instrument of moral 
pedagogy.  
Moral pedagogy was a practice present in Greek culture in “classical thinkers from Socrates to Marcus 
Aurelius”, who “were concerned to elucidate a way of thinking about reality that promoted arête: 
moral excellence and proper citizenship” (Charry, 1992:33). Charry establishes a parallel between 
Greek paideia and the salutary function of Scripture. She cites Jaeger48 (Jaeger in Charry, 1992:34): 
Jaegar argued that Plato’s philosophy was not simply an intellectual search for abstract notions of eternal 
truth, but a proposal for paideia: a disciplined educational approach to Greek cultural values that sought 
to train morally grounded, socially responsible government leadership. In other words, truth for Plato was 
not neutral: it was morally formative …  Jaeger noted that Platonic paideia prepared the way for Christian 
paideia, which adapted the Platonic heritage of philosophy as an instrument of moral and, thereby, social 
formation.  
                                                     
48Ellen Charry references Werner Jaegar from his book Paideia: The ideals of Greek Culture, “Jaeger, Werner 
(1944). Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. 3 vols. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.” (1997a: 250).  
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Christian paideia express second-order assertions that are concerned with “the rules and principles 
that maintain a community’s authentic identity, assure the consistency of its teachings, and relate its 
authentic self-understanding to competing claims” (Charry, 1997a:225). Second-order assertions are 
interdependent with primary doctrines, for primary doctrines as “first-order assertions” “teach about 
God and propose right courses of action, virtues, and a way of life in which members are to be 
nurtured by the community” (Charry, 1997a:225).  
Three bishops who were concerned with second-order assertions were Athanasius, Augustine and 
Aquinas. Each respectively contributed to the notion of loving, enjoying and knowing God as 
foundation for happiness. Their primary task, affirms Ellen Charry, was to be “theologians, pastors 
and administrators of the church” (1997a:86), a position which necessitated a loyalty to both Scripture 
and community, she proceeds to state (Charry, 1997a:86): 
These bishops of learning and broad vision were able to think the Christian faith through carefully, with 
one eye trained on the spiritual needs of their parishioners and the other on the church’s interaction with 
the dominant culture, for they flourished as the church inherited the mantle of empire. That is, they 
believed that God’s work in Jesus Christ provided a firm foundation for a moral society. Indeed, they 
understood the unpacking of Christian doctrines as paideia … 
The task of theologians consequently became “to explain Christian claims but also to create a morally 
coherent culture that would educate and form persons for the change of ages happening in their own 
day (Charry, 1997a:86).  
Athanasius contributes to first-order assertions in his doctrine of God. Ellen Charry states that his 
focus was on (Charry, 1997a:228): 
on the good life that resulted from coming to know God the father properly. And since our knowledge of 
the Father is through the Son, articulating the relationship between the Father and the Son precisely 
became central to his argument.  
Augustine, on the other hand, understood the act of knowing God as (Charry, 1997a:229): 
the key to mature and refined happiness. His attempt to render the doctrine of the trinity transparent by 
appealing to a series of trinities in ourselves, was to help seekers over the mental gridlock that the 
doctrine invites. But in addition to the cognitive clarity he sought to provide, he also led seekers into the 
mystery of God. By linking God intimately with ourselves, Augustine brought his readers to a deeper 
self-understanding, by means of which they make their own way to the good life. 
Finally, Thomas Aquinas, representing medieval piety, sought to synthesise theological knowledge 
with secular philosophy with the purpose of demonstrating that all knowledge comes from and leads 
to God. It is from these three individuals that modern theology derives its systematic urge, although 
the notion of truth toward which it drives is no longer understood in St. Thomas’s holistic sense 
(Charry, 1997a:230).  
Premised on the notion that God seeks to enjoy humanity and humanity God, Ellen Charry shows how 
happiness is understood as imitation of Christ (Athanasius) (1993a:267) and assimilation49 to the 
“beauty, wisdom and goodness of God”, which lures us to the cross (Augustine) (2006c:137). She 
                                                     
49 In the article, “The Moral Function of Doctrine”, Ellen Charry indicates how Anselm’s theology of the cross 
presses beyond assimilation toward imitation: “Anselm’s direct statements that Christ became human and died 
as an example mean that Christians are pressed beyond assimilating behaviour that befits the earthly children of 
God toward the salvation of others regardless of the cost to himself. This, it seems, and not less, is the standard 
God has set for us” (1992:43).  
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continues with a reading of Athanasius, who understood happiness to be the restoration of human 
dignity through imitation.  
3.4.1 Athanasius: happiness as restored human dignity  
Athanasian Christology is situated in a pre-critical period where (Charry, 1993a:265): 
the assumption was that God was the singular source for the dignity and flourishing of human persons. 
Only by understanding and submitting to the love and demands of God could a person’s freedom, 
relations to self, others, and things be properly ordered. And only when these are properly ordered could 
one flourish. On the classical view, both the means whereby salvation is effected for human persons and 
the effect the economy of salvation is to have on believers were seamless whole. That is, God’s 
soteriological activity was implicitly the standard for human personhood, the norm for relationships on 
the horizontal plane.  
Ellen Charry cites Athanasius’ analysis of the human problem in Contra Gentes (1993a:268): 
in terms of unhappiness caused by a disordered and disoriented mind that has wandered from God. 
Happiness, that is, the capacity to direct human life aright, was buried, lost, and forgotten through 
generations of fumbling around in the dark. The good life, that is the virtuous life, was trashed beneath 
indignities that misused body, mind, and soul. The process began by forgetting who God is. This led to 
losing touch with who we really are: creatures destined for happiness at the hands of the one who created 
us. This loss led to idolatry which in turn destroyed human dignity, and turned human intercourse into a 
jungle of violence, corruption, and deceit. In short, civilisation was on the verge of collapse. And God 
saw that it was not good at all. 
Athanasius’ posteriori form of argumentation is situated in a therapeutic Christian faith “because it 
leads followers back to the father of Christ. And since it produces goodness, it must be true” (Charry, 
1997a:89). For Athanasius, Charry underscores, “human dignity comes from our relatedness to God, 
as given by God in creation. Unlike the modern view, our dignity is seen in our connectedness to God, 
not in our autonomy” (1997a:90). Our relation to God is situated by Athanasius’ linkage of “human 
logismoi with the divine Logos”. Athanasius consequently finds the source of knowledge of God 
within humanity itself. A disordered mind or intellect is then “a wandering from God” (Charry, 
1993a:270). The only way through which humanity can be saved is by God saving “us from ourselves 
by renewing us in his image, reforming our minds, and shaping our actions to their proper end” 
(Charry, 1993b:91-92).  
“Properly ordered human dignity should wean people from devotion to debasing fantasies of the 
imagination that lead to misery and suffering50” (Charry, 1993a:271).  
Athanasian Christology was the means to a restored human dignity through participation in God. A 
complex argument pertaining to “how” humanity is made participants in the divine followed in Contra 
Arianos III. At risk of speaking of deification, Athanasius drew a distinction between a “constituted” 
nature and an “acquired” nature. Ellen Charry concurs that (1993a:273): 
Our adoption is of a categorically different nature. It is an act of grace. As Christ teaches us about God 
and leads us back to proper contemplation and focus on God, we become children of God by participation 
                                                     
50Ellen Charry continues to describe Athanasius’ centring of the logismos in the divine ordering of creation. 
“Having blamed social and moral deterioration on forgetting God and consequently developing disordered 
thought patters, and having pointed out that we are equipped to know God properly throughout capacity to think 
clearly, beginning in #35 to the end of Contra Gentes, Athanasius carefully explained the divine orderliness 
evident in creation with which we are out of tune” (Charry, 1993a:271).  
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(metachon). Those who live in obedience to [Christ] have eternal life as a reward while Christ has divine 
attributes inherently.  
Charry deconstructs the particular role of Christ in taking on a human body (1997a:97): 
The point of the Logos’s taking on a body turns out to be more than simply destroying the fear of death. 
Christ not only reveals the Father to us: he also teaches us through the intimacy of their relationship itself. 
By imitating them we find a standard for our relationships with one another. Social harmony breaking out 
among new Christians, spoken of in the DI, stems from becoming with the Lord, “having the one Lord in 
ourselves,” not by “identity or equality” but by imitation.  
It is by observing God’s “mechanisms to lure us home” (Charry, 1993a:279) that the reader comes to 
understand God’s priority toward the happiness of humanity. Ellen Charry observes (1993a:279): 
God’s empathy, compassion, and concern for our perceived needs enable us to attend to God over all the 
other concerns vying for our attention and leading us in other directions. But once God has our attention 
we are confronted with his way of dealing with us that inevitably becomes the standard for our own 
behaviour … It is neither healing as such, nor self-sacrifice as such, nor resurrection as such, that are 
specific behaviours to be imitated. Rather the teaching that is pressed home is the exclusive concern for 
our welfare and happiness, and the recognition that we are not able to devote ourselves to the welfare and 
happiness of those in our charge by being told to do so: we must be led to do so by having our own needs 
met first51.  
In its final analysis, Ellen Charry writes, “it seems that Athanasius concludes that God is bent on 
telling us that compassion and care cultivate human dignity and human dignity leads to human 
excellence” (1993a:281). Human beings are not always aware of God’s compassion and care as “we 
spurned God and our own intelligence and fashioned gods for ourselves, producing social and 
personal degeneracy” (Charry, 1997a:98).  
The concept of homoousios is utilised by Ellen Charry to bridge the gap between degenerate intellect 
and God’s care for humanity (1997a:99): 
We have seen that living in accord with the beauty of God’s creation and imitating God are central 
features of the Athanasian plan for our restoration. God is self-consciously teaching us how to live 
rightly. In this sense he has only the deepest respect for us … From this perspective, insistence on the 
homoousios becomes more intelligible. Christ breaks through our fear to reveal God. And since God 
wants us to model ourselves on him, it is paramount that the standard for our knowledge of dignity, 
compassion, and caring indisputable and crystalline. Thus, the aretegenic52 function of the homoousios 
emerges. If the Son were not the very ordered goodness of God but became the Son at a point in time, he 
could not restore us to our true nature or provide us with the standard of human excellence … Knowing 
                                                     
51 Ellen Charry, in an attempt to indicate the aretological perspective in Athanasian Christology, explains: “We 
have seen that ordered harmony and balance and modelling are important features of Athanasius conceptual 
framework. And so it is not a very large step to take to conclude that throughout the execution of this detailed 
plan God is self-consciously teaching us how to deal with one another as he has dealt with us. God is only and 
utterly a loving parent” (1993:280).  
52 Charry substantiates her use of “aretegenic” in her article, “Academic theology in pastoral perspective”: “I 
have reluctantly decided to suggest a new word to represent the moral and psychological dignity and honour 
which Christianity encourages. Aretogenic comes from the classical Greek word arête, excellence or virtue. I do 
not restrict it to the amenities of the Greek nobility as was the case in ancient Greece, but employ it in a broader 
sense to suggest the nobility of human life including both moral and intellectual responsibility and psychological 
wholeness” (1993b:101). She relates this to the forming potential within the church’s liturgy, “more specifically 
to attend to the shaping effects theological doctrines ought to have – along with sacraments, liturgy, hymns, and 
preaching on crafting human personhood” (Charry, 1993b:102).  
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God himself was necessary, he believed, in order for us to come to our senses, return to God, and flourish 
as God intended.  
Ellen Charry shows in Athanasius’ thought how God was understood to be the source for human 
dignity and flourishing. Human dignity was accordingly seen in the relation of humans to God. In the 
instance where human dignity was negated, restoration could take place by participating in God 
through Christ. Once it is established that happiness and human flourishing comes through the 
restoration of human dignity through the imitation of Christ, Charry continues to consider Augustine 
who believed relation to God to be the course of therapy for a happy life.  
3.4.2 Augustine: happiness as a course of therapy  
Ellen Charry sets out Augustine’s Trinitarian theology as a means to introduce the notion of 
participation in the dignity of God (2000c:452): 
the Christian tradition contains within itself sources of an alternative identity, a God-centred identity that 
might at least act as a plumbline against which market-shaped identity may be measured and perhaps even 
function as a discriminating set of principles for wending one’s way through culture.  
Augustine’s elaboration of Gen 1:27 serve as foundation for constructing such an alternative identity. 
Charry illustrates (2000c:453):  
Augustine … extended a theological self-concept beyond Christians to provide all persons with a God-
centred self-concept by their very nature as God’s creature. Human faculties reflect the triune rationality 
of God. He depicted the God-seeker as discerning this identity slowly by testing it out and eventually 
understanding oneself through it. The struggle to claim this deep relatedness to God requires turning away 
from false identities and toward the goodness, justice, wisdom, and beauty of the Trinity. Understanding 
oneself-and others-to reflect the unity and cooperation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and to be 
claimed by their work of salvation on human behalf provides self-esteem and personal dignity that the 
world cannot give. 
Ellen Charry focuses on Augustine’s De Trinitate with its emphasis on the act of curing “diseased 
minds of seekers who conceive of God in bodily terms” (1997a:120) and to purify them so that they 
may “contemplate and have full knowledge of God’s substance” (1997a:120). She indicates that the 
whole plan for the work is “to explain the missions of the Son and Holy Spirit in the context of the 
unity of God as a course of therapy for a happy life in God” (Charry, 1997a:120).  
Charry affirms (1997a:90): 
In pursuance of our plan to train the reader in the things that have been made [e.g. Christ] (Rom. 1.20), 
for getting [the reader] to know [H]im by whom they were made, we come eventually to his image … 
[T]his is what is called mind or consciousness. The reform of the mind is necessary for knowing God.  
The mind as the platform where humans come to experience and partake in God’s divine beauty 
underscores Ellen Charry’s concern of the modern distinction between sapience53 and science. If 
knowledge is devoid of salutary implication, first-order assertions have no function in the Christian 
tradition. Charry states synonymously (1997a:27):  
                                                     
53 “Sapience” is broadly defined by Ellen Charry as not being “a return to Augustine’s precise understanding, but 
more generally a retrieval of theology’s duty to promote grateful love of God while critically assessing the 
church’s witness to the faith” (1993b:102).  
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In theology’s case this will mean attending to how God understands and renders us vulnerable for 
cultivation by engaging our hopes and aspirations as well as expanding our minds. That is, theology 
assumes that God is psychologically sophisticated.  
In seeking to bridge the gap between sapience and science, Ellen Charry communicates the advantage 
of turning to an “aretegenic reading of doctrinal interpretations” (1997a:27), which “offer a notion of 
rationality that embraces the emotions as integral to the process of discernment and moral 
deliberation” (Charry, 1997a:27). She hints at the salutary potential of Augustine’s Trinitarian 
theology: “Augustine realizes that emotions and behaviour are not readily vulnerable to the dictates of 
reason. He postulated that only divine grace, not any rational capacity within the individual, can 
provide the support needed for change” (Charry, 2001:125).  
A soteriological divide occurred between an “ontological view of salvation” and a “functional view” 
(Charry, 1997a:149), whereby Ellen Charry suggests (1997:128): 
that it is time to re-examine the patristic understanding of happiness grounded in who we are in God- an 
understanding that died sometime in the Middle Ages54, when salvation became narrowed to the question 
of how God forgives sins, and, specifically, whether he has forgiven mine.  
The death of a “God-centred understanding of the human self” is described by Ellen Charry as an act 
of “marginalization” with ethical implications. “One result of this loss is that it is virtually impossible 
for Western Christians to see the social and ethical implications of formation through enjoyment of 
God” (1997a:129).  
Three voices who seek to reintroduce both an ontological and functional view of salvation are cited by 
Ellen Charry. Gerhart Ladner55 “points out that Augustine combated the spiritualistic depreciation of 
the creation that survived in Christian Platonism (Ladner in Charry, 1997a:130). Charry cites Ladner 
in “The aim of reformation” (Ladner in Charry, 1997a:130): 
is not spiritualization pure and simple, but rather an order in which spirit and matter both have their place 
though that of spirit will always be higher. Christian reformation is a process of becoming more and more 
similar to God, a process of deification accomplished by grace, not an adoption by nature 56… The soul 
must turn toward God who has made it, and thus become consciously aware of its character as divine 
image: to be with God is to realize fully this image relation: to remember Him, to know Him, and to love 
Him-it is in other words, the reformation of the image of God in man. 
                                                     
54 Ellen Charry traces in a short hand manner the theological shifts in formulations of salvation: “In the medieval 
period, when the Western church developed an extensive and powerful penitential system, the understanding of 
salvation shifted dramatically, or one might say narrowed, from knowing and enjoying God to the remission of 
sins. With Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo…soteriological interest bore down on the Incarnation (i.e., the cross) as 
the locus of forgiveness…Late medieval theologians wrestled with the role of grace in the remission of sins, but 
the locus remained the cross. Luther’s reclamation of the gospel out of the tangle of medieval theology, 
especially the sacrament of penance, construed trust in God’s mercy rather than the penitential system as the 
means of grace but maintained remission of sin as the soteriological juggernaut. Subsequent Protestant distrust 
of reason in favour of faith rendered Augustine’s trust in the soteriological power of knowing the divine qualities 
anathema to the Reformed churches” (Charry, 1997a:128).  
55 Ellen Charry references Ladner’s contribution as follows: “Ladner, Gerhard B. (1967). The idea of Reform: Its 
Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers. New York: Harper.” (1997a: 251).  
56 Ellen Charry adds a disclaimer to this position: “My reading of De Trinitate supports Ladner’s conclusion as 
long as the return to God accomplished by grace is recognised as a process of transformation of self-
understanding. The process of coming to remember, know, and love God is simultaneous with the process of 
coming to one’s senses- or, rather, becoming more and more like God is a process of coming to one’s senses” 
(1997a:130).  
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The second thinker, Andrew Louth57 argues Ellen Charry (Louth in Charry, 1997a:130): 
treats De Trinitate as a work of mystical theology designed as a search for God through introspective self-
scrutiny. Louth sees Augustine as following a Plotinian model, yet differing from Plotinus by insisting on 
the doctrine of grace: the soul finds God only because God deigns to disclose himself both in history and 
to the mind. Louth argues that the craving for a return to God requires the seeker to reclaim and perfect 
the image of God in herself. Augustine assists the seeker in this process by disclosing love as a chief (and 
Trinitarian) function of the mind, so that through awareness of how it loves itself the soul comes to love 
the qualities of God disclose by the economy and move beyond the image into God himself.58 
An important contribution in Louth’s understanding of Augustine is clarified by Ellen Charry: “The 
point is not that a proper understanding of self leads to finding God but that a proper understanding of 
God is the only way to come (gradually) to a purified self- that is, a happy self” (1997a:131).  
Isabelle Bochet59 shifts the interpretive focus of De Trinitate toward the “transformation of the reader” 
as Augustine’s primary task (Bochet in Charry, 1997a: 131). Ellen Charry remarks of Isabelle 
Bochet’s contribution (Bochet in Charry, 1997a:131): 
Her work is particularly useful because she develops the anthropological side of Augustine’s Trinitarian 
theology. Augustine sought to correct and transform human desire. Natural human desire is corrupt 
because, in searching for happiness, the self grasps at carnal objects- those that it knows best. But these 
desires cannot be sated, for the carnal objects themselves carry one away from the proper object of 
happiness and truth, indeed the authentic source of itself- God. The result of misplaced desire is lust, evil, 
and sin born out of ignorance and pride at thinking one can find happiness in self and transient pleasures 
… The distorted self is spiritual but starved, ill, and dying. So God, realizing that creaturely things that 
lead away from God in the first place can just as easily lead back toward God, sent the Son and Holy 
Spirit into the created order. For the desire for truth and happiness is irrepressible, and consequently, the 
repair of desire is possible.  
Ellen Charry cites an epigram that sums up Bochet’s thought on Augustine “the self is formed by 
creation, deformed by sin, and reformed by Christ” (Bochet in Charry, 1997a:131).   
She further indicates how Ladner, Louth and Bochet have underlined the sapiential dimension of De 
Trinitate, which “prepares for an aretegenic reading” (Charry, 1997:132). The aretegenic reading is 
“one that illustrates how the doctrines constructed and elaborated therein, including the anthropology, 
the soteriology, and the epistemology, are linked in a self-conscious plan of reform of self through the 
economy of salvation, which discloses the beauty, truth, and goodness that is the being of God” 
(Charry, 1997a:132). In her chapter on Augustine in By the renewing of your minds (1997a), Charry 
does not enter into a detailed discussion on Augustine’s Trinitarian soteriology, but rather seeks to 
indicate how Augustine’s doctrine had a priority toward the moral shaping character of doctrine in its 
ability to rehabilitate the mind through coming to know God (2010:xii).  
                                                     
57 Ellen Charry cites the work of Louth as follows: “Louth, Andrew (1981). The Origins of the Christian 
Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys. Oxford: Clarendon.” (1997a: 251).  
58 An important methodological remark is made by Ellen Charry with regards to Louth’s rationale, which runs 
parallel to Charry’s theological agenda: “Louth notes (correctly) that ‘Augustine is less concerned to illustrate 
the doctrine of the Trinity from his understanding of man, than to discover the true nature of and by means of the 
doctrine of the Trinity that he believes by faith’. Recognising one’s likeness to God is requisite for ascending to 
God” (Louth, 1981 in Charry, 1997a:130). 
59 Ellen Charry draws on the work of Isabelle Bochet and references it as follows: “Bochet, Isabelle (1982). 
Saint Augustin et le Désir de Dieu. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.” (1997a: 249).  
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Augustine underscores Ellen Charry’s priority toward a particular form of knowing that transforms 
character. Charry accordingly believes that coming to know God is a process marked by the 
transformation of the self. In the transformation of the self, life is lived excellently, an act which 
underscores a happy and flourishing life. A shift occurred, however where knowledge of God was 
intellectualised. The increasing intellectualisation of knowledge of God is already present, for Ellen 
Charry, in the time of Aquinas.  
3.4.3 Aquinas: happiness as a shift away from pathology driven psychology 
Ellen Charry engages with the writings of Aquinas60 to indicate two things; firstly, how theologians 
began to speak of knowledge from “being helpful to being correct” and second, how this turn resulted 
in an un-substantive description of happiness as enjoyment of God (2006a:157). When referring to 
academic theology, she asserts (Charry, 2006a:157): 
My argument will take issue with the modern consequence of this move precisely at this point: I will 
claim that cognition is insufficient and that a virtuous bent is necessary for good knowledge. To state this 
theologically: grace is needed for good knowledge.  
Charry describes the effect of “intellectualizing belief (2006a:165): 
coupling theology as primary theory with belief as assent to that theory intellectualizes belief into a 
conceptual activity. It quite effectively removes sapience -wisdom for a good and happy life- from view 
because it centres on assent to correct church teaching to the exclusion of ascent to God. 
The majority of Ellen Charry’s comments on Aquinas are read in light of the divide found within 
academic theology. Despite the emphasis on academic theology, Aquinas continues to be an apt 
conversation partner for Charry in consideration of happiness. Aquinas represents an amalgamation 
between philosophy and theology, which has as its result the intellectualisation of happiness (Charry, 
2010:88). Aquinas’ Christology is however of particular interest to Ellen Charry when engaging with 
happiness. She describes the “agendum” of Aquinas as follows (Charry, 1997a:185): 
The rhetorical effect of Thomas’s presentation of atonement theories and of his exegesis of the passion 
narrative is certainly to strengthen the believer’s conscience, or what modern psychology would call her 
superego, by focussing attention on the importance of dealing properly with wrongdoing, whether by 
punishing the evildoer or, as God chose, sparing the one responsible and making amends 
himself…Thomas wants the reader to engage the issues in order to grow in self-understanding, to know 
God more deeply, and to grasp the power of love, the need for humility, and the importance of 
righteousness. The reflective reader will be led to self-examination by Christ’s virtues, by both love and 
the righteousness of God, and by the power of God as well as the anger of God, because an example has 
been set before her, a man lifted up upon a cross, who willingly gave his innocent life that she might be 
spared. 
Aquinas’ soteriological development illustrates Ellen Charry’s suspicion (2012:229): 
that western theology has a narrow and fragile doctrine of terrestrial happiness as relief from fear of 
eternal punishment through faith in the forgiveness of sin. This is a pathology-driven psychology based on 
God’s displeasure with humanity. Inattention to the full range of divine emotion has restricted happiness 
                                                     
60 I have chosen to indicate Ellen Charry’s thought on Aquinas instead of Lombard and Anselm, whom Charry 
also engages with from the medieval period. There are three reasons for this choice, (a) Aquinas serves as 
example for the increasing divide between knowledge and wisdom, which (b) lead to the decrease of a 
therapeutic understanding of happiness, and (c) Ellen Charry engages with Aquinas in the sequel to By the 
renewing of your minds (1997a), namely, God and the art of happiness, where a terrestrial understanding of 
happiness is re-established (Charry, 2010:109).  
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to escaping deserved punishment. Acknowledging God’s full-bodied emotional life will enable theology 
to appreciate God’s enjoyment of human flourishing for God’s own happiness and to argue that, 
theologically speaking, happiness is the mutual enjoyment of God and humanity when each fulfils the 
other.  
A transition is made by Ellen Charry from salutary knowledge to talk of happiness by asserting the 
purpose of her book in By the renewing of your minds (1997a): “I argue that classical doctrinal 
theology is pastorally motivated and that its end is human flourishing … all the thinkers to be 
examined here held that knowing and loving God is the mechanism of choice for forming excellent 
character and promoting genuine happiness” (2010:ix). When Charry reclaims happiness from secular 
captivity, she depends upon Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas, who were concerned both with 
knowledge and its salutary effect. By emphasising salutarity, Ellen Charry bridges the gap between 
knowledge and happiness. Knowledge as mechanism of choice for forming an excellent life 
underscores the notion of asherism, which understands happiness to be a way of life.  
3.5 Christianity’s offering of happiness 
Ellen Charry centres her discussion of happiness on the “gap between eschatological happiness and 
temporal happiness”, which “needs to be addressed because people experience hardship and grief that 
sets them off balance, and they wonder whether they can ever be happy again in this life, or whether 
life amounts to no more than a vale of tears simply to be slogged through somehow in hopes of a 
heavenly reward” (2010:ix). God and the art of happiness (2010), the sequel to By the renewing of 
your minds (1997a) describes a salutary reading as normative framework from which one may begin 
to think of happiness. Happiness, describes Charry (2010:x): 
[is] a realizing eschatology with salvation centred in sanctification. Salvation is growing into the wisdom 
of divine love and enjoying oneself in the process. I address the concern for academic theology by asking 
how the doctrines shape a way of life that forms people for living their lives excellently.  
In the article “On happiness”, she describes the reciprocal nature of the enjoyment of God that 
underscores happiness (Charry, 2004b:19): 
The purpose of knowing God better is to love “him” and that loving “him” we may enjoy him. Further, 
that enjoying him we may dwell in him and that in dwelling in him that we may glorify and be glorified in 
him and that being glorified in him we may be happy, or, at least enjoy all the days of our life. To put the 
point sharply, a God-centred life is joyous and happily productive. It blesses not only individuals, but also 
society, and one’s contribution to society by means of a God-centred life enhances personal satisfaction.  
The disposition of personal satisfaction, as synonym for happiness, has a scriptural and doctrinal point 
of departure. The former, satisfaction, in the words “makarios” and “ašrê” found in the New and Old 
Testament and the latter, happiness, in Augustine’s The Happy Life as well as Aquinas’ Treatise on 
Happiness. Ellen Charry engages in both traditions to indicate that God wills the flourishing of 
humanity (2011a:34). In both accounts, the nature of happiness “is the experience not of a transient 
pleasant emotions but rather of sustained flourishing as a result of living wisely and being carefully 
guided by reverence for God” (Charry, 2011c:347). In light of a doctrine of happiness, Charry 
understands the scriptural witness of happiness through salvation as the act of “maturing in the 
wisdom of divine love” (2010:x-xi).  
As a final indication of Ellen Charry’s motivation for “reopening” the discussion of happiness, she 
writes in the introduction to God and the art of happiness (2010:xii):  
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Some readers may ask why I wish to retrieve the Christian doctrine of happiness now. With affection for 
pieties and theologies espousing self-denial, the redemptiveness of suffering and a towering fear of hell 
are out of favour: Christianity is in an upbeat mood, and Christians reassure one another that God loves 
and encourages them in their struggles.  
One of the aims, Ellen Charry (2010:xii) indicates: 
(is) to reclaim Christianity’s offering of happiness from secular captivity. Untethered from God, there is 
little call to locate happiness in a spiritual-moral framework. Christian doctrine has not adequately linked 
piety to pleasure, thus leaving a theological gap between goodness and happiness. Happiness unlinked 
from goodness and linked to excitement has moved in to fill the space. My hope in reopening the 
theological discussion is to reconnect pleasure to goodness so that happiness may regain its soteriological 
calling, not only for Christian who may have ceded the term to the marketplace but also for those who 
seek spiritual flourishing.  
Charry finds in Augustine and Aquinas a move in the right direction, the understanding that 
knowledge of God is salvific in nature. Augustine and Aquinas consequently have an important 
contribution to make when thinking of happiness soteriologically. On the one hand, Augustine and 
Aquinas assimilated theology with the reigning philosophical schools61 of the day; while on the other 
hand, they retained a distinctively theological accent in consideration of happiness. This re-articulation 
is important for Ellen Charry, as it continues from her logic that only through truly knowing God can 
we come to enjoy God’s presence and so be happy. She derives this logic from the notion of asherism, 
a form of living in the presence of our knowledge of God, which is salutary by nature. The particular 
emphasis of Augustine and Aquinas62 are noteworthy for Charry’s argument.  
One may begin with Augustinian therapeutic soteriology introduced by Ellen Charry (2010:157):  
His dogmatic examination of the scriptural foundation for the doctrine of God leads to a search for the 
image of God in us by means of which we discover who we are in God, that is, who we are. To know God 
is to know ourselves, and understanding ourselves theocentrically in terms of Genesis 1.26 is true self-
knowledge for true self-love. 
Sin is accordingly described in terms of disordered love, which must be healed through true self-love: 
“Although Augustine often names sin as pride, he means simply badly misshaped self-love. This is not 
evil, but the misoriented good of love which God created us” (Charry, 2010:157). 
A rich heritage is found in Aquinas, who “drew on Augustine, Boethius and Aristotle in fashioning a 
rich foundation for Christian happiness. To understand Thomas we must first discard the idea that 
happiness is a feeling of moderate euphoria” (Charry, 2007:31) and “we must be willing to consider 
that happiness is linked intrinsically to virtue63 (doing good well)” (Charry, 2007:31). The premises 
from which Aquinas considered happiness are as follows (Charry, 2007:31): 
                                                     
61“The Western Philosophical Heritage” is the title Ellen Charry uses for her chapter on “classical moral 
philosophy”, which served as conversation partners for Christian conceptualisation of happiness. She describes: 
“In contrast to happiness as sustained external pleasure, the ancients agreed that happiness is enjoying oneself in 
living morally and productively, and it is an external judgment on how one is faring at life” (Charry, 2010:3-4). 
It is from such an understanding that Augustine and Aquinas drew their appropriations for theology. 
62 In the article “The necessity of divine happiness”, Charry recalls the contribution that Aquinas has to make: 
“Classical metaphysics is perhaps best represented in Christian theology by Thomas Aquinas” (2012a:239).  
63 Ellen Charry describes the context of Aquinas as follows: “Aquinas received Aristotle as fresh Latin 
translations of Aristotle’s Greek text became available. It is not surprising that, in a philosophically sophisticated 
environment, happiness was of general interest, since it was such a prominent theme in ancient philosophy…The 
translation of the complete text of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE) in the mid-thirteenth century intensified 
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1) God is good. 2) The cosmos is God’s creation. As such, it is an expression of his goodness. 3) The 
creation is unified because each part belongs to and contributes to the whole and is in turn promoted, 
sustained and perfected by the rest. All things actualize the goodness of God and celebrate themselves as 
good creatures when they are at their best and helping all creation to flourish. 
Aquinas furthers Augustine’s argument by indicating how “being healed of bad love requires 
deconstructing bad knowledge” so that “better knowledge of love” may be found (Charry, 2010:158). 
Ellen Charry illustrates this point (2010:158):  
 
Augustine tells us that being healed of bad love requires deconstructing bad knowledge, but he does not 
tell us how to break through bad habits of love that are built on bad knowledge. He tells us where to look 
to find better knowledge of love- that is where to find wisdom and goodness- but he does not explain how 
that actually happens. 
 
For Charry, Aquinas represents an amalgamation between Augustinian and Aristotelian conception of 
happiness, bringing into conversation an eschatological and physical understanding of happiness. She 
writes (Charry, 2010:88): 
 
Nicomachean Ethics ensconced in a discussion of happiness is the highest good of life that guides our 
moral efforts. Goodness is the only way to true happiness. Putting happiness at the head of Nicomachean 
Ethics signals the practicality of philosophy on which all the ancients agreed. Aristotle’s interest is not in 
theorizing about the good life but in helping us live it. This means becoming excellent persons through the 
cultivation of virtue. 
 
The fact that the “highest good is valuable in itself and is desired for its own sake, not as means to 
some further good” (Charry, 2010:88) is noteworthy, as it parallels scriptural affirmation that 
“happiness is a way of life” (Charry, 2010:89). Ellen Charry continues to highlight important 
moments in Aristotle’s thought that influenced Aquinas’ thinking (2010:89): 
 
Aristotle makes a significant methodological move. To distinguish his position from Plato’s, he says that 
he will work inductively, beginning with what is knowable to us from experience, as opposed to working 
from first principles, as did Plato … Aristotle leaves an opening for the Christian teaching that happiness 
is found in God when, in the opening book of the NE, he muses that happiness may be a gift of the 
gods…The path to happiness is unflinchingly social, not private, because it takes place in the context of 
interpersonal and public relationships and behaviours.  
At this point in the discussion, Ellen Charry develops a similarity between Aristotle and Augustine: 
“Augustine’s eschatology is also deeply social. Heaven, after all, is a city. True happiness is in a 
harmonious community where peace pervades all relationships” (2010:89). Charry understands 
Aristotle’s conception of happiness to be progressive by nature. She explains (Charry, 2010:89): 
Happiness is being an excellent person, and that is demanding: learning to “do” one’s life excellently 
takes time. Aristotle’s theory implies that we become happier as we become better able to handle a wide 
range of experiences, settings, and relationships. It requires using ourselves well. Learning to live happily 
(morally) is not an exact science that can be calculated, but an art to be cultivated. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
interest in the subject because the first and last books are on happiness, suggesting that the moral life and 
happiness are inseparable” (2010:86). In her contribution to The Dictionary of Scripture and ethics, Charry 
indicates how “Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics sets the virtuous life in the context of happiness” (2011c:348).  
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Up to this point in the argument, Augustine and Aquinas concur with Aristotle’s conception of 
happiness. Augustine and Aquinas depart with Aristotle, however, in Aristotle’s conception of 
happiness as self-sufficient and complete within itself. Charry argues (2010:90-91): 
because for them complete happiness is possible only after this life, when physical distractions are gone 
and we can know God and love God intellectually, perfectly, and uninterruptedly. Based on the tradition 
gathered from Augustine and Aristotle, Aquinas turns his attention to knowing God, and, though he does 
not always call it happiness, life’s goal is to know God perfectly. Perfect knowledge is the eschatological 
intellectual activity of the blessed in heaven, though inklings of it are possible in this life. It is possible 
only by divine grace and can be called supernatural happiness. Knowledge from the unaided or natural 
mind is possible, but it is limited to sensory knowledge for the most part. Perfect knowledge of God is 
perfect happiness for Aquinas. 
Echoes of Augustine’s theology are to be found in Aquinas, Ellen Charry recalls (2010:109): 
Following Augustine, Aquinas believed that happiness is enjoying God, but he articulated it primarily as 
knowing or seeing God. Happiness is possible in this life in a limited but significant way, for it requires 
God to illuminate the human mind by uniting it to his own. 
Aquinas makes two contributions to the conversation of happiness: “First, he integrated Augustine’s 
notion of happiness residing in the enjoyment of God with divine illumination, the beatific vision, and 
immortal life” (Charry, 2010:109). The second lies in Aquinas’ recognition “that terrestrial happiness 
prepares one for eternal bliss” (Charry, 2010:109). Aquinas consequently “valued mundane happiness 
because he saw continuity between temporal and eternal bliss: temporal happiness is a foretaste of the 
heavenly banquet, and enables us to anticipate and yearn for eschatological fulfilment even more” 
(Charry, 2010:109).  
Ellen Charry’s presupposition that happiness is “realizing eschatology with salvation centred in 
sanctification” (2010:ix) resonates with her assessment of Aquinas. “Thomas’s painstaking detail in 
working through Christian belief is the tapestry of a realizing eschatology” (Charry, 2010:110). In her 
final analysis, Charry describes “the Christian teaching on happiness” as reaching “its zenith”64 
(2010:111) in Aquinas. The doctrine of secondary agency65 enables Aquinas “to explain human 
activity while holding to a high doctrine of divine sovereignty” (Charry, 2010:159).  
Aquinas’ conceptualisation of the intellect as an extension and instrument of God’s intellect implies 
that providence proceeds from “a person who plans, envisions, and executes action” (Charry, 
2010:159-160). In accordance, “God delegates specific creativity in obedience to human abilities. 
Creativity honours and expresses human dignity and nobility … In using ourselves wisely and 
creatively, we advance creation, and that cannot but please the Creator” (Charry, 2010:159-160). 
Ellen Charry describes herself as taking Aquinas’ argument a bit further (2010:160): 
                                                     
64 Ellen Charry describes how happiness in the Modern period distanced itself from Aquinas’ realising 
eschatology: “Protestants were wary of Aristotle and scholasticism – and therefore of Aquinas. Happiness was 
of little interest to them. While Aquinas thought from creation, Protestants thought from the fall. Starting with 
Martin Luther’s search for a gracious God, Protestants became preoccupied with finding a solution to the 
paralyzing fear produced by their belief in God’s justifiable wrath about human sinfulness. Although Protestants 
did not talk much about happiness, it implicitly became relief from anxiety before God. Having rejected the 
penitential system, Protestants turned to Christology in a search of absolution” (2010:111).  
65 Charry quotes Aquinas in seeking to define secondary agency: “The first cause of all things…is compared to 
the whole of nature as nature is to art. Hence that which first underlies the whole of nature is from the first cause 
of all things, and the function of second causes is to make it suitable for singular things” (2010:160).  
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since God is goodness itself, and creation exemplifies that goodness, God enjoys his own goodness 
when we comply with the power delegated to us in this creative way. Using ourselves artfully advances 
not only creation itself, but also God’s enjoyment of us and our enjoyment of ourselves. Godly self-
employment both enhances our lives and pleases God, who always enjoys our flourishing.  
She holds: “Happiness … is a state of the soul that can be cultivated through a certain way of 
knowing. It depends upon knowing, because knowing shapes the soul...” (Charry, 2004b:26). There 
are two forms of knowing indicated by Charry; “how we know” and “what we know” (2004b:26). 
Charry explains (2004b:26): 
The knowledge we assimilate shapes us depending upon the effect what we come to understand deeply 
has on us. We become attached to what we know well … We can become both what we love and what we 
hate. The emotional power things have over us shapes our souls … All this suggests that happiness 
requires discerning what is good to know well from what is bad to know well. Growing into a happy life 
requires prioritizing what is to get more, and what less, of our attention. 
The turn toward a doctrine of happiness, as one where our knowledge of God shapes our being, is pre-
empted in Ellen Charry’s statement (2004b:26): 
The philosophical and spiritual traditions often suggest that we need a teacher to lead the way…The 
ability to be spiritually nourished is itself a gift: one cannot impose it on oneself or on another. The 
argument here is that the beauty, wisdom, and goodness of God provide us with a pattern of meaning for 
our lives that bends the soul toward happiness by leading us in the care and nurture of human dignity.  
A definition is given of happiness in light of the aforementioned: “Perhaps now we are ready for a 
theological notion of happiness or flourishing-enjoyment of and satisfaction with life through 
participation in the properties we understand to characterize God that become us” (Charry, 2004b:26-
27).  
The means through which happiness may be cultivated begins and ends for Ellen Charry with the 
“interpretations of Scripture and doctrine”, which “promote spiritual” and “social flourishing” 
(2002a:177). Scripture serves as foundation for character formation through its revelation of God. A 
reciprocal process takes place, whereby the reader is transformed by acquiring knowledge of God 
which evokes happiness resulting in God’s enjoyment of humanity. Charry describes how God 
reaches out to humanity through Scripture (2002a:176): 
As God draws us to himself with motherly care, we may participate in God’s wisdom and love, gaining 
strength and skills from our intimacy with him. Thus, strengthened by our life in God, we may grow in 
personal self-mastery to enjoy serving God and neighbour…The means to happiness is the truth of God 
that is to goodness, beauty, and wisdom. This is to say that God is the psychological and moral 
foundation, not only of personal fulfilment, but also of just societies.  
Ellen Charry pre-empts the possible criticism of self-love in a happy life centred in Christ by 
providing a “rehabilitation of self-love” as “positive theological category” (2010:161). She finds that 
(Charry, 2010:161):  
Butler’s self-love resonates with Aquinas’s work on secondary agency as obedience: in both cases, living 
a godly life is obedience to one’s nature. The call to spiritual thriving is a priori: we are defined to it, so to 
speak. God has outfitted us for happiness by being ourselves in the proper theological sense of the term. 
In Aquinas’s case, it is to be an instrument of divine providence in creative activity: in Butler’s case, it is 
pursuing the moral life as self-love. 
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Self-love, “is not only faithfulness to our nature, but it actually enriches us, so that we become happier 
as we become more adept at being our proper theological selves, that is, as salvation and sanctification 
realise themselves in us” (Charry, 2010:161).  
The a priori conditions relied on by Aquinas and Butler make happiness possible (Charry, 2010:162). 
Ellen Charry argues (2010:162): 
these conditions mean that all persons are blessed by God to enjoy themselves and their life in him. 
Believers learn this through the ministrations of the church that orient people toward their proper identity. 
When believers properly grasp that identity, they should want to become in practice who they are in God 
by definition. Happiness is a universal possibility for both Aquinas and Butler.  
Charry has voiced through Augustine and Aquinas how knowledge of God shapes the human 
character. Scripture and doctrine are the means by which God communicates this knowledge to 
humankind. As Christians are assimilated to knowledge of God, a happy disposition occurs as result.  
Ellen Charry describes the formative potential exerted by knowledge of God on the lives of 
individuals as asherism. Asherism depicts a satisfaction with life, where the “properties” participated 
in are understood to characterise God (Charry, 2004b: 26-27). The nuanced way of speaking about 
both knowledge of God and the transformation of character present in Aquinas was lost with 
modernity. Charry takes issue with this loss, as it separated talk of piety and pleasure from happiness.  
3.6 Asherism: goodness and pleasure 
An integrated understanding of happiness, formulated by Aquinas who “guarded intimacy between 
goodness and truth” was “rent asunder” explains Ellen Charry with modernity (2011a:239). She 
remarks that (Charry, 2011a:239): 
Truth and goodness, fact and value were severed from one another and Christians had to locate 
themselves in this new epistemological arena. Happiness, now interpreted hedonistically as pleasure was 
ripped from its moral moorings and set loose for “the pursuit of happiness” detached from God and 
goodness. Christians found themselves having to opt for either goodness or pleasure, as it seemed the two 
no longer dwelt in the same abode”. 
Ellen Charry finds a foundation for happiness in Scripture that does not necessitate a divide between 
goodness and pleasure, namely asherism. The argument for asherism is two-pronged (Charry, 
2011:239): 
First, theology does not have to choose between temporal and eschatological happiness66 … Second, 
theology does not have to disparage commercial invitations to pleasure in order to articulate a robust 
theological teaching, because a theological teaching, while sensitive to the importance of material well-
being, is not define by it. It recognizes the moral as well as the material place of flourishing. 
Asherism consequently provides a substantial doctrine of happiness as “realizing eschatology of 
growth into the beauty and wisdom of God” (Charry, 2010:157). Charry illustrates that: “Happiness is 
enjoying life through a divinely initiated pattern of spiritual growth” (2010:157). The pattern of 
spiritual growth is illustrated by relating to God’s covenant with Israel. Asherist commands are 
commands that “conduce to a successful and pleasurable life” (Charry, 2011:244) and Charry 
(2010:182): 
                                                     
66 Ellen Charry delineates her thought: “It is possible to construct a modest theological doctrine of temporal 
happiness knowing that death awaits each of us and that we will lose whatever happiness we have in this life on 
the principle that to have and to lose is preferable to not having at all” (2011a:239).  
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proposes that happiness is enjoying life through the way of life to which Israel is called. It begins with the 
covenant between God and Israel…The argument is that happiness is enjoying God, creation, and self by 
cultivating the wisdom behind divine commands that enable one to become an instrument of the world’s 
flourishing.67 
 
The Pentateuch is read in light of the covenant, which brings a social dimension to human flourishing 
(Charry, 2010:193): 
The covenant grounds the biblical doctrine of happiness. Israel’s responsibility to live the divinely authorized 
way of life shaped by the divine commands that construct and maintain society. They structure personal and 
family life in terms of Israel’s corporate well-being, from which all benefit. Reverent obedience to God 
promotes self-mastery, values, and skills that promote personal well-being and the common good…The 
Decalogue, the Holiness Code, the ensuing Deuteronomic legislation – and even morally perplexing precepts 
– structure an asherist way of life in which God and Israel enjoy one another, as Israel lives into and rejoices 
in its covenantal responsibilities. 
Ellen Charry draws a parallel to happiness (2010:193-194): 
From these texts it is reasonable to conclude that the Pentateuch understands Israel’s thriving as its 
happiness: happiness is enjoying and celebrating a productive and fulfilling life in obedience to the terms 
of the covenant with God to which Israel agreed at Sinai. Socializing legislation discloses values and 
virtues that are to be understood dynamically and applied liberally in situations.  
In contrast to the Pentateuch, whose focus was on obedience to the commands themselves, the Psalter 
refers to such commands universally (Charry, 2010:214): 
Divine precepts and ordinances have coalesced into a salutary way of life that is summarized as reverence, 
keeping the commandments, taking refuge in the Lord, being humble, walking in his way, and so on. 
Specific practices have been generalized so that revering the Lord is a high-minded life of integrity, 
justice, generosity, and honesty that encourages others along the same path to a rich and enjoyable life. 
This is the life for which the law has destined Israel, from oppression but had international moral 
leadership as its ultimate goal. 
Ellen Charry elaborates the asherist reading of the Psalter: “The Psalter expects energetic fidelity to 
covenantal precepts. Corporate election calls for enthusiastic corporate response. In this, numerous 
psalms follow the pattern set by the Pentateuchal passages”, which is used as examples in her 
exposition. “They testify that Israel’s flourishing – or, perhaps better, salvation – lies in learning to 
live uprightly by carrying out God’s ordinances and applying the values and skills learned from 
specific practices across life” (Charry, 2010:197). This “fidelity to God’s way is all that one needs to 
succeed in life, for success is measured in more than money (Charry, 2010:215). “Finally, there is a 
strong sense in which happiness is a judgment on the quality of one’s life as it proceeds and when it is 
evaluated at its end” (Charry, 2010:215).  
In Charry’s reading of Proverbs, two themes come to the fore; the personification of lady wisdom, 
where Charry argues that (2010:228): 
objecting to wisdom ethics because it is boring or simplistic misses the point that constructing and 
maintaining healthy societies is not simply a political art. Civilizations only flourish as the spiritual 
                                                     
67 Charry relates this asherist dimension to happiness: “Happiness is a discipline that might be called godly self-
enjoyment” (2010:182).  
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strengths that the sages cherish captures the imagination of the people. For Scripture, enjoying advancing 
in this strength is the happy life.  
The second theme is a therapeutic understanding of asherism reminiscent in Augustine’s therapeutic 
soteriology. “The skeptical might object that the promise of a happy life held out by the wisdom ethic 
of Proverbs is naïve. Happiness is a fragile gossamer fabric … Yet the skeptics are a breath of fresh 
air in a room of unrelenting trust in goodness,” (Charry, 2010:228). Ellen Charry alludes to the 
presence of suffering in life (2010:228):  
Life is not fair, and the just can seem abandoned. The question for the skeptic is whether, in the dark night 
of the soul, happiness as Scripture understands it can be eradicated or whether the comfort and enjoyment 
of a reverent life is a tool for fighting tragedy and rebounding from it.68 
Whereas Ellen Charry reads asherism in the Old Testament as enjoyment of the self, neighbour and 
creation coupled with the celebration of the ability to contribute to the “flourishing of creation” 
(2010:229), she turns to the New Testament to uncover how the Gospel of John imagines happiness.  
A parallel exists between the Old Testament’s emphasis on knowing God through obedience and 
knowing God in the New Testament through obedience to Christ. Ellen Charry acknowledge the 
“glaring discontinuities between the Old and New Testament” (2010:241), but finds the asherist 
potential in the possibility of enjoying a happy life through Christ” (2010:241). She states (Charry, 
2010:241): 
The Fourth Gospel’s talk of becoming a child of God, being born or reborn of God, being illumines or 
living as a child of light, having eternal life, and being one with God by keeping the commandments of 
Christ are analogues of the Tanaḥ’s reference to keeping the commandments, taking refuge in the Lord, 
living in God’s house, and revering the Lord. 
Ellen Charry indicates how in the New Testament, reverence, worship and happiness occur when 
believers are united with God through obedience to Christ (2010:241): 
Here, in John, we love God by loving Jesus, and we abide in his teaching, which is participation in Jesus’ 
unity with the Father. These images recall and intensify the asherist vision of reverence in the Older 
Testament materials we have examined, but with an excitement missing in the older settled texts … 
Abiding by divine commands is the wisdom of God for the Tanaḥ: in John’s Gospel it becomes loving 
intimacy with God. Eternal life with God is to abide in Jesus’ wise guidance.  
Jesus sets the ultimate example of obedience in obeying God unto death. “Loving Jesus” consequently 
“means keeping his word and commandments just as he keeps those of his Father. This is the way to 
eternal life”69 (Charry, 2010:246). Ellen Charry continues (2010:249-250): 
                                                     
68 Ellen Charry uses a similar logic in her contribution “On things we can’t fix”, where she discusses the 
question of theodicy. The first remark indicates the human disposition toward suffering, “the assumption that we 
should be able to write our own scripts and act them out flawlessly”. Hereafter, Charry seeks to show that human 
dignity resides in the moral sphere where physical damage cannot “take away” from the worth of humans. When 
speaking of someone who suffers, she asks: “Or, should we say that since her virtue and honour are intact, that 
she has not suffered damage in the place where her proper dignity and worth resides? Here suffering is 
understood not in physical but in moral terms. Happiness is correctly judged by the state of our souls, not our 
bodies, much as we want them to be perfect.” A final remark pertains to the opportunity presented in suffering to 
grow into the situation, when speaking of people who suffer: “They set themselves then to growing into the 
situation, to finding spiritual gifts within the reality they actually inhabit, as a way of escaping from the hell of 
constant, debilitating anguish that things are not right and cannot be made right. In addition, when they did, each 
found a way forward …” (Charry, 2000b:159). 
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Eternal life occupies the place of ashrey, smḥ, and reverence for the Lord that is dominant in the texts 
from the Older Testament … It is sadly ironic that John’s message – that eternal life is love – that binds 
the Father, Jesus, and disciples together into one body, was formed in the crucible of rancour and 
malice…the eternal life that Jesus was sent to deliver is the love of God, the knowledge that love locates 
God in us, us in God, and us in one another as members of Christ’s body. Love is the dynamic power that 
reaches down in Jesus and carries us into the love he shares with his Father, out into the community that is 
formed by this love, and back up into the beauty of the Father, who is responsible for saving happiness. 
The wisdom of divine love is eternal life.  
Charry makes two important statements regarding the role of grace in forming our knowledge; the 
first, how grace and the law are not in opposition to one another, but rather a fulfilment of the promise 
of Christ’s reign: “It is a mistake to oppose law and grace, for God’s grace makes way for a radically 
transformed social and moral order. The law of Christ enables a new way of life that is obedient to 
God” (2003a:34). Secondly, grace centres our practices in Christ, “both Pauline and Matthean 
interpretations of faith in Jesus Christ elucidate a new and demanding vision of religious practice that 
applies divine grace given through Christ” (Charry, 2003a:38). Moreover, notes Ellen Charry 
(2003a:238): 
[the] cross and resurrection, not the Decalogue, are front and centre for Paul. They reformulate godliness 
and regulate the practice of a pure life. They are the grace of God for the reconciliation and true 
empowerment of Jews and Gentiles as one people … Purity lies in the spiritual strength to live as Christ 
died: testifying to the power and strength of letting go that others may live. Christ embodied the wisdom 
of God that now belongs to those who belong to Christ. One should not worry about how one makes 
one’s way into the body of Christ…  
Augustine’s belief “that all humans are broken by disordered love70 and that their spiritual search is 
for healing” (Charry, 2010:251), coupled with the actualisation thereof in biblical material forms the 
foundation for her doctrine of happiness. The cognitive-behavioural approach to actualising one’s 
healing is indicated, in Ellen Charry’s opinion, by the canonical ordering of the Scripture. 
“Behavioural skills enable personal dynamics to assume a different place in our arsenal of skills. 
Theologically put, obeying divine commands enables us to experience the reverent life as pleasing and 
rewarding71. We do better by practicing than by being talked into it” (Charry, 2010:252-253). The 
sacraments serve as forum in which “the slow and arduous process” of centring oneself in God 
through participation takes place (Charry, 2001:127). Charry affirms (2001:127): 
Christian therapy is emancipation from the distortions of the self to which all persons are liable. It begins 
with realizing that the source of one’s proper dignity and nobility is God and no one or nothing else. 
Dignity and nobility are found in coming to understand God and in coming to see oneself as an echo of 
the Trinity. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
69 Ellen Charry devotes a chapter to illustrate how eternal life is inaugurated by Christ, “John 14 charts Jesus” 
leading into eternal life as follows: (I) “Believe in God… (2) Accept Jesus” claims about himself at face value… 
(3) Abide in Jesus” word of loving intimacy… (4) Imitate Jesus… (5) Love Jesus by obeying him…(6) The 
process is to carry believers to the Father…” (2010:247).  
70 Ellen Charry states that this disordered love can affect harm on the self as well as others. Of importance is 
where dignity, or as Charry puts it, the image of God is located: “Clinging to the part of us that cannot be 
damaged by others because they have no access to it is the theological ground on which the healing of love can 
occur. This is the place in us that can rest in God, and it is a refuge in times of trouble” (2010:252).  
71 The quote rings true to Ellen Charry’s conception of sapience as a practical form of knowing. Charry explains 
when reading Augustine’s understanding of various forms of knowing: “Sapientia is the response of loving God 
once the mind is able to remember and understand and love him by whom it was made … In this way it will be 
wise not with its own light but by sharing in that supreme light, and it will reign in happiness where it reigns 
eternal. Sapientia is practical because it turns the believer outward” (1993b:94).  
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Through the sacraments, also called “symbolic rituals,” people are formed “in the virtues needed for 
healthy functioning and, where persons are the object of the action, lay moral claims on their lives. 
They edify and formally bring people to a society and, in the case of some Christian rites, to God”72 
(Charry, 2008:86). “To this end, rituals teach and reinforce virtues, values, and standards needed by 
individuals for the well-being of the society” (Charry, 2008:86). The sacraments underscore important 
dimensions of therapeutic soteriology, “the community’s sacraments graft people into the life of God, 
uniting them with the saving work of Christ and making them living members of it” and “some 
Christian liturgical rites can restore” “ones relationship to the saving work of God in Christ” (Charry, 
2008:91).  
The opportunity is presented by Ellen Charry to construct a “therapeutic foundation from which to 
help people build strength and well-being73” (2011b:291); “it suggests that maturation in spiritual and 
practical wisdom is a realistic hope because God’s love and trust abides in the deep recesses of one’s 
soul”. Expressing the recovery model spelled out in The Trinity, Augustine put it this way (Augustine 
in Charry, 2011b:291):  
people become children of God to the extent that they begin to exist in the newness of the Spirit and begin 
to be renewed in the interior human being according to the image of him who created them. All the old 
weakness is not done away with from the moment of one’s baptism. Rather, the renewal begins with the 
forgiveness of all sins and is realized to the extent that one who is wise is wise about spiritual things. 
In short, “the church’s sacramental agency offers Christians an abiding in the Holy Trinity and the 
power of Christ and the Holy Spirit to heal and be healed” (Charry, 2010:256). Ellen Charry uses the 
example of baptism, which co-opts its participants in the salvific drama exemplified by Christ 
(2010:262-263): 
Having been co-opted into that drama at baptism, the believer is dressed in the vestments of salvation, the 
armour of God. Assimilating salvation into our personalities requires developing a new outlook on things 
and strategies for accomplishing them … 
Ellen Charry continues with the train of thought when referring to Aquinas’s “idea that one is an 
instrument of divine providence”. Charry suggests (2010:262-263): 
By embracing that instrumentality joyfully, we enjoy ourselves in God. This is the happiness of abundant 
life. Those co-opted into the drama of redemption have no choice but to embrace their providential 
responsibility energetically, for they have become servants of the world’s flourishing and of God’s 
enjoyment of creation. Their happiness is in enjoying God and the world as servants. Enjoying eternal life 
is doing this excellently and energetically.  
The point is similarly illustrated in the article “Sacramental ecclesiology” (2005:213): 
Baptism … inducts people into the redemption of Israel and the death and resurrection of Christ, setting 
them in the church as the foundation of the Christian life. These ceremonies define and identify them like 
any swearing ceremony. Baptismal rites sanctify in this objective sense. They do not confirm previously 
cultivated piety, but call for it. 
                                                     
72 “Although they differ in performance, both civic and Christian rituals practices preserve and nourish the 
community performing them, the persons for or on whom they are performed, and the persons witnessing them” 
(Charry, 2008:86). It is interesting to see that Ellen Charry does not engage with the language of “performance” 
which makes this article the first.  
73 In the book God and the art of happiness, Ellen Charry describes this process in terms of the gospel of John’s 
Christology in speaking about the increased need for healing, through and of love (2010:255).   
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“The church” consequently “equips those who wish to be healed unto eternal life through public 
initiatory rights. Christian initiation imposes an identity not of one’s choosing. Like being ashrey, we 
must grow into this identity, since, as Paul put it, Christians have the Holy Spirit in them” (Charry, 
2010:264).  
The initiatory process invokes an intimate form of knowing God, she argues (Charry, 2002c:114): 
Knowing the story of God’s dealings with us in creation, we are given spiritual knowledge of the wisdom, 
the goodness, the truth, and the moral beauty that is the very being, the ousia of God. By knowing and 
loving the beauty and goodness of our God, and by yearning to know God more fully, our desires are 
already oriented in a godly and noble manner. We may come to taste, to touch, to dwell in the wisdom of 
God, which is the patrimony of our baptism.  
Ellen Charry indicates why the “initiatory rights are therapeutic” (2010:266). Because, “through them 
God equips people with spiritual power tools to become the ‘new Creation,’ which they have been 
made by the Trinitarian work of creation, healing, and empowerment, not by their own strength” 
(Charry, 2010:266). “In asherist terms, these people are healing through incorporation into Christ’s 
life, death, resurrection, and ascension…” (Charry, 2010:266).  
In addition to being healed, three moments occur where the identity of the participant is transformed. 
Charry indicates (1995:1077):  
First, this sacred washing purifies the baptized for a new life dominated by belonging to God … Second, 
the baptized are always in the presence of God and carry the seal of the Holy Spirit around with them. 
They are ennobled and dignified by the presence of God, and live as signs of God’s self-communication 
through Jesus … Third, the baptized are empowered. No matter what direction they turn, the dignity of 
God impels them to be agents of reconciliation and empowers them for self-control.  
Ellen Charry brings the concepts of healing as empowerment and strengthening of love in 
conversation with asherism. She shows (Charry, 2010:268): 
Asherism’s realizing eschatology functions in two directions, suggesting that healing is healing: that is, 
being healed by Christ strengthens one’s ability to heal others. At the same time, healing others is 
therapeutic, because it is empowering and it is empowered by and for the beauty of holiness that is 
obedience to God … Being led by the disclosure of God in Christ and empowered by the spiritual gifts 
given in initiation offer the healing of the broken image in us that Augustine worked so hard to draw us 
into, for healing and empowering love water the soul.  
Ellen Charry understands realising eschatology as a continuous disposition before God where 
Christians participate in God’s will for creation while enjoying life through obedience to God’s 
commandments.  
It is affirmed by Ellen Charry that grace and God’s commandments are not in opposition to one 
another instead, it enables one to live life excellently. Grace accordingly situates obedience to God’s 
commandments in Christ. Furthermore, sacraments teach and reinforce the standard set by God’s 
commandments. Through the sacraments, a way of living life excellently is enacted through symbol 
and ritual, underscoring the role of grace in bringing human persons into relation with God.  
3.7 Conclusion: 
Knowledge of God and happiness are two themes that run parallel to Ellen Charry’s construction of 
flourishing, a disposition where happiness is evoked through an established habit of mind.  
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Charry traces the discrepancy in theology’s response to the Enlightenment, where there was 
distinguished between knowledge of God and truth and its consequent goodness. The discrepancy 
leads her to rethink the contribution theology has to make to the notion of happiness. When 
knowledge of God is understood to be the source of happiness, the knowledge itself must be 
deconstructed. Ellen Charry does exactly this by indicating the formative potential of truth in the 
knower which leads to a form of living that is simultaneously directed toward God and creation. Life 
that is lived excellently marks enjoyment of God (as humans participate in God’s goodness by being 
assimilated to God through knowledge) and creation. The mutual enjoyment of God and creation 
evokes a disposition of flourishing characterised as happiness.  
The emphasis does not only fall on the experience of happiness, but also on the notion that God enjoys 
Godself when creation flourishes. Happiness becomes a disposition for Ellen Charry that functions 
irrespective of human suffering, as happiness is a state of being premised on a particular knowledge of 
God. Ellen Charry argues (2006a:145): 
knowledge is true if it leads us into goodness, making us happy and good. The idea that knowing good 
things make us good implies continuity between the knower and what she knows. It is not simply to be 
cognizant of the truth but to be assimilated into it.  
Charry circumvents the divide between terrestrial and eschatological happiness by establishing the 
notion of realising eschatology. The understanding that happiness is premised on enjoyment of God 
through obedience to God’s commandments in light of a soteriology centred in sanctification (Charry, 
2010:x). Ellen Charry is led to argue for a realising eschatology in her understanding that happiness, 
“is the experience not of a transient pleasant emotions but rather of sustained flourishing as a result of 
living wisely and being carefully guided by reverence for God” (2011c:37). 
Actualisation of happiness occurs for Ellen Charry in two stages; firstly, Christians are to partake in 
the enjoyment of God by assuming a Christian identity premised on a therapeutic soteriology, and 
secondly, Christians are to assimilate to happiness by participating in God’s plan for human 
flourishing. This occurs through a disposition of being ašrê, a life filled with obedience to God and 
preoccupation with the flourishing of creation.  
Finally, the sacraments in particular baptism, co-opt Christians into a realised eschatology. This final 
stage may be likened to Ellen Charry’s second-order assertions, where happiness becomes a regulative 
norm for the Christian community. By partaking in the sacraments Christians confess that terrestrial 
happiness is finite but substantial, as way of subscribing to God’s will for the flourishing of creation.  
Happiness for Ellen Charry is independent of momentary euphoric experiences. Instead, to be ashrey 
is a continuous disposition coram deo where Christians are reminded of their participation in God’s 
will for creation to flourish while participating in the joys of life.  
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Chapter 4 
Virtuous? Jennifer Herdt on human flourishing 
 
“Happiness is found not in achieving independence but in embracing our ultimate dependency…while 
our final good is not fully up to us, it is something that requires our active participation: it is not 
something that we simply passively undergo. If virtue is the perfection of my love for God, the end of 
enjoyment of God cannot be fully characterized apart from my virtuous activity, my loving response 
to God. We find happiness in the perfected activity of receiving and returning God’s gifts.”  
(Herdt, 2012b:57) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
If the question were to be posed to Jennifer Herdt’s74 literature, “in which ways does Jennifer Herdt 
contribute theologically to the themes of well-being and happiness?” one would possibly find her 
response in the suspicion of virtue present since the sixteenth century. Led by the “trajectory … in 
Augustinian anxiety over acquired virtue” (Herdt, 2012b:24), Herdt asks “in what sense virtuous 
action is at the same time performed for the sake of happiness and for the sake of the good aimed at by 
political science” (Herdt2012b:24).  
Jennifer Herdt remarks on the distinctively Christian character of virtue understood theologically in 
the article “Hauerwas among the virtues”75 (Herdt, 2012a: 215): 
Crucially, Christians cannot understand responsibility for character in the way that Aristotle does: virtue is 
not a matter of acquiring skills or excellences that allow us to flourish as instantiations of human nature, 
but a matter of becoming a follower of Jesus … We are to be made participants in God’s story, not 
authors of our own. 
This is in contrast to what Jennifer Herdt calls “the ironic secularization of religious thought” 
(2000:173), where the appeal to self-interest was used as means of escaping a common good premised 
on fear of the divine76, coupled with an emphasis on human agency in moral formation.  
There are three possible routes one may take when reading Jennifer Herdt’s literature; the first would 
be a systematic investigation of the history of moral philosophy where themes of ethics and the 
Christian worldview may serve as platform upon which notions of happiness and flourishing may be 
constructed. This approach would be satisfactory in its articulation of a “religious reconstruction”, 
where religion is seen “as ‘a cultural system’ that links ‘worldview’ and ‘ethos’ ” (Herdt, 2000:169). 
Providing “an ultimate account of the way things are, and … simultaneously shapes our feelings and 
actions so that they conform to that description of reality” (Herdt, 2000:169).  
The second possibility would be to look at soteriological themes that arose from appropriations of the 
Augustinian anxiety of virtues as splendid vices. Such an approach would grant the opportunity to 
distinguish between splendid vices and true virtue based on various theological contributions. It would 
                                                     
74 Jennifer Herdt contributed to the 2010 God and Human Flourishing Consultation with her paper “Desire for 
the Common Good: A Defense of Eudaimonism” (Herdt, 2010).  
75“This essay traces the evolution of Hauerwas’s reflections on virtue and the virtues over the course of his 
career, with special attention to how this has been bound up with an increasingly emphatic theological 
particularism that has remained ambivalent between what I term “comprehensive” versus “exclusive” 
particularism” (Herdt, 2012a:202). 
76 This is often levelled at Luther’s account of utter passivity in justification (Herdt, 2012b:179). 
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however, not allow for a comprehensive presentation of the development of conceptions of virtue in 
service of the greater good77.  
A third methodological approach which takes into consideration various streams of thought as they 
developed parallel to one another is most appropriate. Jennifer Herdt delineates the development of 
virtue premised on a theological understanding of happiness. The Augustinian legacy serves as point 
of departure for the reclamation of “virtue-talk” (Herdt, 2012a:205) where Herdt seeks to reclaim the 
possibility of habituation into virtue through a mimetic understanding of happiness (Herdt2012b:ix):  
This project took shape, than, as a particular way of narrating the story of virtue and of thereby beginning 
to recover and recast a Christian ethics of mimetic virtue freed from these distorting preoccupations. 
It is my hope to set out Jennifer Herdt’s contribution based on the greater framework of the good life 
as envisioned by various constituents where notions of virtue, salvation and the good life are woven 
together interchangeably. Jennifer Herdt begins her exposition of virtue with the secularisation of 
moral thought where virtue was divorced from its religious moorings.  
4.2 The rise of secular morality 
The development of moral thought is significant for understanding how various conceptions of 
happiness lead to divergent appropriations of virtuous living. Jennifer Herdt believes there to be no 
singular theme or criteria that may describe the “nature” of happiness, but that within moral thought 
various traditions of virtue were established based on various conceptions of the good life78 (Herdt, 
2004b:202) and of God. The latter is seen in her article “Divine compassion and the mystification of 
power: the latitudinarian divines in the secularization of moral thought”79 where Benjamin 
Whichcote80 (2010) reckons “all our happiness to consist in our enjoyment of him, our being and 
living in communion and acquaintance” with God (Whichcote in Herdt, 2001a: 259). Herdt 
understands this enjoyment to be made “possible when we partake through Christ in God’s goodness 
and God’s compassion” (2001a:259).  
Benjamin Whichcote, reflecting the position of the Cambridge Platonists, makes an important link 
between morality and religion. Jennifer Herdt affirms of the Cambridge Platonists: “The Cambridge 
Platonists are well known for their view that morality is the heart of religion. When Whichcote 
declared that ‘the sum of all religion is divine imitation’ (Whichcote, 2010:284 in Herdt, 2001a: 259) 
he was pointing to the way in which goodness draws one to God, allows one to be caught up more 
fully in the life of God” (Whichcote in Herdt, 2001a:259). Morality consequently served “to bring 
                                                     
77 Jennifer Herdt does not qualify the use of the term “greater good” in her literature. One might instead seek to 
interpret “the greater good” within Herdt’s priority toward praxis inherent in reflection. This is seen in the article 
“Christian humility, courtly civility, and the code of the streets”, where Herdt reflects on courtly civility within 
the eighteenth-century and the critique thereof. She continues to pose this critique to the church and its 
interaction with the code of inner-Philadelphian streets. In her reflection, Herdt looks at particular church models 
and the relevant change that they could bring to the betterment of society.  
78The history of moral philosophy serves as a shared “playing field” between philosophical and theological 
narratives that “is capable”, for Jennifer Herdt, “of fruitful dialogue” (2004b:202).   
79 In this article, Jennifer Herdt tests the claim that “seventeenth-century theologians “domesticated” divine 
transcendence, with fostering an understanding of God that was clear and comprehensible, but unattractive, 
unpersuasive, and easily undermined by secular thought” (2001a:253).   
80The Encyclopaedia Britannica describes Benjamin Whichcote as leader of the Cambridge Platonists, a “group 
of 17th-century English philosophic and religious thinkers who hoped to reconcile Christian ethics with 
Renaissance humanism, religion with the new science, and faith with rationality.” Benjamin Whichcote 
expounded “in his sermons the Christian humanism that united the group” (The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2013b). Jennifer Herdt references Whichcote’s contribution as follows: “Benjamin Whichcote, Select Sermons, 
ed. Lord Shaftesbury (London: Awnsham and Churchhill, 1698).” (2001a:268).  
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humanity into deeper relation with God” (Herdt, 2001a:259). Herdt furthers the argument, stating 
(2001a:259): 
the natural world and human nature reveal God’s goodness, but repentance and further grace are needed if 
we are to participate more fully in God’s goodness and hence draw closer to God. The point of talking 
about compassion, whether human or divine, was therefore to bring humanity into deeper relation with 
God, not primarily to enhance human morality as such. 
Morality, defined as a normative criterion from which societies exercise virtue (Herdt, 2004b:197-
199), lends a clue to the way traditions function. Tradition has “a relationship to the past constantly 
constructed by the current generation” (Herdt, 2004b:197-199). The development of rationality, 
present in the Enlightenment, evoked a sense that tradition as something governed wholly by religious 
presuppositions was logically unsound (Herdt, 2001b:148). This is evidenced in “attempts to construct 
a morally acceptable religious ethic” which “continually threatened to render God superfluous to 
human morality and that no attempts to avoid this result were fully successful”81 (Herdt, 2001b:148).  
In addition to the rise of rationality, a problem arose in the exclusive dependence on God’s grace for 
true virtuous living as it restricted divine action to Christian virtue, in the process eliminating any 
possibility of divine action in “natural virtues” (Herdt, 2012b:3). Herdt describes (2012b:3): 
What was lost was any sense that grace can work through ordinary processes of habituation, allowing a 
gradual transcendence of prideful self-love, a growing recognition of our true final end, a developing 
sense of the dependent of our virtue and moral agency. Even where some place remained for habituation 
or growth in charity, understood as a form of secondary causality or co-causation with divine agency, this 
had to be preceded by some moment of exclusively divine action on the passive human self. 
The “exacerbated Augustinian worry” led to the thought that “false natural virtue might be more 
important for the conduct of public affairs” (Herdt, 2012b:3). Jennifer Herdt argues (2012b:3): 
What emerged in the course of these explorations into natural moral psychology were new forms of moral 
philosophy that were secular in the sense of setting aside any appeal to grace. Even when these secular 
forms of moral thought understood themselves to be reclaiming forms of pagan ethics, they continued to 
be shaped in problematic ways by the legacy of the splendid vices.  
In Jennifer Herdt’s article, “The invention of modern moral philosophy” (Herdt, 2001b), she 
delineates the argument further by referring to Schneewind82 (Schneewind in Herdt, 2001b:148): 
The secularization of moral thought was a by-product of efforts to work out tensions internal to Christian 
moral thought. He shows in great detail that attempts to construct a morally acceptable religious ethics 
continually threatened to render God superfluous to human morality and that no attempts to avoid this 
result were fully successful. 
Jennifer Herdt places the secularisation of moral thought squarely before the Christian tradition 
(2001b:148): 
                                                     
81 In this instance, Jennifer Herdt recaps Schneewind’s argument in his book The Invention of Autonomy (1998), 
where he argues “that an impasse between modern natural law and perfectionist ethics revealed irresolvable 
tension within Christian ethics and thus encouraged the emergence of secular moral thought” (Schneewind, 1998 
in Herdt, 2001b:147). Herdt argues contra to Schneewind’s hypothesis by suggesting “that these tensions were 
specific to a voluntarist strand of Christian moral thought from which even antivoluntarists of the modern period 
were unable to break free” (Herdt, 2001b:147).  
82 Jennifer Herdt refers to the particular contribution of Schneewind in his book The Invention of Autonomy 
which she references as follows: “Schneewind, J.B. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern 
Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.” (2001b:173).  
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Secularization was due not to the subversive efforts of religious skeptics, but to inconsistencies within 
Christian ethics that became unbearable within a socio-political context characterized by religious wars 
and the collapse of traditional religious authorities. The failure of modern moral thought to create a stable 
non-sectarian religious ethics, joined with the fear that sectarian forms of religious ethics could insert 
themselves into the public realm only at the risk of re-igniting religious wars, encouraged the conclusion, 
endorsed by Schneewind, that a public ethic must be fully secular. 
Stanley Hauerwas is indicated by Jennifer Herdt as identifying a misplaced emphasis on the 
implication of virtue present within the secularisation of moral thought. Hauerwas consequently 
distinguished between agent and actions, with the latter being a misappropriation of virtue. Herdt 
quotes Hauerwas83 (1985:37 in Herdt, 2012a:207):  
in the history of ethics the language of virtue became associated, especially in the Stoics, with the 
descriptions of actions or duties as defining particular classifications of virtues. The focus was thus shifted 
from the agent to the value of certain actions for the public domain. It was assumed that the way one 
becomes virtuous is by conforming to the prescribed acts and duties. 
Stanley Hauerwas84 negotiates this divide in his focus on “virtue-talk” “not simply” as “a way of 
making sense of the supererogatory or of turning attention to characteristics of agents rather than of 
acts” (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012a:205). It is a way of capturing something irreducibly theological85 
about how Christians understand what they are doing. Herdt recalls the words of Hauerwas (Hauerwas 
in Herdt, 2012a:205): 
it is necessary to maintain the specificity of Christian moral behaviour in order to do justice to the 
theological claim Christians make that their moral life is intimately connected with their religious 
convictions. Christians believe their moral values are an inseparable part of the meaning of the faith they 
confess.  
With regards to the secularisation of moral thought, Jennifer Herdt describes how Hauerwas turns to 
the category of character because he finds it a corrective both to characteristically Protestant and 
characteristically secular modern ailments (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012:208-209). She affirms 
Hauerwas’ argument that (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012:208-209): 
Both have had trouble speaking about the identity of the moral agent over time, about moral growth. 
Protestants, with their emphasis on justification, have tended to divorce the hidden, inner, justified self 
from the outer visible self, have emphasized the latter’s sinfulness, and have regarded the moral life as a 
site where one is repeatedly confronted with God’s command, not a locus of gradual moral 
development…Lutheran themes, given a Reformed reworking by Karl Barth’s ethic of command, have 
fed into empty situation ethics, in which now the command comes void of content, demanding only that 
we do the loving thing in the concrete situation 
                                                     
83 This quote of Hauerwas’ explanation is referenced by Jennifer Herdt as, “Hauerwas, Stanley 1985a. Character 
and the Christian Life. 2nd edition. San Antonio, Tex: Trinity University Press.” (2012a:225).  
84 Jennifer Herdt references her quote of Hauerwas as follows: “Hauerwas, Stanley 1973. “The Self as Story: A 
Reconsideration of the Relation of Religions and Morality from the Agent’s Perspective.” Journal of Religious 
Ethics 13.2 (Fall): 185-209.” (2012a:225).  
85 When reflecting on the work of Hauerwas it is appropriate to mention two Professors of Stellenbosch 
University who wrote their DTh on themes pertaining to Hauerwas, namely, Robert Vosloo who is the head of 
Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology at Stellenbosch University and Nico Koopman who is currently the Dean 
of the Faculty of Theology. The contributions are respectively: Vosloo, R. 1994. Verhaal en Moraal: ŉ Kritiese 
ondersoek na die narratiewe etiek van Stanley Hauerwas. Source: LMS SUN and Koopman, N. 2000. Dade of 
Deugde?: implikasies vir Suid-Afrikaanse Kerke van ŉ modern-postmoderne debar oor die moraliteit. Source: 
LMS SUN.  
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Jennifer Herdt articulates her indebtedness to Hauerwas’ insight toward the Protestant “emphasis on 
justification” (Herdt, 2012a:208), which “has tended to divorce the hidden, inner, justified self from 
the outer visible self” (Herdt, 2012a:208) and finds the moral life to be “a site where one is repeatedly 
confronted with God’s command, not a locus of gradual moral development” (Herdt, 2012a:208). This 
comment is noteworthy in its preparation of the reader toward the turn to participation and liturgy 
echoed in the concluding section of Putting on Virtue (Herdt, 2012b:342-352), where Herdt introduces 
concepts such as narratives, performance and liturgy as basis for moral reflection.  
Jennifer Herdt shows how the understanding that morality brought human persons into relation with 
God was undermined by the inconsistencies within Christian ethics. The inconsistencies lead to the 
secularisation of moral thought which had a misplaced emphasis on actions instead of the agent of the 
action, a shift which restricted the role of grace in bringing an agent into relation with God. Herdt 
seeks to return the emphasis on the agent of virtue by emphasising the role of grace as working 
through ordinary processes of habituation (2012b:3). Human persons are accordingly enabled to 
participate in God by means of grace.    
4.3 Participation in God through virtue 
The claim by contemporary philosophical ethics that individuals are “responsible for their moral 
reflections and actions” (Herdt, 2012a:210) are problematic for Jennifer Herdt. She argues, “Gone is 
the concern for articulating the conditions for responsible agency, for being able to claim one’s actions 
as one’s own” (2012a:210). Herdt affirms her statement by quoting Hauerwas86 (Hauerwas, 
1981:262n10): 
 
My rebuttal, which follows, requires that the self be formed by a tradition (and its correlative virtues) that 
is sufficient to interpret our behaviour truthfully. Thus, the categories of character, agency, and intention 
recede, while those of community, narrative, and tradition come to the foreground …  
 
Contemporary philosophical ethics motivated the Christian tradition to erect its own moral vocabulary 
with a narrative that (Herdt, 2004b:202): 
moves not, as Schneewind does, from a view of man as lowly and needing external control to a much 
higher estimate of our capacities, particularly our ability to govern ourselves (Schneewind in Herdt, 
2004b:202) but rather from an understanding of human beings as created in the image of God and 
capable, through the renewal of grace, of self-government by virtue of participating in divine reason to a 
view of human freedom as competing with divine freedom and thus of human self-government as 
necessarily a rejection of divine government.  
Indicative of Jennifer Herdt’s reflection is an approach to human agency and autonomy that is seen as 
not opposing God’s autonomy or symbolising disobedience, but a participatory approach to virtue and 
morality.  
                                                     
86 The particular contribution is referenced by Jennifer Herdt as, “Hauerwas, Stanley 1981. A Community of 
Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.” 
(2012a: 225).  
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Cudworth87, representative of the Cambridge Platonists88, asserts this approach in his retention of a 
“teleological account of the soul’s final end as participation in God” (Cudworth in Herdt, 1999:47). 
Jennifer Herdt writes (Cudworth in Herdt, 1999:50):  
For Cudworth, God is important to morality not primarily as external to the world … but rather as the 
Good, the internal telos of human action, immanent in-and yet transcending- human love and goodness. 
Participation in God is not bestowed on human beings in heaven as a reward for good behaviour on earth: 
rather, participation in God is what we do more and more deeply as we grow in perfection. 
Premised on the account given by Cudworth (1996), autonomy becomes a means by which humans 
can act in goodness. Acting in goodness is a way of participating in God (Herdt, 1999:64)89. This 
participation was often seen as the height of earthly happiness. This account of autonomy was not 
evident in first theological reflections on moral tradition and the function of virtue therein. Instead, 
sixteenth century thinkers understood “the project of acquiring virtue” as “fundamentally dishonest 
not because it is a betrayal of the authentic self but rather because it is a false and fruitless assertion of 
human moral agency” (Herdt, 2012b:1).   
Often the internal logic of traditions were questioned and re-appropriated in the presence of 
epistemological crises (Herdt, 1998:528) present in the sixteenth century. Herdt describes this internal 
questioning as evidence of a healthy functioning tradition. The assessment of this questioning as 
“undermining the category of tradition would be to treat tradition as requiring some sort of static 
substance, a “deposit” that underlies historical change” (2004b:199).  
The basis of traditions, where ethos and worldview are linked according to anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz90 (Geertz in Herdt, 2000:169), allow for the investigation of human experience. Problematic to 
Enlightenment thinkers, however, was that religion was seen to define experience (Geertz in Herdt, 
2000:171), unlike science which was based on induction from experience. Inherent in the tension was 
the “necessity for autonomous individual judgment” (Herdt, 2000:171). Faith in the authoritativeness 
of tradition had been undermined (Herdt, 2000:171), which meant that “it could not lend authority or 
objectivity to a particular ethos by rendering it part of the unquestioned furniture of the world” (Herdt, 
2000:171). This is a plausible reason why different accounts of virtues were developed based on 
notions of autonomy and human agency. 
                                                     
87 Jennifer Herdt’s remarks on Cudworth is referenced by her as follows: “Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise 
Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A Treatise of Freewill (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 170-171.” (1999:64).  
88 The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy describes philosophers who found resonance with Plato and 
Plotinus as sharing “the Renaissance Humanist regard for the achievements of ancient philosophy, but like the 
Humanists of the Renaissance, their interest was dictated by their sense of the relevance of classical philosophy 
to contemporary life. They also emphatically repudiated the scholasticism that prevailed in academic philosophy 
and took a lively interest in the developments that brought about the scientific revolution. They therefore form 
part of the philosophical revolution of the seventeenth century, especially since they sought an alternative 
philosophical foundation to Aristotelianism which was waning fast in the face of challenges from skepticism and 
competing alternative philosophies, notably those of Hobbes and Descartes. They were the first philosophers to 
write primarily and consistently in the English language” (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: 2008) and are 
distinct “from their philosophical contemporaries” in having a theological background (Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy: 2008).  
89 In the article “The Rise of Sympathy and the question of divine suffering”, Jennifer Herdt critiques 
Cudworth’s (1996) methodology by noting that he employed incompatible strategies when attempting to 
reconcile God’s transcendence with his sympathetic relation to the world (2001c:386). His contribution on moral 
philosophy and autonomy is however, found useful by Herdt.  
90 Jennifer Herdt references Geertz as follows: “Geertz, Clifford. 1963. “Religion as a Cultural System.” In 
Anthropological Approaches to the study of Religion, edited by Michael Banton, 1-46. London: Tavistock.” 
(2000:186).  
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As will be seen in the next section, constituents such as Aquinas and Erasmus did not find the mutual 
reinforcement of ethos and worldview to be problematic. Despite this optimism, ethos was exchanged 
for ethics. Jennifer Herdt uses Geertz’ words to articulate the move toward ethics, “in some circles, a 
few new virtues, such as sincerity and tolerance appeared on the scene, while others, such as humility, 
fell by the wayside. But at another, less empirically available level, a deep irreversible change began 
to unfold” (Geertz in Herdt, 2000:172). Jennifer Herdt continues in the words of Geertz that “the 
mutual reinforcement of ethos and worldview was weakened, and thus the ethos began to seem 
arbitrary, culturally specific, and unmoored from its anchor in the ways things are” (Geertz in Herdt, 
2000: 172).  
The notion of ethics91implied the loss of worldview and ethos as “mutually reinforcing” in addition to 
the increased “distinction from manners and cultural mores” (Herdt, 2000:173). Jennifer Herdt relates 
(2000:172):  
The response to this change was often to reiterate particular elements of the Christian worldview while 
attempting to link them to something indisputable. John Locke, for example, claimed that moral 
obligation rested on the power of God to reward and punish, since if that was so, it would then be in 
everyone’s self-interest to do the right thing92.  
Jennifer Herdt argues that “Locke went further in his rationale to situate this decision in each 
individual’s conception of obedience to God, “everyone should do what he in his conscience is 
persuaded to be acceptable to the almighty, on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their 
happiness”” (Herdt, 2003:24).  
David Hume, argues Herdt (2000:172): 
rejected large parts of the Christian worldview, claiming that by filling people with fear, it failed to 
provide a social context in which human beings could flourish. Hume suggested that to live a virtuous life 
one needed only to have loving parents and to cultivate natural social sentiments. 
Jennifer Herdt continues to explain that Hume depicted the movement away from the “defence of 
Christian morals” to “modern moral philosophy” who “sought to root itself not in disputable religious 
assumptions whose only defence lay in a flight to authority, but rather in shared and putatively 
universal truths of reason or of human nature” (2000:173).  
This process of distancing from what seemed a total reliance on authoritative tradition is described by 
Jennifer Herdt as a “project new to Christian Europe”. She terms this project “justifying morality.” 
The justification of morality was “one expression of the growing acceptance of autonomy”, the 
premise that “our understandings can be validated or redeemed only by appeal in some sense to 
human experience and reason as such” (Herdt, 2000:174).  
Aquinas did not see this expression of autonomy as problematic within itself but did however see it as 
sufficient only for natural virtues (Herdt, 2012b:73). Natural virtues were those virtues cultivated 
through human effort (Herdt, 2012b:73). These were in contrast to infused virtue, which was 
                                                     
91Jennifer Herdt writes in this regard: “Ethics came to be distinguished from manners and cultural mores, with 
the relativity of the latter being accepted. It was simultaneously more difficult and more urgent to be able to 
regard the narrower realm of ethics as embodying the way things really are” (2000:172). 
92 As will be seen later in the article “Locke, martyrdom, and the disciplinarity power of the church” (Herdt, 
2003), Locke was motivated by the insistence “that the point of religious faith and practices is to secure eternal 
happiness in the life to come” (Herdt, 2003:27). 
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dependent on the grace of God (Herdt, 2012b:73). Where Hume considered natural virtues to be 
sufficient for cultivating the good life, Jennifer Herdt explains that Aquinas would suggest these 
“natural, acquired virtues direct” humans “only to a “proximate and particular good,” the imperfect 
happiness of this life” (2012b:73). According to Jennifer Herdt, Aquinas effectively draws a 
distinction between imperfect and perfect happiness, to which the latter is the final goal of humanity.  
Jennifer Herdt notes, “only the supernatural, infused virtues are “perfect” and “virtuous simply,” 
because only they direct us toward our ultimate end, the enjoyment of God” (2012b:73). What is made 
clear in this contribution is that natural virtues are in and of themselves only this (Herdt, 2012b:75). 
The thoughts presented in the previous paragraphs depict the growing instability that marked the 
legacy of moral thought from as early as the fourth century with Augustine of Hippo. It was this very 
instability that triggered the imagination of Jennifer Herdt. She notes in the preface to her book 
Putting on virtue (Herdt, 2012b:ix): 
This book began with a certain curiosity, formed somewhat inchoately during my graduate school days at 
Princeton, about the fact that certain forms of Christian faith champion a theatrical conception of moral 
development while others judge it false and hypocritical. When, years later, I returned to puzzle this over 
more fully, I began to understand the issue in terms of differing understandings of the relationship 
between acquired virtue and infused virtue, and to see it as a key to unlocking the dynamics of early 
modern moral reflection. Anxiety over the authenticity of acquired virtue was a transformed and 
exacerbated rendition of Augustine’s critique of pagan virtue that continued to shape theological and 
philosophical ethics well into the eighteenth century. This project took shape, then, as a particular way of 
narrating the story of virtue and of thereby beginning to recover and recast a Christian ethics of mimetic 
virtue freed from these distorting preoccupations.  
It is likely that Jennifer Herdt’s articles concern the appropriation of various themes to the 
Augustinian anxiety; articles such as “The endless construction of charity” (2004a), “The rise of 
sympathy and the question of divine suffering” (2001c) and “Christian humility, courtly civility, and 
the code of the streets” (2009), which depict the very wrestling with a Christian worldview amidst the 
development of moral thought.  
In the recollection of the development of moral thought, Jennifer Herdt indicates how religious 
moorings were understood to be the origin of morality. The “sum of all religion” was “divine 
imitation” (Whichcote, 2010 in Herdt, 2001a:259), which brought “humans into relation with God” 
(Herdt, 2001a:259). Morality consequently served as “the normative criteria from which individuals 
exercise virtue” (Herdt, 2004b:197-199). The rise of rationality threatened the relationship between 
morality and its religious moorings however, which lead to a theological response that further 
encouraged a growing dichotomy between religious truth and morality. Talk of virtue was furthered 
exacerbated by Christian critique of secular virtues represented in the Augustinian legacy.  
Jennifer Herdt points out three important moments in the attempt to establish “a Christian ethics of 
mimetic virtue freed from these distorting preoccupations” (2012b:ix). The first is to erect a 
conception of virtue premised on the agent instead of the action in itself (Hauerwas in Herdt, 
2012a:207). The second is to move away from the Protestant’s emphasis on justification which has 
“tended to divorce the hidden, inner, justified self from the outer visible self, have emphasized the 
latter’s sinfulness, and have regarded the moral life as a site where one is repeatedly confronted with 
God’s command” (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012b:208-209) toward an understanding of virtue that 
emphasises progressive moral development (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012b:208-209). The third is to 
reconceptualise the way virtue is acquired (as stemming from participation in God through virtue 
instead of a miraculous surd) (Herdt, 2012b:350). 
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In order to account for a Christian ethics of mimetic virtue, Jennifer Herdt erects a conception of 
virtue which is characterised by its agent, where moral development occurs progressively and the 
acquisition of virtue is reconceptualised. In her book Putting on Virtue Jennifer Herdt explains her 
logic for a Christian ethic of mimetic virtue.   
4.4 A Christian ethic of mimetic virtue 
Jennifer Herdt begins her discussion on virtue ethics by accounting for the different emphases placed 
on moral development. Whereas the eighteenth century thinkers considered habituation and social 
formation to endanger autonomy, sixteenth and seventeenth century thinkers thought the process of 
acquiring virtues to be a “false and fruitless assertion of human moral agency” (Herdt, 2012b:1).  
In Putting on Virtue, Jennifer Herdt depicts two moments within the history of moral development. 
The first is a preoccupation with virtues as mere appearance, apparent in form, but different in reality. 
The acquisition of virtue was seen as performances with various constituents thinking of these 
performances in various ways (2012b:128). The second shift pertained more to moral anatomy and the 
way in which morality was socially constituted (Herdt, 2012b:221). The “enterprise of moral anatomy, 
which sought to unearth the processes of character formation that give rise to socially desirable 
character and behaviour” was “characteristic of seventeenth-century European moral thought (Herdt, 
2012b: 221).  
Jennifer Herdt names the latter group “Anatomists” and suggests that “some thinkers undertook this 
analytical project in order to facilitate a pursuit of worldly greatness that could be assimilated to the 
pursuit of heavenly greatness” (2012b:221-222). “Others to show how false worldly virtue 
providentially mimics true Christian virtue” (Herdt, 2012b:221-222) and “others yet in order to 
demonstrate the social utility of ‘false’ worldly virtue” (Herdt, 2012b:221-222). Herdt affirms that 
“they were united by their interest in the ways in which virtue (or at least apparent virtue) is socially 
constituted” (2012b:221-222).  
Jennifer Herdt makes three methodological statements to her use of “virtue” in the singular instead of 
the plural. The first reason is that it “reflects early modern moral discourse”, “rather than”93 what she 
calls “my own predilections”. The second reason for speaking of virtue in the singular is closely 
linked to the first; it “also made sense in light of the intense anxiety over personal salvation that was 
characteristic of early modern Augustinian thought.” The third reason pertains to the reason for her 
study, “I am in fact focused here on issues surrounding the general structure of framework of good 
character and its acquisition, rather than on concrete moral norms or specific virtues” (Herdt, 
2012b:10-11).  
Aristotle’s contribution to the discussion of virtue lies in what Jennifer Herdt calls the “habituation 
gap”, the embodiment of virtue as an act of “doing the right thing for the right reasons” and allowing 
this process to move us “from semblance toward reality” (Herdt, 2012b:23). Herdt indicates in her 
article, “The virtue of liturgy,” Aristotle’s emphasis “on the craft-like character of the virtues and the 
apprentice-like character of the acquisition of the virtues.” She explains Aristotle’s thought, “a person 
learns to be courageous by imitating acts of courage as these are exemplified by someone who is 
already a master at the craft” (Herdt, 2012a:537). The process of habituation has two possible 
dilemmas, discovers Jennifer Herdt, habituation as “merely mechanical repetition” (2012a:537) and 
                                                     
93Jennifer Herdt affirms in this regard: “One of the important contributions the contemporary revival of virtue 
ethics has made to ethical discourse is to restore the capacity to speak in a differentiated way about specific 
aspects of character that equip a person to act well in very different respects” (2012a:10).  
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the possibility of the semblances of virtue in the acting thereof. Despite the inherent tension, Jennifer 
Herdt concedes, “even though it is not always the case that human beings do the right thing for the 
right reason, the position of “acting” has the potential to transform the actor”94 (2012b:23).  
Augustine’s concern was the possibility that modes of “putting on” virtue cultivated in daily life 
remained only that, a process of “putting on” that never proceeded into transformation (Herdt, 
2012b:24). The lack of transition from “acting the part” to a real transformation within the individual 
lead to a legacy of Augustinian anxiety where different streams of moral thought sought to erect 
criteria which would evidence virtue (Herdt, 2012b:24). 
Jennifer Herdt steps back from initial criteria’s and asks upon which premise transformation from an 
outward disposition toward an inward disposition is possible. In order to understand Augustine’s 
anxiety, one must first understand the premise upon which habituation is based (Herdt, 2012b:24). 
Furthermore: “We must also ask in what sense virtuous action is at the same time performed for the 
sake of happiness and for the sake of the good aimed at by political science” (Herdt, 2012b:24). In 
Herdt’s illustration of the process of habituation, she uses the example of a girl named Susie, who 
goes through a process of “moderating her most immediate desires” (Herdt, 2012b:26) based on the 
response she receives from external stimuli. While initially she acts in an undesirable manner, she 
quickly alters her behaviour in order to receive positive responses from external stimuli (Herdt, 
2012b:24-27).  
The process of habituation has begun, but her virtuous character is still under question. Herdt argues: 
“Clearly, while the child may fairly reliably exhibit good behaviour, she cannot be said to have a 
virtuous character” (2012b:26). What is needed in the instance of Susie is reflexivity, an 
“understanding of the fact that these actions are choice worthy for their own sake” (Herdt, 2012b:30). 
As Susie begins to combine her experience with theoretical commitments, she is more readily 
equipped to live for virtues own sake95. Herdt establishes three characteristic features that the person 
of virtue now possesses; first, the virtuous agent takes pleasure in virtuous action (Herdt, 2012b:31-
32), second, by perceiving the beauty of virtue her actions are admirable and noble (Herdt, 2012b:31-
32) and thirdly, “she has formed a reflective understanding of the good life as constituted by virtuous 
activity, and this has given rise to rational desires to so act” (Herdt, 2012b:31-32).  
Aristotle makes an important shift in his logic in distinguishing people who act for virtues own sake 
and those who act merely externally for what he terms “for the sake of natural goods”, also known as 
semblances of virtue (Aristotle in Herdt, 2005:140). The individual who acts according to the former, 
acts “for the sake of the noble”, which is “structurally analogous to acting for the supreme end, that of 
happiness or eudaimonia” (Herdt, 2012b:34-35). Jennifer Herdt highlights in Aristotle’s thought the 
notion that happiness in not an ultimate end within itself to which virtue is a mere instrument, instead 
she quotes Aristotle (Herdt, 2012b:35): 
                                                     
94 Jennifer Herdt describes the process of habituation into virtue as possible when considering the distinction 
made by Aristotle between right actions and virtue: “Aristotle points out, though, that virtue is not just a matter 
of performing certain right actions but also of the way in which these actions are produced. Truly virtuous action 
issues forth from knowledge, decision, and stable character” (Aristotle in Herdt, 2012b:23). 
95Jennifer Herdt argues that the formation of initial virtue is enhanced by virtuous elders who teach children in 
the ways of virtuous living. Only when their experiences are shaped toward the good life, can theoretical 
commitments such as set out by Aristotle be truly utilised (2012b:31). Herdt accordingly states Aristotle’s 
argument in the case of those who have not been cultivated into virtue: “Those, in contrast, who have no 
experiential grasp of virtuous action cannot benefit from argument and discussion concerning virtue. They are 
unable to express their theoretical commitments in action because their appetitive elements are not in harmony 
with reason” (Aristotle in Herdt, 2012b:31). 
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happiness is not a subjective state that could be somehow artificially induced. The way in which 
happiness functions as an end seems to be not that the happy man does things in order to be happy, but 
rather that he does, for the sake of their own nobility, the noble things which in fact constitute the 
happiness which makes life worthwhile96. 
Aristotle’s thought continues by extending eudaimonia to the cultivation of a common good, where 
the leaders of the polis serve as educating parents. Jennifer Herdt comments in this regard: “The good 
politician seeks to inculcate virtue in the citizens of the polis because only when citizens are virtuous 
can the greatest good, the end of political science, in fact be secured” (2012b:36-38). Whereas virtue 
was initially understood as “excellences of the individual” (Herdt, 2012b:36-38), Herdt depicts the 
culmination of virtue through the “fellowship” (2012b:36-38) thereof. This fellowship created an 
arena “for the exercise of the virtues” (Herdt, 2012b:36-38), where virtue could be cultivated for its 
own sake but, ultimately, also, “one will help others for their own sakes” (Herdt, 2012b:36-38). This 
leads her to indicate in Aristotle’s thought: “Moreover, Aristotle regarded intentions as embodied in 
action and thus as public and visible” (Aristotle in Herdt, 2005:140).   
Up to this point, Jennifer Herdt affirms that there is no opportunity for suspicion when reflecting on 
Aristotle’s appropriation of virtue and its contribution toward eudaimonia. When questioning the 
modes of acquiring virtue, nothing hints at a problematic approach to agency (Herdt, 2012b:43). This 
is changed however in the discussion of Aristotle’s magnanimous individual, whom Jennifer Herdt 
believes essentially undermines the social nature of happiness (2012b:43).  
A magnanimous individual, Jennifer Herdt indicates, presupposes a particular way of thinking about 
oneself in the act of virtue; “For magnanimity has essentially to do with the virtuous person’s own 
self-perception”97 (2012b:28). Self-perception within itself need not be problematic, as it presupposes 
a type of reflexivity. Herdt continues however to problematise the concept of magnanimity when 
asking whether the magnanimous person is still acting for virtues sake. She asks (Herdt, 2012b:41): 
Is the magnanimous person acting for virtue’s own sake? Or has he fallen into a semblance of virtue, his 
activity directed now instrumentally toward the end of his own consciousness of moral greatness?  
The danger, explains Jennifer Herdt, is when a magnanimous person instrumentalises virtuous activity 
as a means to an end. Thus “her end is no longer constituted by her activity itself, as it is for one 
whose end is perfected rational action” (2012b:41). The outcome of this process is characterised by 
Herdt as “self-deception” (2012b:41), where the magnanimous person persuades themself that they 
possess a moral greatness “that in fact we have lost inasmuch as we now seek consciousness of moral 
greatness rather than virtue for its own sake” (2012b:41). 
A perpetuation of self-sufficiency is indicated in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, described by 
Jennifer Herdt as an attempt to serve oneself and one’s own greatness instead of the common wealth 
(2012b:42). Herdt accordingly highlights the tension inherent in Aristotle’s thought in this regard 
(2012:42):  
                                                     
96 Jennifer Herdt underscores the importance of ethical reflection, “not because it arrives at a theory of virtue but 
because of how it reinforces the commitment embodied practically in the merely good person’s actions by 
giving such a person an understanding of why she is doing what she is doing” (2012b:35).  
97 Aristotle is quoted by Herdt as defining magnanimity or being a “great-souled” person as “one who “thinks 
himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of them” (Herdt, 2012b:38). 
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We may discern a tension here within Aristotle’s thought. After all, the magnanimous person’s greatness 
is constituted by her virtue. But Aristotle is usually quite attentive to the fact that much luck is involved in 
whether one succeeds in developing or fails to develop a virtuous character.  
Jennifer Herdt draws on Aristotle’s logic by concluding that the cultivation of virtue occurs in social 
settings (2012b:43). There is a “dependence” (Herdt, 2012b:42) on others for virtue’s cultivation 
(Herdt, 2012b:42):  
Ironically, magnanimity, which was supposed to be constituted by proper self-knowledge, an accurate 
estimate of one’s own moral greatness, seems on closer examination to involve a falsifying denial of 
one’s own dependency on other.  
This final analysis overrides the initial appreciation for the magnanimous person, preferring a 
communal understanding of the development of virtue over and against an individualised account 
(Herdt, 2012b:43). In addition, Aristotle’s account of magnanimity as perfect virtue is turned on its 
head by Aristotle’s very own requirements for true virtue (Herdt, 2012b:44):  
For what first appears as a virtue concerned with truthfulness and accurate self-perception, and 
specifically with truthful acknowledgement of one’s own worthiness of honour, emerges instead as a 
falsifying grasp at godlike self-sufficiency. And even though the consciousness of one’s own moral 
greatness is not intrinsically problematic, the fact that the magnanimous “man” pretends to self-
sufficiency strongly suggests that the magnanimous man is indeed preoccupied with his own moral 
greatness, with himself as moral actor, in a way that competes with his commitment to virtuous activity 
for its own sake.  
Habituation into virtue and the possibility of habituating semblances was the main concern of 
Christian thinkers reading Aristotle. Jennifer Herdt indicates the discomfort with which Christians 
approached the moment of transformation in Luther and Erasmus. Luther locates transformation 
whole heartedly in Christ’s agency and the utter passivity of the human agent (Herdt, 2005:147), while 
Erasmus allowed for the possibility of external influence evoking transformation. Herdt describes this 
as a “sympathetic account” towards natural virtue98 (2005:142). 
Jennifer Herdt accounts for a Christian ethic of virtue by beginning with Aristotle’s notion of 
habituation into virtue. An emphasis is placed on the agent of the action instead of the action itself. By 
affirming the role of the agent, Herdt alludes to the possibility that grace may initiate an individual 
into relation with God through virtue. Augustine however, was more concerned about the semblance 
of virtue than the possible soteriological effect on the agent.  
4.5 Mimetic performance of virtue 
The growing discomfort of distinguishing between the virtuous and those who are merely acting the 
part is depicted by Jennifer Herdt in the early church father Augustine, who initiated the debate that 
continued well into the eighteenth century. She calls this the theatrical nature of human virtue, as 
constituted by the acting of one individual based on the exemplar of another (Herdt, 2012b:65). 
Christian virtue, for Augustine, is centred on “a pure intention, directed solely to God” (Herdt, 
2012b:47), unlike pagan virtues critiqued by Augustine as being “puffed up and proud” and 
“employed in the service of human glory” (Herdt, 2005:542).  
                                                     
98I would like to reiterate the distinction made by Jennifer Herdt between infused virtue, which was described as 
the transcendent “breaking in” to transform natural virtue through grace vis-à-vis natural/acquired virtue, which 
was restricted to virtue cultivated through social settings (Herdt, 2012b:4).  
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The process of directing our virtuous acting toward God is possible, for Augustine, only through 
mimesis of Christ. Jennifer Herdt describes this process as beginning with the act of conversion 
(2012b: 47):  
In this life, Christian virtue remains imperfect, embattled, our loves divided. It is grace that converts us, 
that turns us from self to God by confronting us with divine beauty so irresistible that we cannot but fall in 
love with it- the beauty of God in Christ. Having fallen in love, we want naturally to draw closer to our 
beloved and seek to do so through imitation, since like assimilates like. Habituation in Christian virtue is 
thus much more than the imitation of exemplars of human virtue, through it is also this. Made in the 
image of God, but having lost through sin our likeness to God, we are restored through mimesis of Christ.  
Herdt understands mimesis to be the restoration of the image of God, which brings into relation 
“virtue, happiness, and our final end” as indicated by Augustine (Augustine in Herdt, 2012b:55). She 
describes (Herdt, 2012b:55, 60): 
virtue is not the way I demonstrate to God that I am worthy of the reward of eternal life: rather, “virtue 
proves to be nothing but the perfection of the love of God”. And it is when my love to God is perfected 
that I can experience the union with God, which is fruition, the love of enjoyment. Virtue proves after all 
to be not just instrumental but partially constitutive of my happiness, of my final end…My final end is not 
just external: even though I cannot in this life fully realize that loving union with God, my loving, 
virtuous activity is even now an expression of the love of God … Finally, it is through the Christian’s 
responsiveness to grace that mimesis may take place, permeating every act done by Christians. 
Jennifer Herdt uses the logic of mimesis to indicate the theatrical nature of virtue, “that we must” act 
virtuously in order to become actually virtuous …” (2012b:61). Augustine, in accordance with Plato, 
critiques bad examples of mimesis alleging that they “care only for appearances, and manipulate these 
appearances in order to maximize their own honour and glory” (Herdt, 2012b:66). Herdt quotes 
Hudert99 on Augustine (Hudert in Herdt, 2012b:66), “What centrally concerns him are the developed 
patterns of public performance by which authoritative standards of common morality may be 
corrupted into opportunities for the enhancement of pride.” The solution, she suggests, is to direct all 
“performance and rhetoric” toward “the honour and glory of God” (Herdt, 2012b:67).  
Augustine’s priority toward the transcendent is delineated by Jennifer Herdt. She begins with a 
discussion of “Augustine’s eudaimonism” (2012b:57), wherein participation and enjoyment of the 
divine effectuates true happiness. This participation requires recognition of our dependence and a 
willingness to be in relation with God who is eternal and abiding100, Herdt argues (2012b:57): 
Happiness is found not in achieving independence but in embracing our ultimate dependency…while our 
final good is not fully up to us, it is something that requires our active participation: it is not something 
that we simply passively undergo101. If virtue is the perfection of my love for God, the end of 
                                                     
99 Jennifer references Hudert as “E. J. Hudert, “Augustine and the Sources of the Divided Self,” Political Theory 
20 (1992): 94, 95.” (2012b: 366).  
100Jennifer Herdt shows how Augustine understands God’s divine beauty as means of initiating a relationship 
with humanity: “In order for our loves to be properly ordered-ordered, that is, to God- we must be inspired, we 
must first fall in love, with God” (Augustine in Herdt, 2012b:66). 
101 This will prove to evoke an intriguing conversation, as Jennifer Herdt notes Luther’s fundamental belief that 
righteousness (which may perhaps be a plausible alternative to a virtuous person) comes through utter passivity, 
where we are given gift out of our utter dependence (2005:150).  
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enjoyment102 of God cannot be fully characterized apart from my virtuous activity, my loving response to 
God. We find happiness in the perfected activity of receiving and returning God’s gifts. 
Augustine provided a legacy from which Christian moral thinkers would continue to develop the 
relation of virtue to happiness and their dependence on either the common good or God. For Jennifer 
Herdt, Augustine’s conceptual categories “are not differentiated adequately enough to account for the 
variety of semblances of virtue found among pagans (and Christians)” (2012b:61).  
A focus on Aquinas and later Erasmus (amongst others) brings to the fore different appropriations of 
virtue in relation to happiness and the good life.  
Jennifer Herdt investigates Aquinas’ rehabilitation of Aristotelian magnanimity while retaining 
Augustine’s emphasis on grace and Christian dependence. She shows that Aquinas’ theorising of 
virtue was not satisfactory for some. “While Aristotle’s philosophy continued to be regarded as 
authoritative by virtually everyone, many thought Aquinas had failed to show how Aristotle’s thought 
could in fact be reconciled with Christian, notably Augustinian, commitments” (Herdt, 2012b:92).  
Despite the apparent difficulty in Aquinas’ thought, Jennifer Herdt shows a similarity in thought with 
the Christian humanist Erasmus. She emphasises that (Herdt, 2012b: 9): 
The moral life, we might suggest, is not divided into two regions, one subject to empirical exploration and 
the other mysterious, but is rather always at once both ordinary and mysterious. We encounter, after all 
(as Aquinas himself affirms), not a simple dichotomy between nature and grace but manifold forms of 
grace-enabled human agency. We can affirm the radical dependence of all human agency on divine 
sustenance while also insisting that the quality of that dependence is transformed when acknowledged and 
embraced. We can affirm the redemptive activity of the Word at work throughout created-but-fallen 
nature while also insisting that the equality of that redemptive activity is transformed when the Word is 
known as Jesus Christ and His Spirit is known in the church. 
Jennifer Herdt indicates in the passage presented previously the ways in which Aquinas and Erasmus 
respectively sought to work out the relation of virtue to the final goal of enjoyment of God, the 
foundation of happiness. Aquinas and Erasmus sought to mediate between heavenly and earthly 
“flourishing”, (Herdt, 2012b:76) by acknowledging the possibility of “pagan virtues” (Herdt, 
2012b:76).  
In Aquinas’ attempt to account for the possibility of pagan virtue, an interpretive framework was 
opened whereby grace could potentially transform the actor of virtue. Jennifer Herdt alludes to this in 
Aquinas, “although pagan virtues are not directed to our final end, since this requires infused grace, 
they are directed to true goods that are open to further ordering to our final end of enjoyment of God” 
(2012b:74). Aquinas “consequently contrasts the thought of Augustine that only Christians are able of 
being directed toward the right ordering of the soul, even if this was only perfected in heaven” (Herdt, 
2012b:53) by rehabilitating magnanimity.  
Jennifer Herdt describes the skilful manner in which Aquinas redefined the pursuit of magnanimity 
“so that its focal point is the pursuit of great actions, not the agent’s self-perception as worthy of great 
honour, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act” 
(2012b:77). More specifically, she indicates (Herdt, 2012b:77): 
                                                     
102 Jennifer Herdt continues to qualify Augustine’s eudaimonism by noting, “we cannot enjoy God in this life, 
since in this life we cannot fully see God, and our love remains the love of desire rather than fruition, but the 
possibility of the enjoyment rests on our (God-enabled) response as well as on God’s call” (2012b:57).  
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magnanimity is about handling honour appropriately. In this way the possession of greatness comes not 
from human effort but is held in consideration of the gifts he holds from God. The magnanimous person 
in consideration of the gift bestowed on him considers this in humility.  
Jennifer Herdt continues (2012b:77): 
The magnanimous man refers the honour he receives on to God, for a man has not from himself the thing 
in which he excels, for this is as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honour is due 
principally, not to him but to God.  
The rehabilitation of magnanimity allows Aquinas to transition from virtues without internal 
referents103 to virtues with external referents. This does not necessarily mean that the referent is 
explicitly known by the virtuous person as being the source of virtue. Habituation into virtue is 
therefore understood as acquiring virtue, devoid of explicit knowledge of God as source. To this 
dilemma Aquinas introduces the concept of infused virtues (Herdt, 2012b:83).  
Herdt further elaborates on the nature of virtue (2012b:84): 
Virtues dispose us well in relation to our ends. But the acquisition of virtue requires that we be capable of 
perceiving the end and loving it as such. So the acquired virtues can dispose us to act for our end insofar 
as this is grasped by human reason, but they cannot dispose us well in relation to our ultimate end, since 
this end, the enjoyment of God, exceeds the proportion of human nature.  
Jennifer Herdt continues (2012b:84): 
In order to be disposed well in relation to our ultimate end, we need virtues infused in us by God rather 
than acquired through human action: it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional 
principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness.  
The purpose of infused virtue, Jennifer Herdt indicates, is not to displace acquired virtue, but rather to 
enhance natural virtue in various respects. The first of which she understands as levelling “the playing 
field by signalling that upbringing, intellectual capacity and so on, are not decisive for one’s capacity 
for friendship with God” (Herdt, 2012b:89-90). Herdt states however, that this does not mean 
(2012b:89-90):  
the displacement of human action. Salvation is made possible through the bestowal of infused virtues, 
dispositions to act. Human beings must act to increase these virtues and bring them to perfection, and 
only through this process will they become persons capable of enjoying God, capable of their own 
ultimate good” (Herdt, 2012b:89-90).  
In the final instance, “the virtues prepare us to rely on an agency other than our own”104 (Herdt, 
2012b:89-90). Openness to an agency other than our own does not imply passivity and abrupt 
intervention by the Divine for Aquinas (Herdt, 2012b:91). Instead (Herdt, 2012b:91): 
                                                     
103In Aquinas’ rehabilitation of magnanimity, he introduces God as responsible for that disposition. In this sense, 
God is a referent to the virtue in question (Herdt, 2012b:78).  
104 Jennifer Herdt makes a qualification in this regard, “such comments can be misleading, however, insofar as 
they suggest a culminating displacement of human activity. Aquinas, though, is concerned to link the gifts very 
closely to the virtues. He refrains from calling them virtues proper (although he is willing to call them ‘Divine 
virtue, perfecting man as moved by God’). He does insist on calling them habits. They are habits because they 
are actual ‘perfections of man,’ which ‘abide in’ human beings. That is, they are stable dispositions to act, not 
simply the Holy Spirit coming over someone for a passing moment” (2012b:91).  
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There is no competition between divine and human agency here, such that if human beings are moved by 
God they must themselves be passive. At the same time, human agency is fulfilled not through 
independence or self-sufficiency but instead by being willingly dependent, fully open to God’s gift, thus 
perfecting the charity that unites human being with God. 
 
Erasmus and Luther continued the conversation on virtue and its relation to grace and human agency, 
albeit in divergent ways. Whereas Erasmus focussed on the habituation of virtue from the outside-in, 
Luther believed that humans were “to relinquish any reliance on human agency” (Herdt, 2012b:173-
174) due to the absolute destruction “of the image of God in us” (Herdt, 2012b:173-174) “by Adam’s 
fall” (Herdt, 2012b:173-174). Despite their differences, Jennifer Herdt highlights their shared priority 
to “uncover hypocrisy”, “attack ceremonialism” and the understanding that “true goodness” and “true 
piety, had to be inner and spiritual” (2012b:173).  
Established within what Jennifer Herdt calls the “studia humanitatis,”105 Erasmus regarded an 
individual’s final good “as something contingent on external conformity to commandments, rather 
than as the culmination of an inner transformation” (Herdt, 2012b:104). Herdt alludes to Levi 
Anthony’s106 argument (Anthony in Jennifer Herdt, 2012b:106): 
that human perfection, including the religious perfection which was grace-aided and necessarily rewarded 
by eternal salvation had to be intrinsic to the fulfilment of the highest human moral aspirations inscribed 
on rational nature itself, and not something different from or in addition to human moral achievement, as 
measured by rational norms107.  
Jennifer Herdt addresses the notions of agency at the centre of Erasmus’ theology. She writes: “The 
heart of philosophia Christi is the re-formation of human nature through conformity with Christ” 
(2012b:112). Erasmus’ unsystematic “discussion of grace and human freedom” (Herdt, 2012b:112) 
has evoked a variety of interpretations. Jennifer Herdt states in this regard (2012b:112):  
Its lack of systematicity is also a virtue, though. It does not attempt to pin down the respective 
contributions of divine and human agency as synergism does: it simply insists on the priority of grace, on 
free human response, and on the dependency of this response … Human freedom is not defined as acting 
within a space devoid of divine agency.  
The challenge levelled at human agency with its ability to progressively habituate into virtue was two-
fold. It either embraced the human capacity to habituate into perfect virtue or it became essentially 
hubristic. Erasmus develops the notion of the “inexhaustible exemplarity,” “which Christians can 
image or reflect only in some limited and finite respect”. Christians can consequently only imitate 
Christ in their “own particular natural form” (Herdt, 2012b:118). For Erasmus then, there is a failure 
to “grasp what is involved in the imitation of Christ if we understand it only as an exercise of human 
agency. For Erasmus, the exercise of human agency involved in the imitation of Christ is at the same 
time an indwelling of Christ in us and thus a human participation in divine agency” (Herdt, 
2012b:119). 
                                                     
105Herdt describes studia humanitatis as “a specific group of studies based on the reading of ancient Latin and 
Greek classics, with rhetoric foremost among them. The humanists were united first by their rhetorical concerns 
and their reliance on classical modes for rhetoric rather than by a substantial normative position” (2012b:102).  
106 Jennifer Herdt references the contribution of Levi Anthony as follows, “Anthony Levi, Renaissance and 
Reformation: The Intellectual Genesis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), 10. (2012b: 375).  
107Jennifer Herdt highlights the eudaimonist conception of the humanists, “on this account, the humanists sought 
to sustain a teleological, eudaimonist conception of human moral activity. They did not pursue virtue as 
instrumental to glory, fame, and honour, but they did seek to show that spiritual and moral aspirations are not 
alien to one another, that the pursuit of virtue and the pursuit of salvation, properly understood, are one and the 
same” ( 2012b:106).  
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Jennifer Herdt continues to show how grace is active in the acting of the virtuous in Erasmus’ thought 
(2012b:119): 
For Erasmus, grace is active in our acting, in the beauty of virtue displayed that engages and transforms 
our affections, allowing us to play a part that becomes our own as we play it. While imitation is an act, 
there is also a chastening of human agency implied in the cascade. 
 
Hereafter, Jennifer Herdt begins to unpack the theatrical and performative nature of virtue, a key 
concept in developing her understanding of virtue. Luther108, in contrast to Erasmus, understood “a 
special sort of self-emptying” to “be the starting point, not something toward which we gradually 
advance”109 (Herdt, 2012b:175). Herdt describes this shift in focus as “an exodus from virtues to the 
grace of Christ” (2012b:176) founded on the notion “that human agency is utterly enslaved to sin and 
incapable of anything good” (Herdt, 2012b:174). She describes Luther’s rationale (2012b:176).  
For Luther the honest sinner is closer to righteousness than the aspirant to virtue…It is better truthfully to 
confess one’s enslavement to sin than to put on an act of virtue, struggling to free oneself from sin. Only 
one who knows herself as a sinner truly knows herself, and the law, says Luther, is given to humanity in 
order to “teach man to know himself. 
 
It becomes clear through Jennifer Herdt’s recollection of Luther that “what restores to us the image of 
God, he insists, is not successful imitation of Christ but a marriage that unites otherwise alienated 
parties” (2012b:177-178). With the analogy of a marriage, Luther is able to describe the process of 
sanctification. Whereas Erasmus understands friendship as assimilation, “friendship with God is the 
assimilation of copy with original, and thus the union of like with like, of copy assimilating with 
original” (Herdt, 2012b:178), for Luther, “friendship is predicated not on likeness but on a union with 
Christ that is therefore quite differently conceived” (Herdt, 2012b:178).  
Erasmus describes sanctification in the example of baptism. Jennifer Herdt describes Erasmus’ train of 
thought, stating that “baptism brings forgiveness from sins and gives us a new start on the path of 
salvation, but it is one step in an extended healing process, a process of renewal in God’s image that 
culminates in union of lover and beloved” (Erasmus in Herdt, 2012b:178). Luther rejects this notion 
and believes instead that “union with Christ is not the culmination but the precondition for any process 
of sanctification” (Herdt, 2012b:178). 
The precondition of union in Christ, Jennifer Herdt recalls, alludes for Luther to the fact that, “the 
pursuit of virtue poses such ineradicable barriers to proper trust in and acknowledgment of God that it 
must be abandoned and moral agency ceded to Christ within”110 (2012b:184). Whilst Luther rejects 
Aristotelian habituation into virtue, Jennifer Herdt indicates how Luther navigates between the 
                                                     
108Jennifer Herdt makes  a very apt observation of Luther’s context, “the theologians of the via moderna, in 
which Luther was formed, lacked the patristic understanding of mimesis as assimilation, even if they retained 
some emphasis on Christ as moral exemplar. Persons are justified through having fulfilled the minimum 
condition specified by God’s covenant with humanity, with no inherent reference to the incarnation and death of 
Christ” (2012b:177).  
109 When speaking of Luther, Jennifer Herdt indicates “his insistence, though, that its starting point and 
foundation be a perfect recognition and acknowledgment of the bankruptcy of human agency renders what in 
Erasmus is a dawning recognition into an absolute prerequisite” (2012b:175).  
110 In the end, Luther does “speak of a gradual transformation of character that constitutes assimilation with, not 
simply marriage to, Christ. It is difficult, though, to integrate the account of habituation with Luther’s prior 
insistence on human passivity and the displacement of human agency by the indwelling Christ” (Herdt, 
2012b:184).  
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emphasis on transformation through sanctification without handing some form of participation over to 
human agency. Herdt indicates (2012b:184): 
one of the most helpful approaches to this topic is through Luther’s contrast between grace and gift ... 
Both grace and the gift are given freely by God, but they are distinct in that grace affects our forensic 
status before God, while the gift transform our characters111. 
Individuals who are possibly unaware of God’s grace and gift112 are unable to receive it, as they are 
still within a state of active human striving. To which Jennifer Herdt “fills out Luther’s train of 
thought” by referring to the analogy of baptism previously mentioned. She shows how Luther employs 
theatrical metaphors to explain justification (Herdt, 2012b:180): 
for Luther God is primarily judge rather than author or audience. And yet in some sense God is audience, 
less concerned with which actor plays what role than that the roles are properly played out, with sinners 
condemned and righteous embraced … So Christians must remember that while we have “put on” Christ, 
we ourselves remain sinners. We are acceptable to the divine audience not by virtue of our own active 
righteousness but by virtue of the righteous costume to which we have submitted.  
The language of performance allows Jennifer Herdt to speak of virtuous action as no longer centred in 
human effort, but rather in recognition of our dependence on Christ. The imitation of Christ disposes 
us toward virtuous living, which is no longer suspect of being mere semblances. Happiness is no 
longer part of the process of habituation into virtue as Aristotle noted, but is found within the mimetic 
performance toward community and church. Jennifer Herdt underscores this in her final comments to 
her book Putting on virtue (2012b:350): 
Contemporary revivers of virtues ethics … have enthusiastically embraced the notion that habituation in 
virtue takes place within the context of a community and its practices. This focus on the communal 
formation of character and agency helps to relieve the theological reservations about virtue…A vision of 
Christian virtue as formed by the church and its practices has also made possible a naturalized account of 
the Christian moral life that renders Christian moral agency intelligible as agency rather than a miraculous 
surd…On this view, it is not through an instantaneous evangelical rebirth, a lightning bolt from heaven, 
that Christian are made such, but through hearing Scriptures that proclaim the story of God with us and 
participating in the practices of the church constituted by its willingness to be defined by that story. 
Christian identity is thus formed gradually, in time, by forces that are embodied and open to view- 
narratives, institutions, practices. 
A mimetic understanding of Christian virtue allows for the development of a “divine community” 
(Herdt, 2012b:350-351). Jennifer Herdt continues in her argument (2012b:350-351): 
as our exploration of a mimetic understanding of Christian virtue underscores, the sort of character 
formation that takes place through imitation of exemplars of virtue can be understood at the same time as 
                                                     
111 Jennifer Herdt further works out the distinction between grace and gift: “Through grace we are justified 
before God, despite our sinfulness. The gift, in contrast, which Luther equates with both faith and the indwelling 
Christ, gradually cleanses us from sin: ‘faith is the gift and inward good which purges the sin to which it is 
opposed’ … Faith is an infused gift, which works to transform us from within … While we are married to Christ 
despite our likeness, so that our sins may be imputed to him and his righteousness to us, through the gift we are 
gradually assimilated to our Spouse…” (Herdt, 2012b:184).  
112 Herdt has titled this section of the chapter “Aristotle and the Sophists”, which alludes to her appropriation of 
Luther’s relation to the habituation of virtues” (2012b:181).  
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a form of habituation through which human communities perpetuate their practices and traditions, and as 
God’s transforming activity, drawing us into the divine community113.  
An important qualification is made by Jennifer Herdt in light of a mimetic understanding of virtue 
(2012b:351): 
The hyper-Augustinian tendency to protect the purity of Christian righteousness by conceiving of grace as 
acting outside of or against natural human agency has, then, been productively overcome.  
Once Jennifer Herdt has effectively overcome the Augustinian anxiety, she develops her 
understanding of a virtuous community through a “thicker, more holistic account of the Christian life” 
(2012b:351). Herdt indicates how this thicker description is centred on a Christian community in 
progress (2012b:351). “What I envision here is based not on a neutral account of human nature but on 
a Christian account of nature as we encounter it- already fallen and in the process of being redeemed” 
(Herdt, 2012b:351). The language of performance and liturgy is used by Jennifer Herdt to illustrate a 
broken but redeemed Christian community in progress.  
In an account of mimetic performances, grace turns the agent from self to God. A response is evoked 
in the agent who wants to be in relation with God by imitating Christ. Through imitation the agent is 
progressively assimilated to Christ, an act which signifies the theatrical nature of virtue. Mimetic 
performances, furthermore, underscore a communal formation of character when situated within 
particular liturgies.  
4.6 Liturgies: arenas for Christian virtue 
Language of performance, narratives114 and liturgy underscore Jennifer Herdt’s conception of virtue as 
essentially mimetic (2012b:344): 
It understands the virtues as perfecting human persons in ways that allow them to participate more fully in 
the fellowship of the divine life, and thus regards perfect virtue as constituted by a love of God that 
completes rather than competes with love of human persons, including ourselves, and of other finite 
goods. It accepts virtue as a gift the goodness of which is rightly honoured even as it is also always rightly 
directed to God as its ultimate source. It understands the gift as mediated through Scripture, church, and 
sacraments and also through ordinary inclinations and social relationships…  
A methodological comment is made by Jennifer Herdt in her affirmation of virtue as a gift. By 
conceptualising virtue as a gift, Herdt does not find it legitimate to distinguish between acquired and 
infused virtue, but instead suggests a “rehabilitation of acquired virtue” since “non-competitive 
account of human and divine agency” (2012b:169) have been established. She finds it useful to speak 
of Christian “virtue:” instead of erecting a dichotomy between acquired and infused virtue, she argues 
by means of Jean Porter115 (Porter in Herdt, 2012b:430): 
                                                     
113 Jennifer Herdt shows how, in this conception of mimetic virtue, the hyper-Augustinian anxiety has been 
overcome: “The hyper-Augustinian tendency to protect the purity of Christian righteousness by conceiving of 
grace as acting outside of or against natural human agency has, then, been productively overcome” (2012b:351).  
114 The following section is based on two of Jennifer Herdt’s substantial contributions to conversations of virtue. 
Both articles have a relation to Hauerwas and Wells, the 2004 and 2011 edition of The Blackwell Companion to 
Christian Ethics. In the former, Jennifer Herdt focuses on Hauerwas’ development of Christian Ethics with 
particular focus on Virtue Ethics and the latter is an afterword to the 2011 edition of the Companion namely, 
“The virtue of the liturgy”. 
115 The contribution of Jean Porter is cited by Jennifer Herdt as “The Subversion of Virtue: Acquired and Infused 
Virtues in the Summa Theologiae,” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics (1992): 19-41; here 38-39.” 
(2012b:430).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
I have focused here primarily on Protestant virtue ethics rather than on Catholic (largely Thomist) 
retrievals of the language of virtue … My hunch is that talking about the infused virtues threatens to trade 
away some of the gains associated with the turn to virtue, in that it reintroduces a strong contrast between 
nature and grace, natural and supernatural. Jean Porter is frank about the difficulties associated with 
retrieving the acquired/infused distinction for contemporary Christian ethics, in particular the problems 
posed for a coherent account of human agency by the presence within an individual of both acquired and 
infused virtues and the presupposition of a sharp distinction between natural and supernatural. 
For Jennifer Herdt then, the avenue of critiquing particular virtues and vices and distinguishing 
infused from acquired virtue is not the one she is primarily concerned with, instead she seeks to 
indicate that God through God’s grace can utilise “forms of “secular” virtue” (Herdt, 2012b:431) to 
form Christian character. This does entail a critical stance towards virtue’s formative potential, but 
does not warrant a critical stance that sets Christian virtue over and against secular virtue as defining 
category. Herdt argues (2012b:431): 
Rather than using secular modernity primarily as a contrast point against which Christian identity is 
defined, it seeks to determine with which forms of “secular” virtue Christians can best stand in solidarity. 
This is not to say that the virtues are always and everywhere the same, or that any generic account of 
moral development is available. When Christ is known as God’s ultimate act of loving self-revelation, 
when our dependency on grace is fully recognized and joyfully embraced, this will transform our 
character, and not simply in terms of something added on but all the way down. 
Of similar significance is Hauerwas and Pinches’ appropriation of acquired and infused virtue within 
the Christian narrative, established in the book Christians among the virtues. “Setting aside a two-
tiered account of acquired and infused virtues, the authors suggest that Aristotle’s account of how the 
virtues are acquired can serve as a rich resource for displaying how training in the virtues might 
occur” (Hauerwas & Pinches in Herdt, 2012a:215). Training in the virtues are not finally to be 
distinguished from infusion of the virtues; the virtues are indeed infused “by a special act of God 
which brings us into relation with God,” (Hauerwas & Pinches in Herdt, 2012a:215) but this occurs 
over time through “participation in the body of Christ,” (Hauerwas & Pinches in Herdt, 2012a:215), 
which “involves our reception of the sacraments of baptism and eucharist, but also includes (and 
entails) immersion in the daily practices of the Christian church: prayer, worship, admonition, feeding 
the hungry, caring for the sick, etc.” (Hauerwas & Pinches, in Herdt, 2012a:215).  
One might recall at this point the discussion of Alasdair MacIntyre’s116 logic, (MacIntyre in Herdt, 
2012b:345): 
that the virtues require for their intelligibility reference to living practices and traditions: the virtues find 
their point and purpose not only in sustaining the form of an individual life in which that individual may 
seek out his or her good as the good of his or her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which 
provide both practices and individual lives with their necessary historical context.  
The reference to tradition leads Herdt to a discussion on the development of Christian ethics to virtue 
ethics and potential problems that may be levelled at virtue ethics117. This becomes a long discussion 
                                                     
116 Jennifer Herdt references the contribution of MacIntyre as, “Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).” (2012b: 428).  
117Jennifer Herdt indicates how the invocation of tradition and context has provided a platform for Christian 
Ethics to develop: “This argument has been embraced perhaps more wholeheartedly by Christian ethicists than 
by moral philosophers, since it made it possible for aspects of Christian moral reflection that had seemed to be 
handicaps in the context of the dominant modern moral theories to be heralded instead as advantages. Both the 
intelligibility and the distinctiveness of Christian ethics have seemed easier to articulate in the context of the 
revival of virtue ethics. Stanley Hauerwas has led the way here in focusing increasingly on Christian 
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within two of Herdt’s contributions, “Putting on virtue” and “Hauerwas among the virtues”, with the 
central argument that virtue ethics potentially “falsely idealizes the church and its practices” and “that 
of denouncing secular modernity rather than discerning God at work within it” (2012b:347).  
Jennifer Herdt is led to reflect on Hauerwas’ distancing from virtue ethics to “theological reflection on 
Christian virtues and their social formation in the life of the church” (2012a:203). The life of the 
church presents to individual’s particular narratives that shape their decision making and their moral 
behaviour, Hauerwas’ emphasis, she shows (Herdt, 2012a:205): 
is on the irreducibly particular character of intentionality, on the way that intentionality is bound up with 
the metaphors and stories that form our vision, such that to be fed on the stories of Jesus and of the people 
of Israel is to live in a different world than that inhabited by those fed on other, equally particular stories.  
Jennifer Herdt understands virtue-talk to be “a way of capturing something irreducibly theological 
about how Christians understand what they are doing” (Herdt, 2012a: 205). Herdt indicates how the 
new language of the virtues “was seized upon in order to legitimize both Christian ethics and the new 
discipline of religious ethics. It gave Christian ethics a way of remaining robustly theological as 
opposed to focusing on the translation of theological claims into universal moral principles” (Herdt, 
2012a:206).  
In his book Character and the Christian Life, Jennifer Herdt indicates how Hauerwas reflected on the 
tendency of moral thinkers to talk of virtue in terms of the “value of certain actions for the public 
domain” instead of focusing on the agent of the virtue (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012a:207). This meant 
that Hauerwas did “not seek to define our highest good or final telos and discuss its relationship to 
what we usually mean by happiness” rather, “character, agency, and intention are front and centre in 
his analysis” (Herdt, 2012a:207).  
Herdt affirms the value of speaking of character by referring to Hauerwas’ response (Hauerwas in 
Herdt, 2012a: 209): 
Character offers us a way of capturing the continuity of the self beyond the isolated moment of decision-
making. It makes it possible to articulate a Christian way of being and thus to move beyond the dead-end 
approaches that focus on showing that Christians will act on distinct principles or have access to an 
additional motive not available to non-Christians. 
Finally, argues Jennifer Herdt (2012a:209): 
Character makes it possible to speak intelligibly of moral growth and sanctification. It also allows us to 
articulate how it is that we are autonomous centres of activity, capable of a kind of self-control or self-
mastery. 
The dynamic of speaking of character lies in its location of a particular individual in a particular 
context and the way in which virtue informs the participation of that individual with their context. 
Herdt quotes Hauerwas118 in this regard, who states that “virtues must be context-dependent: the 
individual virtues are specific skills required to live faithful to a tradition’s understanding of the moral 
project in which its adherents participate” (Hauerwas, 1985:115 in Herdt, 2012a: 210-211). He 
                                                                                                                                                                     
particularity- not just narrative but Scripture, not just practices but liturgical practices, not just tradition and 
community but the church” (2012b:345).  
118 Here Jennifer Herdt makes use of Hauerwas’ contribution which is referenced by her as “Hauerwas, Stanley 
1981. A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic. Notre Dame, Ind.: University 
of Notre Dame Press.” (2012a: 225).  
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suggests that the virtues have an inescapable social and political referent; they are necessary not just 
for individual human flourishing, but for “the working of the good society”119 (Hauerwas in Herdt, 
2012a: 210-211). 
Jennifer Herdt continues to indicate through Hauerwas’ thought how virtues are not only to be 
articulated in terms of character, but is intricately related to practices and communities (Hauerwas in 
Herdt, 2012a:213): 
as Hauerwas insisted from early on, the realization that the virtues are not comprehensible merely as 
individual traits of character, but only in relation to the practices and communities in which they are 
formed and the traditions in which they are passed on … Without traditions of communal practice, there 
would be no individual instantiations of the virtues.  
This shift allows Herdt to make two further comments. Firstly, the reunion of “liturgy, spirituality, 
theology, and ethics” with the centrality of the church as point of departure “makes it possible to 
articulate illuminating accounts of moral agency while still preserving the claim that formation of 
Christian virtue is wholly dependent on grace” (Herdt, 2012b:351). The second based on the 
communal nature of the church and the manner in which Christian identity is formed through multiple 
narratives, “that Christian identity is porous” (Herdt, 2012b:351).  
Jennifer Herdt’s comment on Hauerwas’ use of narratives enables her to transition to the practical 
ways in which character and virtue are formed in Christians. Narratives serve as concrete category in 
which we are given the opportunity to participate in God’s divine community. Herdt quotes 
Hauerwas120 (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012a: 214):  
I have increasingly become convinced that rather than talking about narrative as a category in itself, we 
are better advised to do theology in a manner that displays what we have learned by discovering the 
unavoidability of the narrative character of Christian convictions. 
Jennifer Herdt affirms (2012a:214): 
Only through reflecting on the story of God with humanity that we grasp the significance of narrative, 
through reflecting on how humanity is called to communion with God that we grasp the significance of 
the virtues, and indeed, that we can differentiate the virtues from their semblances.  
An “imaginative grasp of the whole form of life in which one’s own activity participates” (Herdt, 
2012a:537) is required. Moreover, the recognition of humans as “embodied creatures” allows one to 
see how the “private mental lives” of individuals “are inhabited by communal symbols and images 
and narratives” (Herdt, 2012a:537).  
By delving into the communal character of the Christian narrative, Christians are made “participants 
in God’s story” (Herdt, 2012a:215). Jennifer Herdt illustrates how Hauerwas evokes a demystified 
understanding of the activity of grace that sets “aside the false dilemmas that arise out of competitive 
accounts of human and divine agency” (2012a:224). Towards an understanding of grace within the 
                                                     
119 It is perhaps useful to highlight Jennifer Herdt’s reading of Hauerwas with regards to the communal aspect of 
the particular Christian context. “It is not community or narrative as such that deserves our attention, but the 
Church as the people formed by the story of Christ, whose primary task is to be itself”. Thus, while Hauerwas 
speaks of Christian virtues, notably those of patience, hope, and peacefulness, “the virtues necessary for 
remembering the story of a crucified saviour”, he has no interest in developing “virtue ethics” as such … (he) is 
thus more interested in the plurality of virtues required than with a singular virtue” (Herdt, 2012a:211).  
120 Herdt references this quotation as follows: “Hauerwas, Stanley, and Samuel Wells, eds. 2004. The Blackwell 
Companion to Christian Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.” (2012a: 226).  
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liturgy that enables exemplification and participation; “It is finally only by virtue of the liturgy, by 
way of the grace that inspires us to long for conformity to the exemplars before us and that disposes us 
to be kneaded into this body, that we can cultivate virtues in and through the liturgy” (Herdt, 
2011:537). 
In her contribution to The Blackwell companion to Christian ethics, Jennifer Herdt makes three 
important remarks with regard to virtue and its interrelatedness to others sets “of realizations and 
commitments” (2011:536). She describes (Herdt, 2011: 536): 
First, that the virtues are not individual achievement, but can be formed and sustained only in the context 
of community. Second, that the task of Christian ethics is not to promote virtue ethics over and against 
other ethical theories, but to place reflection on character and virtue at the service of growth in human 
friendship with God. And not, third, that Christian practices are to be cultivated as the best means to good 
character or a good polity, but rather that the virtues are constitutive of the life, with God and one another, 
that we are called to live. 
Jennifer Herdt uses the concept of imagination to bridge the gap between character formation and 
communal participation in the Christian narrative (2011:537): 
It is at this level, of the shaping of imagination and the training of desire, that participation in Christian 
worship is most fundamentally formative of the virtues…we need to see how liturgy addresses us as 
imaginative creatures whose agency is not autonomous but must be inspired to come to life, meeting us 
neither merely as thinking substances or as creatures of habit, but holistically, as embodied creatures who 
smell and taste as well as see and hear. It envelops us as lovers of beauty, as creatures whose “private” 
mental lives are inhabited by communal symbols and images and narratives. As we pray together, sing 
together, eat together, we are being kneaded together into a body with a shared vision of the life with God 
to which we are called, a good which can integrate our agency and frame all of our experience.  
This strokes well with Augustine’s understanding of Christian virtue, expresses Jennifer Herdt 
(2009:551): 
it is the conviction of all those who are truly religious, that no one can have true virtue without true piety, 
that is without the true worship of the true God: and that the virtue which is employed in the service of 
human glory is not true virtue. 
In her article, “Christian humility, courtly civility, and the code of the streets”, Jennifer Herdt shows 
how the liturgy of the church is not the only “liturgy” that shapes human character. She refers to Elijah 
Anderson’s ethnography of inner-city Philadelphia121, which depicts the various traditions wherein 
vulnerable individuals exist. Each particular tradition dictates a set of social codes which are to be 
conformed to in order for the required character formation to take place122. Jennifer Herdt would 
perhaps classify the participation in the social contexts as conformation and not habituation (Anderson 
in Herdt, 2011:537), as individuals conform to preserve their status and lives. The social codes of the 
streets present an example of cultural liturgies, which vie for the formation of character. Herdt sounds 
                                                     
121 Jennifer Herdt refers to Elijah Anderson’s ethnography of inner-city Philadelphia and references it as follows: 
“Elijah Anderson, Code of he Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City (New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton, 1990), pp. 80-87, 127-129, 112.” (2011:559). 
122Jennifer Herdt describes such a social context as one “in which honour or respect are such scarce goods that 
the virtue of humility is rendered unintelligible, appearing as a confession of lack of worth. What s thereby ruled 
out is the capacity to experience dependency as a gift, to unite confidence in one’s own worth with the 
recognition that one’s worth is not one’s won achievement” (2009:542).   
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a word of caution made by thinkers such as Charles Mathewes123regarding such competitive secular 
liturgies.  
Not all liturgies are negating of the formation of virtue though, positive cultural liturgies “(are) of 
ultimate concern: rituals that are formative for identity, that inculcate particular visions of the good 
life, and do so in a way that means to trump other ritual formations” (Smith124 in Jennifer Herdt, 
2011:538). 
Critique has been levelled at an understanding of cultural liturgies as equally formative as the church 
because it allows “secular liturgies” to compete for our participation, which forms our character. A 
pluralistic understanding of liturgies allows Jennifer Herdt to concur with Charles Mathewes’ proposal 
based on an “Augustinian understanding of the formation of the virtues”, that Christians “are called to 
love the world rightly”. Herdt continues from Mathewes’ proposition” (Herdt, 2011:539):  
But it is Mathewes who has more successfully broken free from the seductions of ‘the secular,’ discerning 
how unhelpful it is to imply that all cultural practices that are not explicitly Christian are necessarily false 
liturgies, antithetical to Christian formation. 
“Instead”, argues Jennifer Herdt, “we can understand the secular simply as that mixed time when no 
single religious vision can presume to command comprehensive, confession, and visible authority, 
even as Christians confess the lordship of Christ” (2011:539). 
In her account of liturgies as arenas for virtue, Herdt underscores her belief that a distinction between 
secular and Christian virtues is false. By erecting a dichotomy virtue as forum wherein God 
progressively brings human beings into relation with Godself is negated. In addition, contributing to 
the common good is understood to be secular, a categorisation that negates the possible initiative of 
God to bring the agent in relation with Godself through virtue. Bearing the false dichotomy in mind, 
she circumvents its problematique by speaking of a communal imitation of Christ’s virtues.  
Jennifer Herdt understands worship to be a process that conform “us to Christ” to “discern the 
contours of the Christian life” (2011:541). She holds that conformance to Christ (Herdt, 2011:541): 
forms us for universal solidarity with suffering humanity and that defines the imagination with which we 
encounter novel and newspaper and neighbourhood gathering. Christian imagination is finally liturgical 
rather than literary. It is not that ethics is authentically Christian only when carried out exclusively in 
terms of a liturgical vocabulary. Rather, it is worship that most deeply forms our moral imagination so 
that we know how to go on in the patient work of casuistry. 
Worship, for Jennifer Herdt, is instrumental in forming “the body of Christ” in and through “God’s 
Holy Spirit” who “gives God’s people the resources they need to live in God’s presence” (2011:543). 
Herdt reflects on praxis through liturgy instead of abstracting the sacraments. Her shift in emphasis 
signals an important methodological adjustment (Herdt, 2011:542) from (Herdt, 2011:543): 
ethical theory to praxis. To theorise is falsely to foster the priority of general concepts (‘virtue’) over 
particular instantiations of Christ-like love and to distract attention from the primary tasks of actually 
responding to God’s invitation to communion, as opposed to thinking about it. 
                                                     
123 Jennifer Herdt references Mathewes as follows: “Matthewes, Charles (2007) A Theology of Public Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).” (2011:546).  
124 In her article “The Virtue of the Liturgy” Jennifer Herdt references Smith as follows, “Smith, James K. A. 
(2009) Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic). (2011: 546).   
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Reflection, for Jennifer Herdt, is useful only in the reformation of our practices (2011:543). Herdt 
places emphasis on the particularity of worship of God, because Scripture, church and the liturgy itself 
has in the past been tools of domination (2011:545). She argues (Herdt, 2011:545-546): 
There is a constant need for discernment, for holding authority accountable to God and God’s purposes. 
There is no privileged standpoint from which this discernment is carried out: instead, we find ourselves 
within a web of mutual accountability and correction. So we read Scripture in the light of tradition and 
lived experience and in the context of worship: we celebrate and reform the liturgy in the light of 
Scripture, received tradition, and our efforts to be conformed to Christ in this world: individual Christians 
are formed within the body of the Church and go on to interrogate the structures and practices of the 
Church in light of their formation and experience: and Church leaders seek to discern God’s will through 
prayerful reflection on Scripture, tradition, and their encounters with the members of the body of Christ 
and God’s creation at large.  
Jennifer Herdt regards praxis as (2011:546): 
crucial to this process: so is ongoing reflection. Discernment and wisdom are also among God’s gifts to 
us. There is indeed a certain kind of priority of worship over other aspects of the Christian life, insofar as 
in worship we enact the loving response to God for which we were created and are thereby enabled to 
understand and love all things in relation to God’s creative and redeeming love.  
Liturgies as arenas for virtue enable Jennifer Herdt to argue that God can utilise “forms of “secular” 
virtue” (Herdt, 2012b: 431) to form Christian character. The virtue of the particular liturgy informs the 
participation of the agent with its context. In the instance of the Christian liturgy, the Christian 
narrative informs the participation of the agent. Christian worship accordingly forms the character of 
the Christian agent.  
4.7 Conclusion 
A mimetic ethic of Christian virtue allows Jennifer Herdt to bypass the legacy of anxiety over 
acquired virtue. In addition, she makes a substantial shift by indicating God’s initiative in leading the 
actor of virtue toward Godself. Virtue, irrespective of whether it is a Christian or secular designation, 
is a platform for God’s participation with humanity. The good performed through virtue serves as a 
progressive turn toward God. Happiness is consequently a disposition where an individual is initiated 
into participation with God through virtue in addition to being cognisant of the value of the virtue in 
itself. In this instance, the value of the action is in its contribution to the common good with the 
realisation that the action done finds its origin in God.  
Jennifer Herdt describes her account of happiness (2012b:57): 
Happiness is found not in achieving independence but in embracing our ultimate dependency … while our 
final good is not fully up to us, it is something that requires our active participation: it is not something 
that we simply passively undergo. If virtue is the perfection of my love for God, the end of enjoyment of 
God cannot be fully characterized apart from my virtuous activity, my loving response to God. We find 
happiness in the perfected activity of receiving and returning God’s gifts.  
In light of the Augustinian anxiety, which does not understand virtue and happiness to be in direct 
relation with one another, Jennifer Herdt argues (2012b:55): 
Virtue is not the way I demonstrate to God that I am worthy of the reward of eternal life: rather, virtue 
proves to be nothing but the perfection of the love of God. And it is when my love to God is perfected that 
I can experience the union with God, which is fruition, the love of enjoyment. Virtue proves after all to be 
not just instrumental but partially constitutive of my happiness, of my final end … My final end is not just 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
external: even though I cannot in this life fully realize that loving union with God, my loving, virtuous 
activity is even now an expression of the love of God. 
In Jennifer Herdt’s opinion, the community of faith is a forum where participation in the divine 
becomes concrete. Herdt refers in this regard to Hauerwas’ “demystification of grace” where the act of 
“delving into the communal character of the Christian narrative” makes Christians “participants in 
God’s story” (2012a:215). In Herdt’s excursus on performative theology, she asks what relation 
Christian participation has to the idea of actors acting out scripts prescribed by an external authority 
(which Herdt explains could recapitulate the Augustinian anxiety125). Jennifer Herdt turns to Kevin 
Vanhoozer to answer the question126, “Fundamentally, it (doctrine) defines our role and disciplines the 
imagination so that we do not simply go through the motions but really inhabit the theo-drama” 
(Vanhoozer in Herdt, 2012b:169).  
Jennifer Herdt affirms in conclusion the adequacy of the mimetic performance (2012b:170): 
to recognize that the criterion of the adequacy of our performance is hidden in the mystery of God is also 
to recognize that we must not be content to look only within the church for the signs of God’s grace. 
Creation is God’s own, however fallen, and human nature as assumed in the incarnation is being 
redeemed by God’s love in ways we cannot always fathom, for now we see through a glass darkly. 
Happiness understood as enjoyment of God through mimetic performances extends the scope of virtue 
to also include those characteristic of the community of faith and beyond. 
Happiness for Jennifer Herdt is found in the recognition that virtue is a mimetic performance through 
which individuals come to enjoy God. Unlike the Augustinian anxiety, she locates acquired virtue in 
the imitation of Christ, which affirms human agency and autonomy. The distinctively Christian 
character of “virtue talk” leads Herdt to affirm a progressive transformation of character which leads 
to salvation. Grace is the means through which acquired virtue initiates an individual into participation 
in God. Once participation has been established through mimetic performance, human beings come to 
experience happiness. The happiness experienced on earth is substantial in its own right. Unlike 
Augustine, who understood earthly happiness to be incomplete in its own right, Jennifer Herdt asserts 
that when a virtuous action is done for the sake of the value of the action itself, complete happiness is 
established. Reflexivity is the term used by Herdt to indicate that an individual is cognisant of the 
source of virtue when performing the virtue itself.  
 
                                                     
125Herdt recognises the problematique inherent in such a notion and consequently purposefully discusses 
implication thereof for contemporary theology. Especially in light of recent developments in theology of 
understanding the Bible as a script that people enact (2012b:168).  
126Jennifer Herdt engages with Kevin Vanhoozer’s book Drama of Doctrine: “If Christians are called to perform 
a script, to take on a role, is there a danger that the result will be merely playacting? Vanhoozer argues: like 
good actors, we have to learn not simply how to play-act a role but rather to become the role we play. The drama 
of doctrine has nothing to do with pretending but everything to do with participating in the once-for-all mission 
of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Such participation is neither play-acting nor a matter of Platonic ontology. 
Christian participation is rather pneumatic: those who participate in the theodramatic missions do so through 
union with Christ, a union that is wrought by the Spirit yet worked out in history by us. Vanhoozer rightly 
argues that there is no other way to become who we are called to be except by acting the part. Moreover, he 
perceives that this enactment is not an assertion of human agency over against divine agency, but a participation 
in divine agency” (Herdt, 2012b:168). Vanhoozer’s book is referenced by Jennifer Herdt as, “Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox, 2005). (2012b: 387).  
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Chapter 5 
Happiness and human flourishing: A Continuing Conversation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The three preceding chapters have sought to delineate the rationale of each respective author’s 
contribution to the conversation on happiness. The title “Happiness and Human Flourishing: A 
Continuing Conversation” is indicative of the purpose of the chapter, to set each respective 
perspective in light of another. Nuances and dissonances are to be expected when bringing three 
voices into conversation with one another, allowing for a diversity of perspectives. From the diversity 
of perspectives, a rendition of happiness may be formulated that takes the voices of three female 
theologians into consideration.  
The chapter will begin by indicating the different points of departure taken by each voice and will 
continue to suggest how the nuances and dissonances enrich a theological conversation on happiness. 
The three female voices take a similar route founded in the Christian tradition, but draw different 
implications for the notion of happiness. I have chosen the concept of “variegated reading” to indicate 
how the notion of happiness is coloured and characterised by various theological appropriations. The 
Merriman Webster Dictionary defines the word “variegated” as an entity marked by stripes or spots, 
bringing forth a diversity of colours (Merriman Webster Dictionary, 2013). The perspective of the 
female voices brings to mind a similar image when speaking about flourishing and happiness. A 
variety of emphases contribute to a comprehensive understanding of happiness that is grounded in 
theology.  
In light of the growing theological conversation on God and human flourishing indicated in the God 
and Human Flourishing Consultations (2007 to 2013) one may return to the question: “In which ways 
do Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt engage theologically with the notion of happiness 
and wellbeing?” A conversation on happiness from a female theological perspective is introduced by 
Serene Jones, who believes that one cannot talk of happiness if one has not taken into consideration 
the ways in which unchecked gendered patterns inform patterns of thought. Serene Jones is placed 
first in the conversation of three, because feminist theory asserts that any conversation held without 
taking into consideration the role of women is open for critique. Serene Jones as first conversation 
partner is helpful in her reformulation of the doctrine of justification and sanctification as forum for 
happiness.  
Ellen Charry contributes in her conception of happiness as a way of life premised on a form of 
knowing God that transforms character. Ellen Charry as second voice continues from the perspective 
of Serene Jones by suggesting that happiness is not only determined by freedom and agency, but is 
also determined by the enjoyment of God. Her account shows a priority toward piety and pleasure as 
the means by which humans come to enjoy God, community and creation. A flourishing disposition 
comes through the mutual enjoyment of God and creation, coupled with the knowledge that God 
enjoys Godself when creation flourishes. A happy disposition is one that results from the position of 
flourishing.  
Jennifer Herdt’s priority toward the role of virtue in affirming our agency as means to relation with 
God marks the third voice. She understands the practicing of virtue to be an affirmation of human 
agency. In the instance where the virtues practiced contribute to the common good, happiness is 
experienced. Herdt continues from the affirmation of human agency toward a possibility of mimetic 
performances. A mimetic performance is an act where the agent who imitates an exemplar is 
transformed by the imitation. She further uses the language of agency to show how God comes in 
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relation to humanity through grace. As the agent is transformed by the mimetic performance, grace 
initiates an individual into relation with God. In the instance where imitation translates to assimilation 
salvation occurs progressively. Jennifer Herdt as third voice in the conversation reminds the reader 
that happiness is a two-part process, whereby an individual firstly experiences happiness by 
contributing to the common good through virtue. Secondly, the agent of virtue is progressively 
brought into relation with God through the imitation of Christ.  
Three female voices present to the conversation theological accounts of happiness premised on the 
affirmation of human agency, morality and relation to God.  
5.2 Grace, happiness and virtue 
Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt are three female voices who contribute to a theological 
conversation on happiness. The context of a conversation allows each voice to make theological 
affirmations with regard to happiness without negating the legitimacy of another.  
Serene Jones, a Reformed feminist theologian, seeks to capture the dynamic interplay between theory 
and theology and thereby reformulates her understanding of doctrine and Scripture. Doctrine and 
Scripture serve as “normative framework” (Jones, 2000:109) from where the Christian community 
may understand itself in relation to God. In addition, the Christian community may critique instances 
of oppression in church and society (Jones, 2001a:51). A feminist critical lens is particularly useful in 
this regard, as it serves to critique the Church through its doctrine (Jones, 2001a:51). Jones emphasises 
how the Church has reinforced prescribed “norms” within society by ascribing to women particular 
gendered roles (2000:59). The doctrine of justification and sanctification may serve as an example 
where sin is often linked to the sexuality of women (Jones, 2000:94). Jones indicates how doctrine 
may be re-imagined in order to address oppressive logics in the construction of female identities 
(2002:56). In the act of re-imagining Christian doctrine, the practices of the church may be 
transformed to reflect a community of faith that is characterised by knowing God and in this way 
being formed by God’s love.  
Serene Jones understands the imagination to be the arena where theology is “mapped” (2002:74). The 
process through which the mapping takes place however, may be distorted by life negating 
circumstances. For this very reason, Jones opts for a “pragmatic eschatological vision” (2000:10), 
where grace deconstructs false natures assigned to women and provides a space where a new identity 
may be given (Jones, 2000:10).  
Ellen Charry’s theological appropriation of happiness is concerned with the divide between first-order 
assertions and second-order assertions, which are no longer markers of a single form of knowing God 
(2006a:145-147). The result of this divide is illustrated in “academic theology”, where method and 
Christian belief no longer inform one another (Charry, 1997a:5). Key patristic thinkers are used to 
illustrate the illegitimacy of this divide, in particular Athanasius and Augustine, who were concerned 
both with truth and the effect of truth on the community of faith. It is Charry’s belief that the 
acquisition of truth, transforms character, a process she terms salutarity (2002a:177).  
The process of transformation is indistinguishable from salvation, as knowing God evokes 
responsiveness to Christ who is the mediator between humanity and God (Charry, 2011a:23). As 
character is shaped, enjoyment of life and God occurs as result. Ellen Charry affirms that “God wills 
the flourishing of humanity” (2011a:34) and as a result, enjoys Godself when humanity enjoys 
creation and God. Charry understands knowledge of God to be acquired through obedience to God’s 
commandments. The term asherism denotes a lifestyle premised on the prescribed norms set out in the 
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Old and New Testament (Charry, 2006a:167). Happiness is consequently a way of life that is good in 
Ellen Charry’s opinion.  
Ellen Charry’s emphasis on the relation between knowledge of God and the enjoyment of God stems 
from her attempt to reunite the division introduced in modernity between piety and pleasure. She notes 
(Reflections on the interfaith Summit on Happiness, 2010): 
The reason I concluded was that Christians are skittish to talk about happiness because some Christians 
perceive happiness and goodness to be in tension with one another. If Christians have a choice between 
being happy and being good they want to be good and they are willing to forego happiness in order to be 
good and obedient. 
Jennifer Herdt progresses from a similar position of discomfort with false dichotomies as Ellen Charry 
does. She begins her account of mimetic virtue with the secularisation of moral thought. The 
secularisation of moral thought brought a divide between morality and its religious moorings, which 
Herdt deems unsatisfactory. A “Christian ethics of mimetic virtue” (Herdt, 2012b: ix) is established by 
Jennifer Herdt, who seeks to free talk of virtue and happiness from the theological preoccupation with 
acquired virtue (2012b:ix).   
Jennifer Herdt makes use of the doctrine of grace to reclaim the notion that happiness understood 
theologically may be formed through secular virtues. Grace facilitates the process of participation in 
the divine through the imitation of Christ. Herdt consequently engages with Christology to transcend 
the divide between secular and theological. Virtue as participation in the common good, as well as in 
God allows her to indicate how habituation of virtuous acts transforms the agent through grace. 
Virtuous action has the potential of transforming the agent of virtue in its imitation of a divine 
example.  
It is indicated in each account how happiness is constituted through relation with both God and 
community. Serene Jones speaks of relation with God through the doctrine of justification and 
sanctification, which assigns to women both agency and freedom while affirming their identity in 
Christ. Ellen Charry understands individuals and communities of faith to be in relation with God when 
they conform to God’s commandments and so enjoy creation and God. A happy life is one where 
knowledge of God translates into a way of living. Jennifer Herdt focuses on the agency of individuals 
who are brought into relation with God by grace through virtue. Morality and its religious moorings 
are unified through the imitation of a divine example. Herdt consequently understands relation with 
God to take place when individuals are assimilated to God  
In light of the varied points of departure for speaking of happiness, one might ask how each account 
contributes to the theological conversation on happiness. By starting with Serene Jones, the 
theological emphasis falls on flourishing as a position where Christ affirms the agency and freedom of 
women. Grace enables women to live according to an identity ascribed to them in the Christian 
redemptive narrative. Jones’ reformulation of the doctrine of justification and sanctification illustrates 
this affirmation.  
The doctrine of justification and sanctification provides an eschatological vision of women’s nature, 
where grace functions as an envelope which holds the substance of women (Jones, 2000:64). 
Accordingly, justification and sanctification are two different markers of a single self, deconstructing 
an individual while simultaneously presenting it with a new identity (Jones, 2000:63, 64). Serene 
Jones describes each accordingly as freedom and form (2000:63). The narratives in Scripture are 
instances where the dual act of undoing and re-making captures the imagination of the reader and 
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presents to the reader an alternative reality (Jones, 2001c:301). Jones describes the process of undoing 
and re-making as one which expands the imaginistic economies of the reader where the alternate 
reality presented is one devoid of oppression (2001c:301). In instances of oppression, grace enables 
women to re-imagine their lives in accordance with the alternative reality presented in Christ. When 
women come to understand their identity as premised in Christ, new patterns of thought are erected in 
their lives.  
The habits of thought presented in the doctrine of justification and sanctification transform the way 
women know God. “Knowing” for Serene Jones is a deeply involved position termed by her as 
“embodied and embodying” (2008b:202). She understands the Reformed “habit of thought” to be 
“deeply engaged, self-involving, and a trusting form of knowledge- the knowledge of faith” (Jones, 
2000:56) which leads women into “experiencing the joy of life abundant in God” (Jones, 2002:56). Of 
particular significance is Jones’ approach to doctrine, “when I open this world of doctrine to students, 
I try to show them what that imaginative world consists of by teaching them habituated thought-
patterns that Christians have devised over the centuries to structure the deep faith play of mind that 
comprise the terms of their engagement with the world” (Jones2008b:199).  
Reformed habits of thought allow Serene Jones to think of grace as a catalyst for flourishing, whereby 
women take on an identity that counters the identity given by cultural norms. Grace defines the nature 
of women “according to the grace-given virtues of the Christian life: faith, hope, and love” (Jones, 
2000:65). Flourishing as a disposition of happiness “is an existential position wherein grace captures 
the emancipatory vision of women. Grace then, embodies flourishing, through its containment of 
God’s love and vision for women. ‘Graced’ becomes her new identity” (Jones, 2000:64) as Christ 
reveals God’s gracious love in God’s “life, death, and resurrection” (Jones, 2000:65). Accordingly, 
Jones deduces that “God wills the flourishing of all people” (2000:108) and draws the attention of the 
reader to the alternative reality presented in redemption (Jones, 2000:110).  
The reality presented in redemption applies not only to an individual, but also to the church, a graced 
community. The graced community envision a space free of oppression where it is both “a 
“sacramental embodiment” of grace and “witness to grace” (Jones, 2000:175). A theological 
perspective on happiness for Serene Jones begins and ends with grace which “comes outside the 
normative framework of sin and oppression” (2000:110) and provides the community of faith with a 
pragmatic eschatological orientation.  
Ellen Charry locates happiness in a particular way of knowing God that is salutary (1998b:379). 
Salutarity presupposes a form of knowing that is transformative in nature. The distinction between the 
rational and “spiritual” is negated by Charry in order to establish the transformative power that 
knowledge has on character. She locates the source of knowledge of God in doctrine and Scripture 
(Charry, 2002a:177), which is the theoretical framework wherein humans come to know God. In the 
revelation of Godself to humanity through Christ, knowledge is understood to be salvific in nature. 
Individuals are consequently invited to participate in God through the sacraments and obedience to 
God’s commandments. Co-optation in the “salvific drama” encourages participants to be concerned 
for the flourishing of creation.  
Ellen Charry understands participation in God to have theological implications. She indicates (Charry, 
2010:262-263): 
Those co-opted into the drama of redemption have no choice but to embrace their providential 
responsibility energetically, for they have become servants of the world’s flourishing and of God’s 
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enjoyment of creation. Their happiness is in enjoying God and the world as servants. Enjoying eternal life 
is doing this excellently and energetically. 
Ellen Charry’s emphasis falls on the flourishing of creation because she believes that God enjoys 
Godself when creation flourishes. When creation flourishes and God flourishes, happiness is 
experienced by an individual. The reality of suffering in life probes Charry to find an understanding of 
happiness that is a state of being instead of an emotion.  
Jennifer Herdt engages with the notion of happiness in the secularisation of moral thought exacerbated 
by the Augustinian anxiety of acquired virtue (2012b:1). The secularisation of moral thought erected a 
dichotomy between morality and its religious moorings, which leads to the separation of truth and 
goodness. She reinforces the illegitimacy of this divide in her conviction that the goodness 
experienced through virtue is a means by which God takes the initiative to be in relation with 
humanity. Virtue consequently progressively brings an individual into a relationship with God. 
Understood theologically, virtue is an expression of love for God that evokes enjoyment of God 
(understood as ultimate happiness). The dichotomy erected through the secularisation of morality is 
negated by Herdt because it restricts God’s initiative to inaugurate individuals into relationship with 
God through secular virtues.  
Herdt affirms her conviction by reiterating Hauerwas’ shift in emphasis (when speaking of virtue) 
from the action to the agent doing the action (Hauerwas, 1985 in Herdt, 2012a:207). In answer to the 
dilemma of acquired virtue, she sets virtue in the context of the Christian liturgy. Christians are co-
opted into the Christian narrative through the sacraments. In this way, virtuous actions performed are 
irreducibly linked to Christian character premised on faith in God (Herdt, 2012a:215). Virtuous action 
as participation in the divine is an act characterised by the enjoyment of God.  
In an Augustinian rendition of eudaimonism Jennifer Herdt describes how participation in the divine, 
premised on a relationship with God, results in happiness (2012b:57): 
Happiness is found not in achieving independence but in embracing our ultimate dependency … while our 
final good is not fully up to us, it is something that requires our active participation: it is not something 
that we simply passively undergo. If virtue is the perfection of my love for God, the end of enjoyment of 
God cannot be fully characterized apart from my virtuous activity, my loving response to God. We find 
happiness in the perfected activity of receiving and returning God’s gifts.  
Grace is central to the acquisition of virtue, as it enables exemplification and participation in God 
(Herdt, 2012b:431). Moreover, through grace God may utilise secular virtues to transform Christian 
character (Herdt, 2012b:431). Jennifer Herdt returns to Aristotelian eudaimonism and describes how 
the imitation of a divine exemplar may become a foundation from which virtuous actions transform 
character. Through the transformation of character, Christians participate in the goodness of God, an 
act effectively bridging the gap between the Augustinian anxiety toward semblance and the 
secularisation of moral thought. When Christians are assimilated to Christ, virtuous actions are 
performed for the sake of the virtues themselves. Happiness becomes, in Herdt’s opinion, a state of 
virtuous acting where the truth of God’s goodness and moral thought coincides to direct us toward the 
common good.  
Present in each conceptualisation of happiness lies a unique point of departure and rationale. One may 
understand the variety of perspectives as enriching to the conversation on happiness. Serene Jones 
with her particular emphasis on the role of grace in ascribing a new identity to women, Ellen Charry in 
her understanding that happiness is marked both by piety and pleasure as enjoyment of God and 
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Jennifer Herdt who understands virtue to be the means through which God brings humanity into 
relation with Godself.  
5.3 A variegated reading 
The Merriman Webster Dictionary defines the word “variegated” as an entity marked by stripes or 
spots, bringing forth a diversity of colours (Merriman Webster Dictionary, 2013). A variety of 
emphases contribute to a comprehensive understanding of happiness that is grounded in theology. In 
light of the different appropriations of happiness, one may proceed to delineate the rationale of each 
voice highlighting similarities along the way. If one were to categorise the thought of each voice based 
on a stipulated rationale five processes would be distinguishable.  
The first process is the identification of an unsatisfactory disposition or dilemma that is 
characteristically insufficient in describing a preferred norm. The second describes the implications of 
such a dilemma while suggesting an alternative. The process of establishing the preconditions for an 
alternative signals the third process, which is accompanied by the fourth in its exposition of the 
suggested alternative. The fifth and final process is the appropriation of the alternative to the desired 
norm. 
The first process, the identification of an unsatisfactory disposition or dilemma that is 
characteristically insufficient in describing a preferred norm is worked out by each voice as follows: 
Serene Jones addresses the gendered roles women are given described in terms of “natures” or 
“essences”. These assigned natures, if oppressive, negate the flourishing of women by disordering 
their imaginations. A disordered imagination represents an individual who is unable to receive God’s 
redemptive narrative as alternative identity. An identity that is counter to God’s will that creation 
should flourish (Jones, 2000:64).  
Ellen Charry locates the unsatisfactory disposition within academic theology and its inability to 
transition between normative truths and salutary knowledge of God. The “academizing” of theology 
was representative of a greater divide between pleasure and piety (Charry, 2010: xii), which left “a 
theological gap between goodness and happiness” (Charry, 2010: xii). There are moral implications to 
human relation with God for Charry. When reading Athanasius, she (Charry, 1993a:268) argues: 
Happiness, that is, the capacity to direct human life aright, was buried, lost, and forgotten through 
generations of fumbling around in the dark. The good life, that is the virtuous life, was trashed beneath 
indignities that misused body, mind, and soul. The process began by forgetting who God is. This led to 
losing touch with who we really are: creatures destined for happiness at the hands of the one who created 
us. This loss led to idolatry which in turn destroyed human dignity, and turned human intercourse into a 
jungle of violence, corruption, and deceit. In short, civilization was on the verge of collapse. And God 
saw that it was not good at all. 
Jennifer Herdt, with a similar awareness of the moral implication of happiness, turns her attention to 
the secularisation of moral thought (2001a:259). The secularisation of morality brings her into 
conversation with history to understand how moral thought was influenced by conceptions of virtue 
and the ultimate good (Herdt, 2012b:24). The secularisation of moral thought presupposed a divide 
between virtuous action as form of participation in God (ultimate happiness) and virtuous action for 
the sake of nobility and the common good (Herdt, 2012b:97). The Augustinian anxiety of acquired 
virtue as semblance becomes an opportune moment for Herdt to facilitate a reading of virtue where 
moral thought and theological implications need not be two different normative frameworks.  
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Jennifer Herdt asks in which ways virtue may be conceptualised for it to be defined by participation in 
the divine (Cudworth, 1996 in Herdt, 1999:47). Another way of asking the question would be to 
inquire to what extent “infused virtue” and “acquired virtue” (categories which no longer suffice in 
Herdt’s recollection) merge into a form of acting that addresses the agent instead of the action. The 
virtuous individual comes to know God through assimilation to Christ, where virtue is the first step 
toward knowledge of God and self. 
Serene Jones and Jennifer Herdt identify the unsatisfactory disposition in the negation of human 
agency, whereas the emphasis of Ellen Charry falls on the divide between goodness and happiness. 
Jones argues that the agency of women is negated when doctrine and Scripture are read with 
insensitivity to gendered constructions of women’s nature. Insensitivity to gendered constructions 
when reading doctrine and Scripture may be oppressive to women. Herdt in turn problematises the 
exacerbated Augustinian anxiety of acquired virtue, as it shifted the emphasis from the agent of virtue 
to the action itself. By turning the attention to the action itself, virtue was no longer understood as 
means by which God initiated an individual into relation with Godself. 
Ellen Charry argues that creation is destined to be happy. Modernity established a divide between 
goodness and happiness however, which shifted the theological emphasis from enjoyment of God to 
goodness. The prioritisation of piety over pleasure is problematic for Charry as it distanced Christians 
from the belief that enjoyment of God inculcated both goodness and happiness. Premised on the 
discrepancies identified by each voice one may consider the implications of the dilemmas presented.  
One may continue to the second process where the three female voices describe the implications of 
such a dilemma while suggesting an alternative: 
Serene Jones’ discomfort lies in the belief that doctrine and Scripture, which communicate a particular 
knowledge of God, has been subverted by false interpretations presented in the Reformed tradition. 
Knowledge of God that is oppressive underscores a redemptive narrative that is irreconcilable to 
women. Women who are at risk of not being able to relate to the saving power of God are “without a 
story to initiate” (Jones, 2000: 63) them “into grace” (Jones, 2000:63). As a result of the fact that 
knowledge of God shapes the imaginations of individuals, false construals may be life negating. Jones 
deems the absence of saving knowledge of God unsatisfactory. Instead of rejecting the Reformed 
tradition altogether, she seeks to show how doctrine and Scripture may be re-imagined to establish a 
knowledge of God that is life enhancing.  
Ellen Charry’s concern lay with the distinction made between knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge 
and wisdom divorced from one another render knowledge of God void of its salutary effect. In light of 
Charry’s emphasis on happiness as a way of life established through a particular way of knowing God, 
the divide between knowledge and wisdom establishes a rendition of happiness that is unintelligible to 
Christians. The result is an abstraction of the human relation to God along with an understanding of 
happiness that is devoid of its transformative potential. Charry accordingly suggests that knowledge 
and wisdom be understood as an unified whole. When wisdom and knowledge are unified, happiness 
marks both our knowledge of God and leads us into wisdom as means of living a good life.  
Jennifer Herdt seeks to circumvent the problematic separation of morality from its religious moorings 
(Whichcote, 1996 in Herdt, 2001a:259), which does not recognise God’s initiative in bringing 
humanity into relation with Godself through virtues. She suggests the emphasis of virtue be re-placed 
onto the agent doing the action instead of the action itself. When the emphasis is placed on the agent, 
morality and its religious moorings need no longer be separate entities. Unification is enabled by 
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Herdt, who introduces grace as means through which virtuous action bespeaks the agent. Virtuous 
action, by means of grace, becomes participation in the divine through the imitation of Christ (Herdt, 
2012b:47).  
Serene Jones brings it to the attention of the reader that interpretation of doctrine and Scripture is 
potentially oppressive if it does not take into consideration the way women’s roles have been 
constructed in the past. Life-negating readings of Scripture are unable to provide women with a 
redemptive narrative that draws them into relation with God. The implications are the inability to 
come into relation with God in addition to the absence of affirming women’s agency and freedom. 
Jones indicates an alternative way of reading doctrine and Scripture by arguing for the role of grace in 
affirming the agency and freedom of women.  
Ellen Charry understands the notion of asherism to be negated when wisdom and knowledge of God 
are separated. This is problematic because knowledge of God when separated from wisdom is not 
understood to translate into an excellent way of living life. Because happiness is established both by 
living excellently and as a result enjoying Godself and creation, the separation of knowledge of God 
and wisdom negates a comprehensive understanding of happiness. Charry suggests an alternative 
reading through obedience to God’s commandments. Obedience to God’s commandments establishes 
both knowledge of God and enables an excellent way of living life. When individuals conform to 
God’s standard for living, knowledge is conveyed of God that is salutary.  
Jennifer Herdt takes issue with the separation of morality from its religious moorings because it does 
not take into consideration how human beings can progressively come to participate in the divine 
through virtue. The inability to understand virtue as forum where the agent is transformed through the 
imitation of a divine exemplar impoverishes the concept of virtue. Herdt provides an alternative by 
arguing that virtues by means of grace are means through which human progressively come into 
relation with Godself. Morality cannot, therefore, be separated from its religious moorings, because it 
would imply a distinction between “secular” and “Christian” virtues as two distinct liturgies. By 
placing the emphasis on the unification of morality with its religious moorings, Jennifer Herdt shifts 
the focus from the action to the agent doing the action. When the focus falls on the agent, grace is able 
to initiate individuals into relation with God.  
Each respective voice has indicated the implications of the unsatisfactory disposition and the 
alternative sought. One may continue to delineate the preconditions for an alternative. 
The third process establishes preconditions for a suggested alternative. In the instance of the three 
female theological voices it is an understanding of God that transforms the individual through a 
stipulated form of knowledge. Whereas Jennifer Herdt understands virtue (as a form of imitating a 
divine example) to communicate a particular knowledge of God to the agent, Serene Jones and Ellen 
Charry begin their inquiry from the presupposition that one can come to know God through doctrine 
and Scripture.  
Ellen Charry describes doctrine as the normative framework by which individuals come to discern 
God’s goodness, wisdom and beauty (2002c:114). The knowledge of God, presented to individuals 
through theology, combined with God’s goodness evokes a transformation in character that shapes 
readers for the good life (Charry, 1997a:viii-ix). Scripture captures the imagination of its readers 
through its redemptive narrative while presenting to the reader knowledge of God previously foreign 
to self. Charry describes how the imagination is captured through the redemptive narrative 
(1997a:185): 
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The reflective reader will be led to self-examination by Christ’s virtues, by both love and the 
righteousness of God, and by the power of God as well as the anger of God, because an example has been 
set before her, a man lifted up upon a cross, who willingly gave his innocent life that she might be spared.  
Serene Jones affirms the acquisition of knowledge of God as result of an embodying and embodied 
reading of Scripture. It is embodying and embodied (Jones, 2002:56) because Scripture exerts 
formative pressure on its reader whilst enfolding the identity of the reader through grace. The 
imagination is co-opted into the redemptive narrative through identification with justification and 
sanctification. As the imagination is re-orientated toward God, habits of thought are formed through 
doctrine (Jones, 2002:56). These habits of thought translate into forms of “knowing” that lead to 
“experiencing the joy of life abundant in God” (Jones, 2002:56). The effect is a “deeply engaged, self-
involving, and trusting form of knowledge- the knowledge of faith” (Jones, 2000:56) and must 
therefore be revisited at every instance of re-imagining (Jones, 2000:56).  
Jennifer Herdt turns to an imaginative grasp of Christian character as premise for living a virtuous life. 
Similar to Serene Jones and Ellen Charry, the imagination partakes in liturgies where the imitation of 
Christ co-opts individuals into the redemptive narrative (Herdt, 2012a:215). Virtue consequently gains 
transcendent meaning, as it enacts the truth and goodness of God depicted in liturgies of faith. For this 
enactment, reflexivity is required. Herdt describes a disposition of reflexivity as a conscious 
awareness in the agent of the value intrinsic to the particular form of action (2012b: 41). 
Ellen Charry, Jennifer Herdt and Serene Jones each understands knowledge of God to be acquired 
through co-optation in the redemptive narrative. The precondition for the suggested alternatives is 
knowledge of God that transforms the way human beings come to understand themselves in relation to 
God. Charry believes knowledge of God to be attained when Christians partake in the norm for 
excellent living stipulated in the Old Testament and New Testament. An asherist life is one where the 
co-opted individual partakes in God’s redemption by living life excellently. Through the realisation of 
knowledge of God through excellent living, creation affirms its priority toward the flourishing of both 
God and creation.  
Jennifer Herdt speaks similarly of co-optation in the redemptive narrative through an imaginative 
grasp of virtue. An imaginative grasp of virtue is a position where the agent is consciously aware of 
the value of the virtue being done. Virtue, understood as the imitation of a divine exemplar, conveys 
knowledge of God, which progressively brings an individual into relation with God. Grace serves as 
the catalyst between virtue and progressive participation in the divine. The role of grace in enabling an 
individual to come into relation with God is similarly underscored by Serene Jones. Jones’ priority lies 
in the role of grace to affirm the identity of women as both justified and sanctified. Once women have 
understood themselves as justified and sanctified, their habits of thought are changed. Changed habits 
of thought establish knowledge of God that is both liberative and emancipatory.  
Co-optation into the redemptive narrative serves not only to present salvation to individuals, but also 
to transform the way human beings understand themselves in relation to God. Once each account has 
established the preconditions for a suggested alternative, one may continue to exposit the nature of the 
alternative sought.  
The fourth process presents an exposition of the suggested alternatives. Each respective voice 
indicates how theology is implicated in a reading of happiness. Jennifer Herdt remarks on the 
distinctively Christian character of virtue in theology (Herdt, 2012a:215): 
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Crucially, Christians cannot understand responsibility for character in the way that Aristotle does: virtue is 
not a matter of acquiring skills or excellences that allow us to flourish as instantiations of human nature, 
but a matter of becoming a follower of Jesus … We are to be made participants in God’s story, not 
authors of our own. 
Participation in the redemptive narrative is a perspective delineated by each voice in a different way. 
In each instance, the role of grace is implicated in the imitation of and participation in the divine. 
Serene Jones uses the language of performance to indicate how women may take part in the 
redemptive drama and be transformed by their participation. The process begins with the doctrine of 
justification and sanctification which assign to women a different identity. Jones states (2000:58): 
Standing in the space of sanctification, the one whose identity has been “undone” and “forgiven” is now 
given normative contours, disciplines, laws, and ethical directives within which to become a concretely 
new person in Christ.  
Grace enables identification with Christ in Christ’s suffering and earthly ministry, which is 
transformative in nature. In the presence of the community of faith, sacraments become a communal 
enactment of the redemptive drama. Serene Jones indicates how this enactment evokes practices that 
shape the “becoming” of women (2002:75). Grace as active entity that bring individuals into salvation 
through performance, resonates thematically with Jennifer Herdt’s emphasis on mimesis (2012b:60). 
Herdt writes (2012b: 119): 
Grace is active in our acting, in the beauty of virtue displayed that engages and transforms our affections, 
allowing us to play a part that becomes our own as we play it. While imitation is an act, there is also a 
chastening of human agency implied in the cascade. We must be inspired by our exemplars: we cannot 
simply decide to love them, to find them beautiful. 
 
The Augustinian anxiety is overcome in the recognition that grace transforms human agency through 
virtuous acting. By participating in the divine through virtuous action, human beings come to partake 
in God’s goodness by responding to grace, an act denoting salvation (Herdt, 2012b:60).  
 
Ellen Charry understands the role of grace as enabling a particular form of knowing God that is 
transformative in nature (2006a:167). In addition to its facilitation of good knowledge in the knower, 
grace is the source by which humans come to participate in God (Charry, 1993a: 273). In light of 
Charry’s emphasis on knowledge of God that evokes enjoyment and happiness, grace reveals Christ to 
individuals who are being transformed by their knowledge of God (2010:262-263).  
 
Jennifer Herdt, Serene Jones and Ellen Charry understand participation in the divine to be enabled by 
grace. Grace in the instance of Herdt enables virtuous action to be a loving response between agent 
and God. Through virtuous action, the agent is transformed and initiated into relationship with God. 
The imitation of Christ is a mimetic performance whereby Christians partake in the liturgy of the 
redemptive narrative. In the instance of Charry, grace directs our obedience to God. The norm 
prescribed by God in the Old Testament and New Testament becomes a norm for excellent living 
whereby God is understood to partake in the enjoyment of creation. By imitating the norms prescribed 
by God, human beings are assimilated to Christ and accordingly partake in God. Jones uses the 
language of performance to indicate how grace transforms the actor taking part in the redemptive 
drama. The doctrine of justification and sanctification presents to women new identities. Once women 
partake in God by assuming the part of one who is justified and sanctified, grace gives agency and 
freedom to women. Women are transformed by their performance in Christ, which is pleasing to God.  
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Grace as the catalyst for imitation of Christ, assigns to women an identity they may perform and 
enables individuals to live life excellently for the enjoyment of God. The role of grace becomes the 
means by which each voice appropriates the alternative suggested to the desired norm.  
In the fifth and final process, the three female voices continue to appropriate the alternative suggested 
to a desired norm. In the context of a theological engagement with the notion of happiness, Serene 
Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt turn to liturgy and the sacraments. Liturgy is a reminder of the 
communal nature of Christian identity through a communal identification and re-enactment of Christ’s 
ministry. Herdt indicates the need for an “imaginative grasp of the whole form of life in which one’s 
own activity participates” (2011:537). Moreover, the recognition of humans as “embodied creatures” 
allows one to see how the ““private” mental lives” of individuals “are inhabited by communal 
symbols and images and narratives” (Herdt, 2011:537). In the first instance, Christian worship deeply 
forms the moral imagination (Herdt, 2011:541), while also forming virtues (Herdt, 2011:537).  
Co-optation in the redemptive narrative through the sacraments, argues Ellen Charry, dresses the 
believer “in the vestments of salvation, the armour of God. Assimilating salvation into our 
personalities requires developing a new outlook on things and strategies for accomplishing them…” 
(2010:262-263). Talk of participation in the divine and imitation of Christ are linked to the restoration 
of human dignity by acquiring a new identity in Christ. Each appropriation of human dignity is read 
differently in light of the particular emphasis on redemption. For Jennifer Herdt, acquiring an identity 
which is constitutive of Christian character through virtue is a gradual process brought to fruition in 
Christian practices. Jennifer Herdt states (2012b:350):  
On this view, it is not through an instantaneous evangelical rebirth, a lightning bolt from heaven, that 
Christian are made such, but through hearing Scriptures that proclaim the story of God with us and 
participating in the practices of the church constituted by its willingness to be defined by that story. 
Christian identity is thus formed gradually, in time, by forces that are embodied and open to view- 
narratives, institutions, practices. 
Jennifer Herdt’s account of Christian identity finds expression in the transformative potential of 
virtuous action when such virtuous action is directed toward God through imitation of Christ 
(2012b:47). The same is not the case for either Ellen Charry or Serene Jones, who understand 
Christian identity to be restored through a therapeutic soteriology. Charry’s starting point is that of a 
broken image of God. Founded upon Athanasian Christology, “human dignity comes from our 
relatedness to God, as given by God in creation” (Charry, 1997a:90). Bad knowledge of God and 
suffering distort the image of God in humanity, which necessitates redemption. A therapeutic 
soteriology provides the forum where human dignity may be restored. Charry writes (2001:127): 
Christian therapy is emancipation from the distortions of the self to which all persons are liable. It begins 
with realizing that the source of one’s proper dignity and nobility is God and no one or nothing else. 
Dignity and nobility are found in coming to understand God and in coming to see oneself as an echo of 
the Trinity.  
Serene Jones takes a similar approach to Ellen Charry by indicating how Christian identity is 
bestowed on women who participate in the redemptive narrative. Doctrine forms the conceptual arena 
wherein women may acquire an identity or nature that is free from oppression (Jones, 2009: 13). In 
her book, Trauma and Grace (2009), Jones indicates how the redemptive narrative captures the 
imagination of its participants (2009:13). Through grace, individuals come to realise the part they are 
to play, which transforms them and bestows a new nature on them. Serene Jones shows how natures 
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that are ascribed to individuals can either enhance or negate flourishing. She illustrates in her 
caricature whom she calls “Rachel”127 (Jones, 2004a: 281-283): 
Maybe standing there, Rachel is able to catch a glimpse of grace, a fleeting hint of redemption, a sense of 
the hope that long ago faded … What kind of grace is capable of meeting her loss?” The crucified Christ 
communicates this grace, “Prevenient - and enhancing grace” that “bears the double mark of being at 
once a new freely bestowed, externally composed gift and a deeply familiar, intimately known presence- a 
grace both foreign and indigenous to us. The glory of Christ lies in a particular form of love, “It has no 
corollary … It simply is the truth of that moment, in all its inexhaustible particularity.  
Human dignity is affirmed when women take on a new identity established by their performance in 
the redemptive narrative. Serene Jones’ approach to soteriology is therapeutic in its ability to meet and 
re-order a disordered imagination due to trauma and suffering. The re-ordering takes place as women 
partake in a divine script set out by doctrine (Jones, 2009:46). Freedom is evoked when woman may 
“perform” (Jones, 2000:67) “an identity that is not ours by right but is a gift” (Jones, 2000:67). Serene 
Jones explains (2000: 60-62): 
When one is sanctified, one performs and is performed by the script of divine love that comes to us in 
Jesus Christ, a script mediated to us ecclesially … This script … is not just something that Christians learn 
to enact. Rather, as the very context within which we become who we are, it is the script of our most 
fundamental selves. As such, when we perform and are performed by grace, our lives take on the form 
that we are. In this manner justification provides women with “freedom” to live.  
The desired norm expressed by each theological account pertains to the unique relation of human 
beings to God. In each instance, relation to God grounds a theological account of human flourishing 
and happiness. Serene Jones, whose account one may term “graced agency,” seeks to illustrate how 
grace is constitutive of a women’s identity as both free and agentic. Graced agency depicts the 
performance of a woman who participates in the redemptive narrative as one who has been redeemed 
and liberated. Graced agency furthermore describes women who flourish as a result of their new 
agentic identity. Performances are a means by which women express their new agentic identity in 
relation to God, because God wills the flourishing of women and their performances are pleasing to 
God.  
Ellen Charry’s account may be termed “happy.” Charry illustrates how goodness and happiness 
cannot be dichotomised. Instead, grace enables an excellent life through conformance to God’s 
commandments. An excellent life is enjoyable to humanity as they flourish and enable creation to 
flourish. Mutual enjoyment of God and creation occur as result of the flourishing of creation and 
establishes a disposition of being ashrey. Asherism is a term which denotes, for Ellen Charry, an 
obedient life marked by both goodness and happiness. Goodness is established through obedience to 
God’s norms, while happiness is the result of a good life. Happiness understood as an obedient, 
excellent life, functions independent of the pain and suffering experienced in life. The state of being 
happy is therefore not an emotional state, but rather a state of being.  
Jennifer Herdt’s account centers in virtue and may thus be understood as an account of “virtue.” 
Virtue as imitation of Christ’s divine exemplar is understood to bring humanity progressively into 
relation with God by means of grace. Herdt terms this imitation a mimetic performance. Similar to 
                                                     
127In her book, Trauma and Grace (2009), Serene Jones describes the context of an individual whom she names 
Rachel: “She is a woman who has been undone by traumatic violence: her spirit fractured by that mythic event 
the Christian tradition has named “the Slaughter of the Innocents” (2004a:270).  
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Serene Jones’ account of performances, virtue as mimetic performance assimilates individual to Christ 
and so enables participation in the divine. Virtues bespeak the agent who is in relation to God, 
affirming the distinctively Christian liturgy they are partaking in.  
Relation to Godself is enabled by grace through imitation, obedience and performances.  
5.4 Converging conversations 
The process of identifying nuances and dissonances within the rationale of each female theological 
voice has established a creative space where each female voice may be read in light of the other. 
The delineation of the five processes of thinking about God and human flourishing has served as 
introduction to a converging conversation. A converging conversation is a meeting place where 
each respective voice has the opportunity to address the accomplishments and shortcomings of 
another’s perspective.  
 
Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt illustrate the complex nature of happiness by 
developing different accounts, each with a distinctive priority toward a theological understanding of 
happiness. For Charry, happiness is an enduring state where Christians live in the presence of God and 
thereby enjoy God and God creation (2012a: 229). For Jones, happiness is graced agency, an identity 
marked by both freedom and form (2002:69). For Herdt, happiness is discussed as part and parcel of a 
virtuous life lived in participation with God through the imitation of Christ (Whichcote, 1996 in Herdt, 
2001a:259). Each voice respectively understands human happiness to imply the flourishing of creation 
through relation with God. When happiness is dependent on one’s relation with God, an 
uncommodified rendition of happiness is attested to. Accordingly, happiness becomes an active 
presence that reminds individuals of their Christian identity.  
One may pose the question to the conversation whether each perspective is comprehensive enough in 
its consideration of happiness.  
It is useful to start with Serene Jones, who employs a feminist critical lens when engaging with 
Scripture and doctrine (2001c:299). In the past, doctrine and Scripture have been used in an 
oppressive way, which is deeply troubling for Jones, as it reinforces an oppressive logic often found in 
the church and society. A feminist critical lens is useful in this regard, as it draws the attention of the 
reader to any life negating interpretation. Moreover, by assuming a critical disposition any normative 
framework that goes unchecked is reason for analysis (Jones, 2001c:299). As a result, the reading of 
doctrine and Scripture becomes the primary concern for re-imagining a graced agency. Graced agency 
describes a reality where women may be defined by an identity other than an oppressive one. Serene 
Jones turns her attention to the Reformed tradition with the intent on re-formulating doctrine. An 
example of such a reformulation is the doctrine of justification and sanctification, which ascribes to 
women both freedom and form.  
In the instance where women experience oppression, flourishing is negated (Jones, 2002:56). The 
feminist critical lens applied to doctrine is by way of deduction also applied to happiness. Serene 
Jones’ use of flourishing substantiates a reading of happiness where agency is affirmed and oppression 
negated (2004a:260). Life negating circumstances include any instance where the imagination is 
disordered as a result of trauma and suffering (Jones, 2009:155). Understood in light of Serene Jones’ 
precondition for flourishing (that agency be affirmed and oppression negated), happiness becomes a 
disposition that results from a position of flourishing. This perspective is representative of the greater 
corpus of liberation theology, which seeks the emancipation of the oppressed and marginalised 
premised on a theological anthropology. 
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Ellen Charry’s construction of happiness indicates a possible shortcoming in Serene Jones’ priority 
toward the absence of oppression and the affirmation of agency. Charry describes the reason for her 
pursuit of happiness as the untimely death of her husband (2010: ix). The answer to her inquiry came 
in her consideration of the patristic tradition, doctrine and Scripture. Happiness is described in terms 
of asherism (Charry, 2003a:39). A term denoting a life of obedience lived in the presence of God, 
where mutual enjoyment between God and humanity occur (Charry, 2011a:240). As a result, creation 
flourishes and God enjoys Godself as a result.  
Ellen Charry skilfully transcends the notion of happiness present in Serene Jones’ conceptualisation, 
by situating happiness in mutual enjoyment of God and creation. Of significance is that Charry assigns 
the disposition of being happy to God as a result of human flourishing and enjoyment of creation. 
Happiness in light of her appropriation serves as a sign that reminds individuals of their participation 
in the divine, a reality that functions independent of suffering (Charry, 2006a:167). In contrast to 
Serene Jones, Ellen Charry understands a disposition of flourishing to be one where an identity is 
affirmed through obedience to a prescribed norm (1993a:273).  
One may continue with Serene Jones’ therapeutic soteriology, which underscores her theological 
motivation for flourishing. Premised on her feminist critical lens doctrine is reformulated to construct 
an alternative identity for women (Jones, 2000: 55). The means through which doctrine is re-
formulated lies in the way Jones understands the imagination. The imagination is the forum where 
daily reality and doctrine meet and influence one another. Per implication, this means that when an 
oppressive logic resides in one’s interpretation of doctrine, the way life is lived is influenced and 
flourishing is negated. It is for this very reason that doctrine is re-imagined at every instance of it 
being read (Jones, 2002:56). Jones continues to indicate how, through deep identification, the dramatic 
nature of the redemptive narrative transforms the imagination where oppression has disrupted it 
(2002:56). The process of re-imagining occurs in the participation of the onlooker in the redemptive 
drama. Jesus’ resurrection and ascension provides a dramatically different ending to the trauma and 
suffering known by its onlookers (Jones, 2002: 124).  
A new interpretive reality is introduced through the process of identification with the cross, whereby 
the imagination is re-ordered. The act of re-ordering is therapeutic for Serene Jones and exists within 
the salvific framework of the cross. Jones’s understanding of flourishing is premised on a therapeutic 
soteriology, which requires the participation of the onlooker. She uses the language of performance to 
indicate how the onlooker engages with the redemptive narrative. The individual takes part in the act 
of deep identification with the cross, a process denoting performance. As each individual takes on a 
particular role in the redemptive drama, a different identity is given to them (Jones, 2004a: 281-282). 
The alternative identity becomes the participants own, establishing transformation as the role is 
enacted (Jones, 2009:124).  
The Augustinian anxiety of habituation into virtue presents a possible dilemma in the use of the 
language of performance (Herdt, 2012b:24), as it does not distinguish between semblance and truth. 
Augustine’s concern lay at this very point, when and if performance became reality. Jennifer Herdt 
describes this Augustinian anxiety as an anxiety toward the possibility that modes of “putting on” 
virtue remained only that, a process of “putting on” that never proceeded into transformation 
(2012b:24).  
Parallel to the Augustinian anxiety, one may ask Serene Jones whether the act of performing a 
particular part is sufficient in evoking a transformation of character. Jones employs the language of 
performance to affirm the agency of women but lacks the implication for character in her 
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conceptualisation of performance. The language of performance she uses has two negative interpretive 
possibilities. The first is that acting the part in a salvific drama does not necessarily imply a 
transformation of character. The second, in the instance where transformation occurs as result of 
acting the part, reflexivity is not guaranteed. This is illustrated by Jennifer Herdt in the instance where 
a child does a good deed and is transformed by it, but does not necessarily grasp the value of the act in 
itself (2012b:30).  
Serene Jones makes an important contribution to the conversation on happiness and flourishing by 
equipping the reader with a critical lens in the analysis of the human condition. Happiness is 
conceived as a result of a position of flourishing. Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt contribute 
respectively to the position taken by Jones. Happiness in light of Ellen Charry’s appropriation must 
function independent from the lived realities of individuals. Moreover, happiness is a way of life that 
affirms one’s participation in the divine (Charry, 1993a:273). Happiness as result of flourishing in the 
case of Serene Jones is potentially short sighted, as it is dependent on an account of happiness where 
gendered constructions are negated. A context-dependent understanding of happiness is a fluid 
concept dependent on a subjective state. She alludes to the fluidity of flourishing in her statement 
(Jones, 2000:75):  
In previous chapters, I stressed the importance of having in feminist theory a bold vision of what life 
without oppression might be like- a vision I referred to as feminist theory’s “eschatological moment”… 
My opening definition of oppression invoked this vision by referring to “the flourishing of women.” As I 
have explained, this vision functions as a yardstick against which the pains of the present are measured 
and critiqued. In theories of oppression, this measurement serves as a “regulative ideal,”…Articulating 
this vision is challenging because it is always in a state of flux. Women’s flourishing means something 
different to my Tuesday-night group than it meant to the first women’s group that gathered in the church 
in 1772. 
Serene Jones’ conception of happiness accords with an emancipatory vision presented in liberation 
theologies and as such, is concerned with the flourishing of women. Jennifer Herdt in turn, within the 
context of the theological conversation, may be understood to comment on Jones’ use of the language 
of performance in which is restrictive in its conceptualisation of the role of the agent. The implication 
is that the one acting the part may not realise the transcendent value of the part being played. The act 
of partaking in the redemptive narrative establishes happiness momentarily if transformation does not 
occur. Herdt’s conception of happiness is helpful, as its emphasis falls on both the agent and the action 
being done (2012b:31-32). Happiness becomes, for Jennifer Herdt, an active presence in the agent of 
virtue whereby grace comes and transforms the individual (2012b:119). An important addition is 
made to Serene Jones’ understanding of happiness by considering the possibility that happiness may 
already be present in the lived realities of individuals.  
Serene Jones as first voice in the conversation introduces a critical disposition when talking about the 
flourishing of individuals. As a feminist theologian, she believes that theology cannot be divorced 
from the lived realities of individuals. Instead, a feminist critical position challenges any construction 
of happiness that does not take suffering and trauma into consideration. Jones’ voice inaugurates a 
discussion of happiness that is deeply critical of the shaping potential of doctrine and Scripture. 
Ellen Charry, as a female theologian with a pastoral intent, contributes to the theme of God and 
happiness by negating the theological gap between goodness and pleasure. Charry’s emphasis falls on 
the concrete practices implicated in the notion of asherism (1997a:5). As second voice in the 
conversation, she transitions from Serene Jones’ feminist critical lens toward a form of happiness that 
has God and creation enjoy another. By implicating God’s enjoyment and happiness in human 
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conceptions of happiness, a transcendent dimension is given to happiness. In addition, happiness no 
longer pertains only to the self but always to the self in relation to God. Knowledge of God extends 
beyond identification to a form of knowing that is transformational in character.  
The particularity of Christian happiness is established by Ellen Charry, who understands participation 
in the divine to be salvific (2006a:167). An asherist disposition is one where participation in the 
divine grounds an individual in the goodness and truth of God, as well as the greater community of 
faith (Charry, 2010: 193). The normative framework for a happy life is found in the act of obedience 
exemplified in the Old Testament and New Testament (Charry, 2010: 193-194). The condition for 
being ashrey functions independent from life’s circumstances and symbolises a state of being that 
finds its source outside of human reality. A certain security is harboured in this perspective, where the 
precondition for the flourishing of an individual is found solely in relation to God. Obedience 
becomes a means of affirming one’s existence in God, as well as participating in the divine. Ellen 
Charry describes the dynamic of obedience presented in the Pentateuch (2010:193-194): 
From these texts it is reasonable to conclude that the Pentateuch understands Israel’s thriving as its 
happiness: happiness is enjoying and celebrating a productive and fulfilling life in obedience to the terms 
of the covenant with God to which Israel agreed at Sinai. Socializing legislation discloses values and 
virtues that are to be understood dynamically and applied liberally in situations.  
Participation in the divine is salvific because an individual’s identity is affirmed in God’s image 
(Charry, 2010:159-160). In the Old Testament, soteriology is therapeutic in the restoration of the 
image of God in humans (Charry, 1997a:99) and in the New Testament, Christians come to know God 
in an unique way by imitating the way of life set out by Christ (Charry, 2010:241). The knowledge 
gained through obedience transforms an individual internally evoking an ashrey disposition.  
A similar theme rings true in Jennifer Herdt’s understanding of participation in the divine. Premised 
on an understanding that grace facilitates the transformation from semblance to virtue, participation in 
God by means of grace (2012b:119), assigns transcendent value to the present. Reflexivity toward 
virtue as means of participating in the divine consequently evokes a form of happiness that cannot be 
reduced or nullified. Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt concur in the position that happiness, when 
understood as affirming relation to God, addresses humanity in a radically different way.  
A word of caution might be signalled by Serene Jones in Ellen Charry’s use of the language of 
obedience. In the past, language of obedience has been a primary perpetrator of oppression and 
violence, especially in light of biblical interpretations of gendered roles such as the household codes 
(Ephesians 5). In addition, talk of obedience necessarily implied submission, a state where the agency 
of women was negated. A feminist critical disposition cautions the reader to the possible oppressive 
logic present in the notion of obedience to a prescribed norm. Charry’s account does not take the 
possible critique levelled by feminists into consideration and falls prey to sweeping statements 
concerning commandments that were outright oppressive to women. Despite the potential pitfall, 
Ellen Charry’s understanding of obedience seeks to promote a sustainable account of happiness.  
Serene Jones provides the tools by which this possible oppressive logic may be negated. The first 
entails a critical disposition toward the scope and nature of obedience prescribed by Ellen Charry 
(Jones, 2001c: 299). The second asks how one may conceptualise obedience in order to avoid an 
image of God that reinforces oppression (Jones, 2001c:302). A re-formulation is needed that has the 
agency of women in mind. The doctrine of justification and sanctification, with its affirmation of 
freedom and form (Jones, 2000:63), may serve as useful paradigm to assign agency to women. Grace 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
establishes a forum that contains the identity and agency of women, while providing her with freedom 
to construct her identity in relation to God and the community (Jones, 2000:64).  
A possible solution for Ellen Charry’s account would be to consider the moral shaping function of 
reverent obedience to God that affirms the agency of women (2010: xii). A salutary reading of 
obedience enables the reader to avoid a harsh juridical understanding of God’s relation with creation. 
Instead, the moral shaping function of obedience serves to transform character, which establishes a 
happy disposition (Charry, 1992:33). Obedience as morally shaping entity consequently invigorates an 
understanding of happiness in its claim to transform character. 
A parallel is wrought by Jennifer Herdt, who understands reflexivity to be a means of habituation into 
virtue. Habituation into virtue takes place as an individual imitates the divine exemplar set by Christ 
(Whichcote, 2010:284 in Herdt, 2012b:119). The transformation of character progressively 
inaugurates an individual into relation with God (Herdt, 2012b:119). Herdt accordingly takes the 
position of reflexivity further by suggesting that daily acts of virtue may initiate the agent into 
salvation (2012b:119) through grace. In this way, salvation is not an instantaneous rebirth, but is 
rather progressively pre-empted in the daily acts individuals partake in (Herdt, 2012b: 350). 
Ellen Charry’s contribution to happiness is substantial in its ability to account for knowledge of God 
and the pastoral intent of Scripture. In this way, individuals come to enjoy God as they partake in the 
normative framework established in Scripture. One may perhaps probe Charry’s contribution further 
by inquiring whether asherism, firstly, takes into consideration how happiness functions outside of the 
Christian framework and secondly, whether the happiness experienced by contributing to the common 
good is a possible means by which individuals are brought into relation with God, a possibility that 
Jennifer Herdt takes into consideration.  
Charry as second voice in the conversation is meaningful as an extra dimension is added to Serene 
Jones’ particular portrayal. Ellen Charry’s consideration of happiness as a mother, female theologian 
and one who writes from past positions of suffering indicates how happiness cannot exist without a 
reference to the divine. Through obedience, self-love is enabled, whereby an individual may embrace 
their position before God (Charry, 2010: 157). As knowledge of God is attained through obedience, 
Christians establish an understanding of happiness that is orientated toward God and creation. In the 
act of obeying God’s commandments, a standard of living is erected that reflects God’s will for human 
flourishing (Charry, 2010: 161). An asherist life reflects happiness through a prescribed norm of 
living that enables Christians to secure their happiness in the enjoyment of God (Charry, 2006a:157). 
Ellen Charry’s account serves as remedy to the divide between goodness and happiness erected by 
modernity.  
Jennifer Herdt illustrates a similar awareness to the separation of virtue from its religious moorings 
when thinking of happiness. Instead of speaking of a particular knowledge of God like Ellen Charry, 
she allows the Augustinian anxiety of acquired virtue to lead her to an account of virtue that affirms 
the agency of individuals (Herdt, 2012b:3). Jennifer Herdt probes further by asking in what ways 
virtuous action performed pre-empts God’s will for humanity and creation to flourish. 
Herdt considers in her account the possibility that knowledge of God is implicated in virtuous actions. 
Knowledge of God is the means through which God initiates human beings into relation with Godself. 
Grace is indistinguishable from this process, as grace is the means by which humans will eventually 
come to be transformed by their knowledge of God (Herdt, 2012b: 47). In the instance where 
individuals unknowingly imitate Christ by acting virtuously, a seed of happiness is sown that extends 
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beyond the emotion experienced to a transcendent knowledge of God. Secular virtues remain secular 
however, if the agent is not progressively assimilated to Christ (Herdt, 2012b: 47).  
Happiness does not come as result of knowing God first, as Ellen Charry and Serene Jones asserts, but 
by acting virtuously. Happiness experienced when contributing to the common good, introduces an 
individual into relation with God. In this manner, acting virtuously might initially be a semblance but 
extends to a deeper knowledge of the act itself by locating it in God (Herdt, 2012b: 47). Happiness 
and virtue is given substantial meaning by assigning to it more than obedience to God’s 
commandments as norm for living. Virtuous acting becomes a sign and promise of God’s will for 
creation to flourish.  
In the midst of the false divide Ellen Charry seeks to re-establish a link between the simultaneous 
presence of goodness and God in an individual’s life. Goodness occurs in an individual when God’s 
commandments are obeyed. Charry’s solution to the divide is to introduce God as initiator of the 
goodness that must be accomplished in an individual’s life. The process may be likened to a top-down 
approach, where God inspires goodness by ascribing a set of norms for individual’s to live by. 
Goodness is a result of obedience to God’s initiative in presenting a reality that might be happy for 
individuals.  
An aspect which has not been taken into consideration by Ellen Charry is morality; how morality may 
be an indicator of God’s initiative to reconcile humanity to Godself through goodness. Jennifer Herdt 
reformulates the divide by distinguishing it as a divide between morality and truth. Theologians 
became sceptical of morality in the sixteenth century, when rationality asserted truth to be valid if its 
premise was logically verifiable (Herdt, 2001b:148). The effect of logical verifiability as prerequisite 
for morality was a shift away from its religious moorings. Truth that made a particular claim about 
God’s role in humankind was made irrelevant for the workings of morality as means by which God 
initiates humanity into relationship with Godself.  
Jennifer Herdt turns to Nichomachean Ethics and the notion of habituation into virtue to indicate how 
virtue is a means by which God systematically initiates individuals into relation with Godself. 
Morality as a separate entity from the truth of God is indicated to be a false dichotomy, as habituation 
into virtue is a premature realisation of God’s truth in the life of an individual. Individuals imitate 
Christ, who has set a divine example. Gradual assimilation to Christ is enabled by grace, which brings 
an agent in relation with God. As an individual experiences happiness through acting virtuously, a 
foretaste is given of relation with God.  
In light of Ellen Charry’s reconciliation of goodness and God, Jennifer Herdt’s appropriation probes 
further than Charry’s, by asking how God is already at work in the lives of individuals who experience 
happiness. Unlike Charry, Herdt seems to reason that happiness through virtuous acting, irrespective if 
it is experienced by a Christian or a non-Christian, is a legitimate form of happiness. Individuals may 
consequently experience the goodness of participation in God without realising it. The process 
through which individuals finally come to know the source of their happiness is by means of grace 
(Herdt, 2012b:55).  
Happiness in Jennifer Herdt’s account is not identified as an external state that comes to bear in an 
individual when a particular knowledge is acquired. Instead, happiness is already present in the virtues 
individuals partake in.  
The differences in approach emphasise different means of understanding happiness and the role of 
salvation therein. Ellen Charry’s approach presupposes that happiness is experienced when life is 
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lived in reverent obedience to God. The problem inherent in this logic is the presence of happiness in 
individuals who do not subscribe to God’s commandments. The happiness experienced by individuals 
who are not Christian threatens to render Charry’s conception of happiness void. If happiness 
experienced by individuals may be legitimate in itself, God as origin of happiness becomes a viable 
option. Jennifer Herdt affirms this notion through Hauerwas128, who places the emphasis on the agent 
instead of the action itself (Hauerwas in Herdt, 2012a:207). When the happiness experienced on earth 
serves as foretaste of the reality presented in salvation, happiness transforms the individual and brings 
them into relation with God. The particular formulation of happiness is salvific in nature. 
Ellen Charry as second voice in the conversation provides an additional perspective to Serene Jones’ 
affirmation of graced agency and the negation of oppression. Happiness understood soteriologically 
provides a forum wherein an asherist life finds its expression. Happiness is consequently a result of 
living life excellently, whereby knowledge of God evokes enjoyment of God and life. Serene Jones 
may be depicted as having the last word with Ellen Charry. As a feminist theologian, Jones may be 
depicted as asking to what extent the happiness depicted by Ellen Charry allows women to identify 
positively with happiness.  
The impact Ellen Charry’s construction of happiness has on female readers might be established by 
asking whether gender specific roles are assigned to happiness. It may also be asked whether the 
language used by Ellen Charry is in any way restrictive to the agency of women. Ellen Charry’s 
motivation behind an asherist life is the practicing of God’s commandments in order to enable both 
the self and creation to flourish. A potential difficulty might present itself in the history of reception of 
God’s commandments. Due to the presence of illegitimate interpretations of God’s commandments, 
women have been disadvantaged in the past, an interpretive possibility Ellen Charry does not seem to 
have taken into consideration. Happiness in the hands of a gender insensitive interpretation of God’s 
commandments may as a result evoke an understanding of happiness that reinforces life-negating 
circumstances.  
A possible answer to the dilemma might come in the universal scope given to the reading of God’s 
commandments. Ellen Charry’s approach identifies the reader as autonomous, independent of 
gendered constructions of women’s nature. The approach however, lacks a consideration of the 
context of the implied audience. In this instance, a woman deconstructed by marginalisation, 
exploitation, violence, cultural imperialism and powerlessness, does not have the same appreciation 
for God’s commandments when it has in some instances encouraged her oppression (Young in Jones, 
2000:80). 
One might ask how Serene Jones’ re-imagining of the Reformed tradition may serve as resource for 
thinking about happiness. A possible answer comes in Ellen Charry’s emphasis on the pastoral 
function of Christian doctrine. Christian doctrine established through Scripture serves for Ellen Charry 
as the framework wherein knowledge of God should evoke healing in the recipient of that knowledge. 
Knowledge of God attained through commandments is thus to have a salutary effect (Charry, 
1998b:379). The feminist critical precondition that all claims made to the lives of women be 
emancipatory is affirmed in Ellen Charry’s understanding of knowledge of God as salutary. Happiness 
as marked by both a salutary way of knowing God and therapeutic soteriology re-imagines the identity 
of women by affirming their agency.  
                                                     
128 Jennifer Herdt’s affirmation of Hauerwas is premised on his book, Character and the Christian Life which 
she references as follows: “Hauerwas, Stanley. 1985. Character and the Christian Life. 2nd edition. San Antonio, 
Tex: Trinity University Press.” (2012a:225).  
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The account established through a pastoral approach to happiness does not have the same liberative 
tone to it as Serene Jones’ understanding of flourishing has. Despite the difference in emphases, 
Charry’s construction of happiness does portray a priority toward the human condition. At another 
level, one would want to dismantle the scope of suffering indicated by Ellen Charry. For instance, if a 
woman experienced oppression in the form of domestic violence, happiness as a way of life would be 
an irreconcilable approach to the injustice being done to a female.  
A solution is required that affirms the agency of women; one that does not rely on obedience as means 
to obtain knowledge of God. It may be asked whether Ellen Charry’s account of suffering is restricted 
to a certain type of suffering, such as the loss of a loved one, in contrast to suffering that takes life-
negating circumstances into consideration. In the case of the former, happiness as means of living life 
excellently enables an individual to situate their suffering in light of a greater account of the good life. 
In the case of the latter, happiness as way of life restricts the liberative agenda present in an account of 
human flourishing.  
Ellen Charry’s contribution to the conversation on happiness lies in her consideration that God seeks 
the flourishing of creation so that God may enjoy creation and creation God.  
In the conversation with happiness, Jennifer Herdt introduces a different approach to that of Serene 
Jones and Ellen Charry, premised on the Augustinian anxiety of acquired virtue (2012b:24). In the 
process of recollecting ways of thinking about virtue, she negates the presupposition that salvation is a 
singular event whereby the transformation of character and happiness occurs as result (Herdt, 2012b: 
350). Herdt rather alludes to the progressive transformation into salvation through the working of 
grace in virtue (2012b: 9). Through the voice of Aquinas, Jennifer Herdt highlights the potentiality of 
acquired virtue to order an individual toward God (2012b: 9). For Aquinas, grace enables human 
agency, whereby virtue is a gift from God. Erasmus adds to the equation by suggesting that salvation 
is not an instantaneous surge, but rather a progression toward the perfection of salvation in an 
individual through conformation to Christ (Herdt, 2012b:76). Human agency is chastened by imitation 
of Christ and thereafter assimilated to God (Herdt, 2012b:178). 
In her consideration of agency and autonomy, Jennifer Herdt makes room for God’s initiative to 
inaugurate an individual into salvation through virtue. Happiness is not founded on salvation as its 
prerequisite, but rather culminates as an expression of God’s initiative to be in relation with humanity. 
The happiness experienced on earth is intrinsic to virtue as assimilation to Christ takes place. Herdt’s 
account of happiness is never complete in and of itself, for it is dependent on a realisation that virtues 
enacted are valuable in themselves as representation of human participation in God (1999:47, 50).  
The act of conforming to Christ is an effective means of bridging the danger Ellen Charry falls prey to 
in her emphasis on obedience. Conforming to Christ does not imply a standardised set of principles 
that must be upheld. To the contrary, conformity presupposes a creative space wherein the example set 
provides a unique forum for agency to be affirmed. The creative space of re-imagining conformity to 
Christ’s exemplarity alludes to the hermeneutical strategy illustrated by Serene Jones. Conformity to 
Christ consequently enhances the agency of women, which negates an oppressive logic.  
A perspective that the feminist theological lens does bring under scrutiny is Jennifer Herdt’s 
recollection of virtue without taking into consideration how the notion of virtue has in the past served 
to construct the identity of women. For instance, women in the past were assigned the label of 
“virtuous” if they kept the household in order and did all the duties that were required of them. A 
woman may be designated as virtuous even when she practices virtues that negate her agency, a form 
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of oppression Serene Jones describes as marginalisation. Marginalisation occurs both in the context of 
the household, as well as the corporate arena (Jones, 2008: 81, 83).  
A deep irony marks the account of women who sought to affirm their agency, as they were 
characterised as being “un-submissive,” “rebellious” and “deviant.” The possible critique levelled by 
Serene Jones is unanswerable in the scope of Jenifer Herdt’s recollection of virtue in light of 
happiness. One might also say that the normative framework utilised by Herdt when recollecting the 
Augustinian anxiety is incompatible with the possible critique. Her emphasis lies not in the virtues 
assigned to women and men respectively and their function within that context, but rather in the 
possibility of secular virtues to initiate an individual into relation with God through grace. The 
difference in approach lies in the distinctive emphases of virtue as potentially restrictive to women’s 
agency and the possibility of virtue to affirm human agency and freedom.  
The language of performance utilised by Jennifer Herdt attests to the emphasis on freedom and agency 
in consideration of virtue. Righteousness is given to an individual in the act of imitating Christ (Herdt, 
2012b: 180). Herdt alludes to Erasmus: “For Erasmus, the exercise of human agency involved in the 
imitation of Christ is at the same time an indwelling of Christ in us and thus a human participation in 
divine agency” (2012b: 119). The agencies of women are affirmed in their unique expression of virtue 
as imitation of Christ. The consequent part an individual assumes serves not to diminish agency, but 
rather to enhance it through participation in the divine.  
In light of the possible critique posed at virtue, virtue assumes a transcendent value inaugurated by the 
freedom presented in Christ. Jennifer Herdt continues to describe the church as a community of 
believers whose practices shape the Christian character of virtue (2012a:215). In this context, the 
Augustinian anxiety recedes.  
The description of virtue as a gift from God (Herdt, 2012b:57) allows Jennifer Herdt to delve further 
into the distinctiveness of virtue moulded by the practices of the community of faith. In her opinion, 
the Aristotelian emphasis on habituation into virtue illustrates how training in virtue occurs (Hauerwas 
& Pinches, 1997 in Herdt, 2012a:215). A parallel exists between Aristotelian habituation and the 
progressive transformation that takes place when Christ is imitated. Virtue as gift (Herdt, 2012b:57) 
breaks free from the secular designation Augustine was weary of, yet does not eliminate God’s 
initiative to inaugurate an individual into participation with God.  
Jennifer Herdt’s contribution to the conversation with happiness lies in the attempt to shift the 
emphasis of happiness from consisting in the process by which virtue is acquired to the role of virtue 
in enabling humanity to participate more fully in God. The act of participation in God enables 
individuals to contribute to the community of faith through its liturgy and practice, which evokes a 
sense of happiness. In addition, as secular virtues are utilised to initiate participation in the divine, 
happiness is experienced. Jennifer Herdt’s recollection of virtue presents to the conversation an 
approach that is distinctive from a feminist theological and pastoral perspective.  
One may delineate Jennifer Herdt’s process of reasoning as beginning with secular virtue and ending 
with an understanding of mimetic virtue that is by nature the realisation of happiness on earth 
(2012b:ix). She begins with the anxiety toward habituation into virtue as pretext for a consideration of 
participation in God as established through virtue. In the Aristotelian sense, happiness reached its 
climax when habituation into virtue took place (Herdt, 2012b:23). Herdt moves beyond this position 
by invoking Aquinas and Erasmus’ theatrical understanding of virtue (2012b:61). Erasmus and 
Aquinas understood earthly virtue as an opportunity to direct humans toward God. Jennifer Herdt 
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describes virtue by means of grace as a gradual realisation of assimilation to God. When individuals 
are assimilated to God, virtue as gift is emphasised by affirming the agency and freedom of an 
individual (Herdt, 2012b:57). Christian virtues that are established through the practices of the church 
consequently become an alternative reality to which Christians conform.  
Serene Jones, Ellen Charry and Jennifer Herdt contribute to the conversation on God and human 
flourishing by establishing an account of happiness that takes the agency of women and the role of 
grace in bringing individuals into relation with Godself into consideration. Relation with God is not 
understood as a momentary event but a progressive assimilation to Christ through identification with 
the Christian redemptive narrative. Identification with Christ establishes habits of thought that 
transform character and the way life is lived. Human flourishing is described in such an account as an 
uncommodified rendition of happiness, where happiness marks the way one’s identity is constituted in 
Christ and the effect such a constituted identity has on the way life is lived.   
5.5 Conclusion 
In light of the research consideration which understood the God and Human Flourishing 
Consultations, 2007 to 2013, as an indication of a growing theological conversation on God and 
human flourishing, three female voices have been presented. From Serene Jones, one learns that 
relation to God is understood to affirm the role of women as autonomous beings. From Ellen Charry, 
one hears that relation to God is understood to be constituted through an excellent way of living life. 
From Jennifer Herdt, one is told that relation to God is understood to be inaugurated by grace through 
virtuous action.  
Serene Jones, as a feminist theologian, presents to the reader an understanding of flourishing as 
“graced agency.” In her sensitivity to the way gendered roles are often assigned to women, she 
delineates the way women relate to God by affirming the enfolding presence of grace. Grace assigns 
to women both freedom and form, as represented in the doctrine of justification and sanctification. 
When women are given a “graced agency”, they understand their relation to God in a distinctively 
different way than when in oppressive circumstances. Co-optation in the redemptive narrative through 
grace establish habits of thought that transform the way women come to understand their relation with 
God. Habits of thought that affirm the “graced agency” of women enable a flourishing disposition. 
Serene Jones consequently affirms that women flourish when their habits of thought are in accordance 
with their “graced agency.” 
Ellen Charry, as a female theologian who is concerned with the pastoral intent of knowledge of God, 
seeks to reunite goodness and happiness as a means of relating to God. When individuals partake in 
God’s commandments, the way of life prescribed by the Old – and New Testaments convey 
knowledge of God that is intended to transform the agent. A life lived excellently is pleasing both to 
the agent and to God. Charry understands human relation to God to be a means by which humans 
come to enjoy God and God creation. Relation to God, marked by mutual enjoyment of God and 
creation, describes a flourishing disposition in her opinion. Happiness results when individuals live 
life excellently, knowing that a flourishing disposition is pleasing to God.  
Jennifer Herdt, as a virtue ethicist, grounds relation to God in the imitation of Christ’s divine 
exemplar. In the act of imitation, grace assimilates an individual to Christ, enabling participation in 
the divine. Relation to God as participation in the divine occurs progressively, as individuals conform 
through virtue to Christ’s exemplar. Herdt shifts the emphasis from talk of virtue to talk of the role of 
the agent of virtue. As individuals contribute to the common good by means of virtues, grace brings 
humans into relation with God. Her account of flourishing rests on two distinct moments. The first 
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moment underscores the role of the agent in contributing to the common good by means of virtues. 
When individuals contribute to the common good, happiness is experienced. Jennifer Herdt does not 
distinguish between the “legitimacy” of the account of happiness given when understood in light of 
virtue. The second moment understands flourishing as the moment where individuals are 
progressively brought into relation with God through grace.  
In order to understand the rationale of the three female voices five processes are identified which 
describe how the human relation to God is understood to be reason for human flourishing. By 
identifying five processes present in each contribution the nuances and differences are emphasised. 
The five processes illustrates how each theological contribution seeks to delineate a “graced agency,” 
“happiness” and “virtue” in light of God’s relation to creation. The five processes are: (1) the 
identification of an unsatisfactory disposition or dilemma that is characteristically insufficient in 
describing a preferred norm. (2) A description of the implications of such a dilemma followed while 
suggesting an alternative. (3) Establishing the preconditions for an alternative, (4) was accompanied 
by an exposition of the suggested alternatives. (5) The appropriation of the alternative to the desired 
norm.  
Serene Jones used the language of performance to denote how identification and relation is made 
possible. Ellen Charry believes obedience to God’s commandments to be the norm that enables an 
excellent and enjoyable life before God. Jennifer Herdt used the language of imitation to show how 
individuals are gradually transformed when they are brought into relation with God. A flourishing 
disposition is accordingly understood as one where the agency of women is affirmed, where an 
excellent life is enjoyable to humans and God and where an individual is brought into relation with 
God through grace.  
A variegated reading of human happiness and flourishing, where the nuances and differences are 
identified in each theological contribution, has been illustrated in a reading of Serene Jones, Ellen 
Charry and Jennifer Herdt. Serene Jones’s priority for the agency of women underscores the feminist 
critical lens with which the notion of flourishing is understood. Jones’ concern lies with doctrines that 
negate the flourishing of women by providing them with patterns of thought that are contrary to God’s 
will that creation flourish. The result is an emphasis on flourishing that takes how relation to God is to 
affirm the freedom and form of women into consideration. Ellen Charry’s emphasis falls on the extent 
to which goodness should be simultaneously affirmed with happiness. When goodness and happiness 
are not understood to be unified, an account of human flourishing is impoverished. An account of 
happiness is given substance when the way life is lived excellently is understood to bring enjoyment 
to God. Jennifer Herdt is concerned with the divorce of morality from its religious moorings. The 
divide between religion and morality shifted the emphasis from talk of the agent to talk of virtue. 
Herdt deems this unsatisfactory, as virtuous action was no longer understood to be the forum wherein 
grace progressively initiates the agent into relation with God. Jennifer Herdt uses the language of 
liturgies to establish a new rendition of virtue and agency. Through Christian liturgies, individuals 
come to partake in the Christian virtues. Christian virtues do not function separately from “secular” 
virtues, but rather contribute to the process of being assimilated to Christ.  
A converging conversation has sought to show how each perspective is valid in its own right and is a 
means by which accounts of flourishing and happiness may be challenged and critiqued. Serene Jones 
could be imagined to critique Ellen Charry’s use of the language of obedience, which may negate the 
agency of women. Jennifer Herdt’s use of the language of virtue was challenged as it harbours the 
possibility of reinforcing the marginalisation of women. The Augustinian anxiety of acquired virtue 
drew the attention of the reader to the potential of performances to remain semblances. Ellen Charry 
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similarly challenged a rendition of flourishing that did not have the transformation of character as a 
priority in a reading of “graced agency.” Forms of knowing God should therefore enable a flourishing 
disposition as way of life.  
With regards to the growing conversation on God and human flourishing, three female voices have 
been presented as possible conversation partners where each voice was allowed to speak in its own 
right. A richly textured account of human flourishing has come to the fore where grace, happiness and 
virtue have been unpacked conceptually. The richly textured account affirms the notion that human 
flourishing is deeply contextual and embodied. For this reason, further research and conceptualisation 
is encouraged in order to investigate theology’s engagement with happiness and human flourishing.  
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